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Abstract
This dissertation probes the origins of intercultural conflict and regional disparity 
in the circumpolar North. The dissertation asserts that the national governments of 
Denmark, the United States and Canada have utilized policies of internal colonialism 
in Alaska, Greenland and the Yukon Territory, and that those policies have shaped inter­
cultural relations and contributed to regional disparities in their northern jurisdictions. 
Michael Hecther’s and Dale Johnson’s definitions of internal colonialism are utilized for 
the purposes of this study.
The dissertation uses a comparative case study approach, reviewing how national 
government policies evolved and were applied in Alaska, Yukon and Greenland. It 
treats Alaska and the Yukon as similar cases, while Greenland is examined in a separate 
chapter as a dissimilar case.
The dissertation provides an historical analysis and comparison of national 
policies towards aboriginal peoples, and shows how those policies were applied 
differently in Alaska and the Yukon than they were in the southern United States and 
Canada. These policies exacerbated conflict between the aboriginal and non-aboriginal 
populations due to the cultural division of labor that was created. The dissertation then 
examines the impact of federal policies on the economic development of Alaska and the 
Yukon. Thirdly, the dissertation examines the history of constitutional change, and 
compares the struggle for Alaska statehood with efforts to achieve provincial status 
for the Yukon.
The dissertation concludes that policies of internal colonialism have been
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
detrimental to the social and economic well-being northern peoples, but that responses to 
these policies have generated creative new approaches and agreements.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the roots of conflict in modem 
northern societies. The premise of this dissertation is that modem social conflicts in 
the North have their roots in national policies of internal colonialism, that continue in 
large measure to this day. These policies have divided northern communities along 
racial lines, and have obstructed efforts to build strong local economies. National 
policies, combined with exploitation by national and transnational corporations, have 
impeded northern development. At the same time, many northern economies depend 
on national government expenditures for generating economic activity in their region.
A variety of events in recent decades, beginning in the late 1950s, have slowly 
begun to shift more power for resolving conflicts into the hands of northerners: the 
granting of statehood and Home Rule to Alaska and Greenland; the settlement of land 
claims in Alaska and parts of the Canadian North; the development of oil and gas 
resources in Alaska; and the devolution of powers to some local governments, 
represent some of these changes. At the same time, some conflicts have become more 
acute and complex, or have defied resolution: the impasse over subsistence hunting 
and fishing in Alaska; the stalled negotiations on Kaska land claims in the Yukon; the 
rise of separatism amongst some Saami in Finland.
Thus, a central dynamic of northern societies involves the relationships 
between the aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples, how their rights are defined and 
exercised, and the conflicts between them. Kenneth Coates has argued that the reality
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of the North can best be understood in terms of “struggles.”1 While this statement can 
be applied to any region, it does suggest that an exploration of various forms of 
conflict may provide useful insights into the unique social characteristics of a region. 
One set of struggles he highlights involves the struggle between indigenous and non- 
indigenous peoples:
Scholars and public observers have often drawn attention to 
the dissonance between indigenous and newcomer perceptions 
of place. In Canada, the phrase “Homeland or Hinterland” has 
come to symbolize the simple reality that indigenous and non- 
indigenous people conceptualize the land and therefore their futures 
in the region in strikingly different ways. This tension remains a 
core element in the struggle for control of the North.2
This dissertation will examine the relationship between the aboriginal and 
non-aboriginal peoples of Alaska, Greenland, and the Yukon Territory, in the context 
of their struggle for stronger constitutional recognition and constitutional rights.
These rights are, for the most part, granted or determined by national governments, 
and it is the role of national governments that is the focus of this dissertation.
This will be a study of land claims and devolution -  the transfer of powers 
from national governments to regional governments, and the conflict between 
conceptions of how those powers should be apportioned between aboriginal and non­
aboriginal populations. The struggle for empowerment by northern indigenous
1 Kenneth Coates, “The Discovery o f the North: Towards a Conceptual Framework for the Study o f
2
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peoples through land claims, and the struggle for statehood and provincial status by 
non-indigenous peoples, are parallel processes, as noted by Colorado University law 
professor, Charles F. Wilkinson:
Indian treaty negotiations are parallel in concept to 
negotiations with representatives of prospective states 
over statehood. Both kinds of transactions sought to 
resolve territorial boundaries, land ownership, and 
governmental authority. A statehood act is “ a ‘solemn 
agreement’ which in some ways maybe analogized to 
a contract.” A treaty between the United States and an 
Indian tribe “is essentially a contract between two sov­
ereign nations.”3
Gurston Dacks has noted that, “Nowhere do the conflicts within northern 
society and between North and South make themselves more acutely felt than in the 
issue of native claims.”4 And, Oran R. Young suggests that:
The recent experience of the Arctic offers a variety of 
fascinating cases worthy of close examination by those 
interested in the links between the exercise of political 
authority and the availability of secure sources of public
Northern/Remote Regions,” The Northern Review, No. 12/13, 1994, pp. 37-38.
2 Kenneth Coates, 1994, p. 38.
3 Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law, New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1987, p. 102. Internal quotation from P. Gates, History o f  Public Land Law Development, 1968.
4 Gurston Dacks, A Choice o f  Futures: Politics in the Canadian North, Toronto: Methuen Publications, 
1981, p. 50.
3
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funding.
The story of devolution in the Arctic is complicated ... by 
concerted efforts to advance the cause of tribal sovereignty 
in some parts of the region, a movement that, in some ways, 
runs counter to the conventional pattern of devolution .. ,.5
Linked to the issue of political devolution is the issue of economic 
development and resource transfers. Oran Young stated it best when he wrote: 
Somewhat more enlightened policies toward the communit­
ies of the Far North feature efforts to promote political 
autonomy through the establishment of home rule arrange­
ments. But such policies become shams when they are not 
accompanied by serious efforts to provide a reasonable basis 
for economic self-sufficiency and when home rule is coupled 
with arrangements that ensure a continuation of de facto 
economic dependence. The results are even worse when the 
idea of promoting political autonomy is combined with 
continuing outside control over the principal resources of 
the communities.6
Around the circumpolar North, aboriginal peoples and subnational 
governments are seeking sources of funds for economic development initiatives that 
will provide employment and independence. Unfortunately, they often seek these
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5resources in competition with each other. Oran Young notes that tribal governments 
and public governments will compete for the same sources of revenues, and that the 
results of this competition are decidedly unclear.7
Another piece of this puzzle relates to the role national governments play in 
aggravating or mitigating the impact of international forces on local and regional 
communities in the North. The relationship between national governments, sub­
national governments, and aboriginal entities (governments, associations, tribes, and 
bands) is depicted in Figure 1. This figure places the relationship within the national 
and international arenas to demonstrate the linkages that exist and the influences that 
impact the processes of conflict resolution and constitutional change. National and 
international events may limit or expand opportunities for court challenges, 
negotiations, and legislative change as outlined later in this chapter. Similarly, the 
consequences of negotiations or other local processes may have an impact on other 
groups and processes at the national and international level.
The Comparative Approach
The comparative approach to studying northern political development appears 
to be most appropriate. This is a study of northern peoples, both aboriginal and non­
aboriginal, seeking political power and economic development, and comparative 
studies in the past have focused on these types of issues. As noted by premier 
comparativist David Apter:
5 Oran R. Young, Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North, London: 
University Press o f England, 1992, p. 20.
6 Oran Young, 1992, p. 51.
7 Oran Young, 1992, p. 20.
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6International Arena
Figure 1 
Context Diagram
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7From the start, comparing has been a particular way of 
connecting ideas derived from political philosophy and 
theory to political events and phenomena. The primary 
emphasis is on power. The purpose is to determine what 
difference differences make between the ways power can 
be deployed -  not power in general ... but as organized in 
political systems and generated at national and subnational 
levels. Interpreting the significance of differences in the uses 
and allocations of power by different political systems is the 
common enterprise underlying various alternative approaches
o
to comparative politics.
Many comparative studies since the 1960’s have focused on development 
issues in the developing world, including decolonization, democratization, economic 
development and political development.9 These studies laid the groundwork for 
understanding the impacts of modernization on rural populations dependent on
8 David E. Apter, “Comparative Politics, Old and New,” in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter 
Klingemann (eds.), A New Handbook o f  Political Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 
Z12.
9 Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, (eds.), The Politics o f  Developing Areas, 1960; Lucian 
W. Pye, Aspects o f  Political Development, 1966; Barrington Moore, Social Origins o f  Dictatorship 
and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making o f the Modern World, 1966; Samuel P. Huntington, 
The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 1993; Leonard Binder, et.al., Crises 
and Sequences in Political Development, 1971; Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington, (eds.) 
Understanding Political Development, 1987; Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture: 
Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, 1965; Charles Tilly, (ed.), The Formation o f  
National States in Western Europe, 1975; Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing 
Societies, 1968; J.A. Raffaele, The Economic Development o f  Nations, 1971.
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subsistence agriculture (peasant societies), and the importance of these populations in 
effecting radical social change.10
This study compares and contrasts two jurisdictions with the Yukon Territory. 
Alaska was selected as a jurisdiction that was “relatively similar” to the Yukon, 
especially in its territorial era, and Greenland was selected as a jurisdiction that most 
clearly contrasts with the Yukon. Both jurisdictions have advanced constitutionally in 
comparison with the Yukon Territory, and it is hoped that a study of these 
jurisdictions will reveal lessons that will enhance the Yukon’s ability to advance as 
well. The details of selection are set out in the following section.
Summarizing a generation of research in comparative politics, Mattei Dogan 
and Dominique Pelassy comment that, “A comparison between ‘relatively similar’ 
countries sets out to neutralize certain differences in order to permit a better analysis 
of others.”11 They also note that, while proximity is not necessarily linked to 
similarity:
in the search for analogy the most natural approach is 
to limit the analysis to a geographical area that, in effect, 
delineates a homogenous milieu in more than one respect:
history, culture, level of development -  so many dimensions
12can be used as elements of control.
10 Barrington Moore, 1966; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis o f  
France, Russia, and China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
11 Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative 
Politics, Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1984, p. 118.
12 Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, 1984, p. 118.
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Thus, similar cases are like matched cases in experimental and control groups, 
enabling the researcher to limit the number of exogenous factors influencing the 
dependent variable.13
Dogan and Pelassy note that comparativists sometimes “try to find analogies 
in contrasting political systems. But comparison will always be made at the point 
where the analogy cuts across the contrast.”14 While Greenland is very different from 
the Yukon and Alaska, its aboriginal population also has numerous social problems 
that are similar to those found among the indigenous peoples of Alaska and northern 
Canada. Furthermore, the Greenlandic economy is highly dependent on natural 
resources and transfer payments from Denmark. This suggests that there is a common 
causal factor that links the problems of modem Greenland with those of the Yukon 
and Alaska, despite the numerous differences that are evident.
The Choice of Case Studies
The Yukon and Alaska share a great deal in terms of history and geography. 
They are, of course, in close proximity to each other, and events in one have had 
profound influences on the other. Indeed, the boundary between them was for many 
years ignored, especially by aboriginal peoples whose kinship relations spanned the 
border. The exact location of the boundary was not surveyed until 1912, some 45 
years after Alaska came under the jurisdiction of the United States, and prior to that,
9
13 Gerald McBeath, pers. comm., 2002.
14 Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, 1984, p. 127.
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10
aboriginal peoples, fur traders and prospectors all traveled relatively freely within the 
region, although there was friction related to the boundary dispute.15
Alaska and the Yukon were both opened to exploration as a result of the fur 
trade and prospecting, and impetus for settlement came about as a result of the 
Klondike gold rush, from 1896 to 1899. Canadian authorities were so concerned 
about the influx of Americans during the gold rush that they mobilized a special 
military unit, the Yukon Field Force, to provide support to the Royal Northwest 
Mounted Police in the region.16
The population and demographics of each jurisdiction have fluctuated with 
their boom and bust economies, which have been closely linked. The region’s fur 
bearing animals attracted early exploration and exploitation, followed by gold rushes 
that boosted development for short periods of time. Both territories lapsed into 
economic doldrums after the gold rushes, until World War II. World War II was a 
major economic “boom” that had profound impacts on both territories: population,
17infrastructure, access, and communications were all transformed.
While events in the Yukon have had impacts in Alaska, events in Alaska have 
more often had significant implications for the Yukon. For example, the discovery 
and exploitation of oil and gas in Alaska have resulted in major efforts to develop
15 Kenneth Coates and William Morrison, “Transciency in the Far Northwest after the Gold Rush: The 
Case o f the Princess Sophia,” Interpreting Canada’s North, Toronto: Copp Clark, 1989, p. 187; 
Norman Penlington, The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal, Toronto: McGraw-Hill 
Ryerson Ltd., 1972, p. 36; Melody Webb, Yukon: The Last Frontier, Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993, pp. 
242-246; Morris Zaslow, “The Yukon: Northern Development in a Canadian-American Context,” in 
Kenneth Coates and William Morrison, (eds.), Interpreting Canada’s North: Selected Readings, 
Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1989, pp. 135-136.
16 Norman Penlington, 1972, p. 36; Melody Webb, 1993, p. 168.
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pipeline proposals to transport these resources through the Yukon along the Alaska 
Highway corridor. There have also been cooperative efforts between the two 
jurisdictions in areas like wildlife management. Robert Mccandless gives several 
examples of cooperative efforts:
Alaska was another influence on Yukon wildlife policy.
The governor of Alaska was a frequent correspondent with 
the Yukon on wildlife matters because of similar geography 
and shared borders. ... in June 1919, Governor Thomas Riggs 
asked Yukon Commissioner George F. Henderson to assist 
Alaska in enforcing its closed season on beaver .... but 
he also raised the matter of the Migratory Birds Treaty and 
its unfair treatment for northern residents.... Later ... in 
1939, cooperation between the two territories was to result in 
a joint patrol of the border area on a search for violators of wolf
1 Sbounty regulations.
More recently, the two jurisdictions have cooperated on a variety of fish and 
wildlife management measures involving the Porcupine caribou herd, the Forty Mile 
caribou herd, and salmon management and enhancement in the Yukon River.
Both jurisdictions are sparsely populated, with a low population density. Both 
have large population centers (Anchorage and Whitehorse) which dominate
17 Terrence Cole and Elmer Rasmuson, Banking on Alaska: The Story o f  the National Bank o f  Alaska, 
Vol. 1, Anchorage: National Bank o f Alaska, 2000.
18 Robert G. McCandless, Yukon Wildlife: A Social History, Edmonton: The University o f  Alberta 
Press, 1985, p. 39.
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economically and politically, and a scattering of smaller municipalities spread across 
the region. Indigenous peoples made up the majority of the population of Alaska until 
World War II, and have been a minority ever since. In the Yukon, they have been a 
minority since the gold rush.19 At the same time, the large majority of indigenous 
people in the region have provided a stable population base, while non-indigenous 
peoples have been highly transient. Indigenous peoples also make up the majority of 
the population in the rural areas of the region, while non-indigenous people are 
concentrated in a few large municipalities.
Both Alaska and the Yukon have served as gateways to each other’s territory: 
the White Pass and Chilkoot trails, and the Yukon River served as transportation 
corridors to the gold fields. The White Pass and Yukon Route railway and riverboats 
became vital transportation services for both regions. Many migrants found their way 
to the interior of Alaska by taking the railway to Whitehorse and travelling down 
river, rather than making the long sea voyage to St. Michael, and then making another
90long voyage upriver from there.
In his 1969 paper contrasting the evolution of territorial governments in the 
Yukon and Alaska, Morris Zaslow noted that:
Canada and the United States followed widely contrasted 
approaches towards the settlement and development of their 
frontier territories that were reflected in the histories of
19 Terrence Cole, “Jim Crow in Alaska: The Passage of the Alaska Equal Rights Act o f 1945,” The 
Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, 1992, p. 430; Kenneth Coates, Best Left as Indians: 
Native-White Relations in the Yukon Territory, 1 8 4 0 -1 9 7 3 , Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1991, p. 74.
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their colonial dependencies along the Yukon River.. ..Those 
histories are a unique opportunity to view the two opposed 
experiments in frontier administration under almost ideal 
conditions. Most of the elements in both situations were the 
same -  the time, the physical environment, the type of settler, 
and the settler’s goals. The major variable, the contrasting 
effects of the colonial programmes of the controlling powers 
during the period of the Klondike gold rush, can readily be 
gauged. By examining this wider situation one may better 
approach the regional trait that is shared by all of Canada’s 
northern territories -  their colonial dependence upon Ottawa 
or the provincial capitals.21
Alaska and the Yukon are both products of federal systems, and both have 
been territories for most of their histories: Alaska from 1912 until 1959, and the 
Yukon has been a territory since 1898. They both had a colonial relationship with 
their respective federal governments while territories. Referring to the Canadian 
North, political scientist Gurston Dacks stated that: “The North can be studied as a 
society -  actually a set of societies -  but it can only be understood as a colony. 
Basically, a society is colonial to the extent that major decisions affecting it are made 
outside it. Colonialism is weakness and dependence.”22
20 Melody Webb, 1993, pp. 205-224.
21 Morris Zaslow, 1989, p. 134.
22 Gurston Dacks, 1981, p. 208.
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As territories, the Yukon and Alaska did not possess all the rights and 
privileges that were enjoyed by other sub-national governments (states and provinces) 
in their countries, and many decisions affecting them were made in Washington,
Seattle and Ottawa. Claus-M Naske described Alaskans’ territorial status in this way: 
As territorial residents, they could not vote in Presidential 
elections, and were represented in Congress by one voteless 
delegate. Travelers between Alaska and Seattle had to pass 
through customs, yet young Alaskan males were drafted into 
the armed forces. The executive branch of the federal 
government appointed the territorial governor, the four 
district court judges and other leading officials. Congress 
acted as a municipal government for the territory, and the 
construction of any sewer system, ball park or other civic 
improvement had to be approved by national lawmakers.
The weak territorial legislature had no role [sic] authority for 
passing any laws which might override the power of federal 
officials, and it was not allowed to manage Alaska’s lands, 
fish, fur, and game resources. In addition, any territorial
• ♦ 9-2law was subject to a Congressional veto.
Yukon residents were in similar circumstances. The Yukon government’s 
chief executive officer was a commissioner appointed by the federal cabinet.
14
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Although the Yukon had a Member of Parliament with voting privileges, it did not 
have a seat in the Senate. Judges for Yukon’s courts were federally appointed as well. 
The Yukon government had management responsibility for commissioner’s lands 
only -  a minute fraction of the land base of the territory. In Alaska and Yukon, 
federal governments owned and controlled about 99.8 percent of the land. The federal 
government owned and controlled all the Yukon’s non-renewable natural resources, 
water resources, fisheries, and forest resources on federal lands. Like Alaska, the 
Yukon government had no ability to amend the federal legislation that served as its 
written constitution, and the legislation the Yukon government passed could be 
vetoed by parliament, the federal cabinet, or the Minister of the Interior by ministerial 
directive. Furthermore, all Yukon legislation was subordinate to federal legislation.
Indigenous peoples in both Yukon and Alaska had unresolved land claims as 
treaties to surrender aboriginal title had never been negotiated.24 The federal 
governments of both Canada and the United States have a special trust or fiduciary 
relationship with the aboriginal peoples within their countries that supercedes local 
jurisdiction. Consequently, aboriginal peoples in both jurisdictions have struggled to 
have their rights recognized and protected through federal legislation. For example, 
the issue of subsistence harvest rights has been a long-standing one in both Alaska 
and Yukon.25
23 Claus-M. Naske, A History o f  Alaska Statehood, Lanham: University Press o f America, Inc., 1985,
p. 281.
24 Donald C. Mitchell, Sold American: The Story o f  Alaska Natives and Their Land, 1867-1959: The 
Army to Statehood, Hanover: University Press of New England, 1997; Kenneth Coates, 1991.
25Theodore R. Catton, “Glacier Bay National Monument, the Tlingit, and the Artifice o f Wilderness,” 
The Northern Review, No. 11, 1994, pp. 56-82; Robert McCandless, 1985; Donald Mitchell, 1997.
15
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The subordinate status of the people and governments of Alaska and Yukon, 
and the unresolved land claims, resulted in demands for change in both territories. 
Beginning in the early 1900s, Alaskans began demanding statehood, and Yukon 
residents sought provincial status. There were also demands to settle outstanding land 
claims. These demands were, for the most part, ignored, until other events, such as 
World War II, resulted in economic and demographic changes that added impetus to 
the demands. The details of the processes leading to change are the subject of this 
study.
If Alaska provides the best example of a case similar to Yukon’s, Greenland 
provides the best example of the most dissimilar case. Greenland contrasts in as many 
ways as Alaska is similar: it is a large island, dominated by a permanent ice cap, and 
its development has been shaped by continental European influences rather than by 
British. It has a large Inuit majority clustered in communities along its coastline, and 
its people subscribe to a state religion. The Greenland economy is based on the 
extraction of resources from the sea that have been marketed through corporations 
with state secured monopolies. It is part of Denmark, which is a unitary state (albeit 
with some federal characteristics). National policies towards Greenlanders differed 
greatly from those of the United States and Canada toward their aboriginal 
populations.26However, Greenlanders suffer from many of the same social problems 
that afflict indigenous peoples in northern North America: high rates of alcoholism, 
tobacco use, suicide, and infant mortality. As in other circumpolar societies,
16
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Greenlanders have a significantly reduced life expectancy when compared with the 
non-Native population in the same country.27 
Application to the Circumpolar North
All sub-national jurisdictions in the circumpolar North face significant and 
similar issues of political, economic and social development. For example, the 
problem of providing adequate education, health, and social services to remote rural 
communities is similar throughout the Arctic, and northern economies are resource 
based, extractive, and dependent on investment capital from locations far to the 
South.
More specifically, many jurisdictions face constitutional issues that continue 
to exist to this day. Alaska’s aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples are engaged in a 
bitter debate over subsistence harvest rights that involves both federal and Alaska 
governments. This is a constitutional issue that has its roots in territorial Alaska and 
the struggle for statehood. Greenland’s aboriginal population lobbied effectively for 
Home Rule in the 1970’s, but the Danish government’s ongoing involvement in 
Greenland’s affairs through military treaties, joint jurisdiction over natural resources, 
and in other fields continues to create friction. Greenland also continues to rely 
heavily on Danish transfer payments for its economic well being.
Other areas of the circumpolar North where this dissertation may be 
applicable include northern Russia and the Saami region of the Nordic countries.
26 Ole Marquardt, “Reservation, Westernization or Annihilation: A Comparison o f U.S. Indian Policy 
and Danish Eskimo Policy in the Nineteenth Century,” in Ingi Sigurdsson and Jon Skaptason, (eds.) 
Aspects o f  Arctic and Sub-Arctic History, Reykjavik: University o f Iceland Press, 2000, pp. 68-79.
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There we find aboriginal peoples in conflict with regional and national governments 
over issues related to land and resource use, subsistence harvest or grazing rights, and 
economic dependency. However, this dissertation would be less applicable in those 
regions because of the different constitutional histories and laws. Nevertheless, I will 
touch upon some of the similarities.
The aboriginal peoples of Russia were subjected to a different process of 
modernization than western aboriginal peoples after the 1917 Revolution. State 
directed initiatives, based on socialist ideological principles, replaced capitalist 
investment as the catalyst for change. Traditional languages and cultures were 
suppressed and non-aboriginal labor was imported to promote exploitation of
AO
northern resources. In northern Russia, the Russian Association of Indigenous 
Peoples of the North (RAIPON) was formed in 1990 to “protect the interests and 
lawful rights of the peoples it represents, including their right to land, natural 
resources, and self-government in accordance with international standards and 
Russian legislation, and their right to resolve their own social and economic
29problems.” The indigenous peoples needed to organize themselves when they found 
that their interests were in conflict with the northern public governments in the 1980s. 
The RAIPON website comments that:
At first, Party and Soviet officials supported the rapidly
27 Statistics Greenland, GreenlandKalaallit Nunat 1997 Statistical Yearbook, Nuuk: Kalaallit 
Nunaanni Naatsorsueqqisaartarfik, 1997.
28 Nikolai Vakhtin, “Native Peoples o f the Russian Far North,” Polar Peoples: Self-Determination and 
Development, London: Minority Rights Group, 1994, pp. 29-80; Victor A. Shnirelman, “Hostages o f  
an Authoritarian Regime: The Fate o f the ‘numerically-small peoples’ of the Russian North under 
Soviet Rule,” Etudes/lnuit/Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1-2, 1994, pp. 201-223.
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emerging social and political movement of northern peoples 
as an independent force; then that support gave way to political 
struggle and opposition to regional authority and local self­
government. In many regions, strong opposition by the authorities 
is manifested in complete disregard for indigenous peoples and 
violation of their lawful rights and interests. Government 
representatives are trying to continue policies of paternalism 
toward and control over indigenous peoples; often they do not 
know or acknowledge international standards for human and 
aboriginal rights and they do not understand the goals of the 
movement.
Like the aboriginal peoples of the Russian North, the Saami peoples of the 
Nordic countries have found it necessary to organize in order to protect their interests, 
and have formed a variety of associations since 1945. However, this has not 
prevented the erosion of their legal rights. Sunna Kuoljok and John Utsi of the 
Swedish Mountain and Saami Museum note that:
Even today the Swedish state is of the opinion that it is 
better suited to administer the lands of Sapmi than the 
Saami are. As late as 1992 the Swedish parliament passed 
a law under which the Saami are no longer allowed to 
make their own decisions about hunting and fishing on
29 http://www.raipon.org. March 11, 2001.
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their lands.31
The Saami have been divided by international boundaries that were imposed 
by external forces, and by legal decisions. Hugh Beach has commented that:
Internally, the Saami face the difficult task of healing 
the divisions within them caused by the various imposed 
legal categorizations. While many of these divisions were 
and are unjust and unjustifiable, there is no doubt that the 
traditional Saami livelihoods cannot alone sustain the entire 
Saami population.. ..The important point is that in these 
internal matters, within the framework of their rights, the 
Saami be allowed to make their own allocations.32
It is clear from these examples that the debates over the appropriate allocation 
of aboriginal and regional government rights are far from over. How these issues are 
resolved will depend on the effectiveness of conflict resolution processes and the role 
national governments play in these processes. And it is likely that many of these 
struggles will require constitutional changes in order to be resolved.
Northern Constitutions and Constitutional Change
This dissertation examines the process of constitutional change. Political 
scientists Richard Van Loon and Michael Whittington have noted that, “ the 
constitution can be viewed as a device that modifies human behaviour, for a
30 http://www.raipon.org, March 11,2001.
31 Sunna Kuoljok, and John E. Utsi, The Saami: People o f  the Sun and Wind, Jokkmokk: Ajtte,
Swedish Mountain and Saami Museum, 1993, p. 52.
20
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
constitution is one of the independent variables that influences the political process. 
Second, the constitution can be viewed as a reflection of the political culture; in this 
sense, it is a dependent variable, which is itself a product of societal forces.”33 In this 
dissertation the focus will be on the constitution as the dependent variable. 
“Constitution” is here defined broadly to include federal or national laws that 
constitute governing charters for defined populations and sub-national jurisdictions. 
For example, in Canada the Indian Act is the federal law that governs the operations 
of the vast majority of Indian bands (also known as First Nations) in the country. The 
Indian Act is subordinate to the national Constitution Act, but serves as the 
“constitution” for First Nation governments in Canada. All band laws must be 
formulated and approved in a manner that meets Indian Act requirements.34 The 
Indian Act is ordinary federal legislation, which can be amended by parliament at any 
time, with or without the consent of the Indian people of Canada. In the Yukon, some 
First Nations have removed themselves from Indian Act governance by ratifying land 
claim and self-government agreements that have granted them self-government. In 
Canada, treaties and land claim agreements are protected under section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, which supercedes the Indian Act.
In similar fashion, the Yukon Act serves as the Yukon’s primary constitutional 
document. The Yukon’s constitutional situation differs from that of the provinces of
32 Hugh Beach, “The Saami o f Lapland,” Polar Peoples: Self-Determination and Development,
London: Minority Rights Group, 1994, p. 205.
33 Richard VanLoon and Michael Whittington, The Canadian Political System: Environment, Structure 
and Process, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1987, p. 166.
34 Donna Lea Hawley, The Indian Act Annotated, Second edition, Toronto: The Carswell Company 
Limited, 1986.
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Canada. Provincial constitutions are recognized and protected in the Constitution of 
Canada, so that only provincial governments can amend provincial constitutions.35 In 
contrast, the Yukon Act, and other federal legislation affecting the territory, can be 
amended by the federal government without the consent of the Yukon government or 
the residents of the Yukon.
Greenland’s Home Rule Act is also national legislation, and it may not be 
protected as part of the Danish constitution. Consequently it could potentially be 
amended without the consent of the people of Greenland. However, the people of 
Greenland have much more authority over their lands and resources than do the 
people of northern Sweden, Finland and Norway where there are only weak regional 
authorities under the direct control of the state. The Saami people in these 
jurisdictions have their own parliaments, but these bodies are advisory only, and do 
not control the lands the Saami use.
Alaska stands out as the only jurisdiction in the circumpolar North with 
unambiguous autonomy as a full-fledged state within the United States. However, it 
should be recalled that statehood was granted by the federal government only after 
decades of struggle by Alaskans for this constitutional status. Furthermore, the 
federal government still exercises substantial powers over sixty percent of the land 
base of Alaska, and is responsible for administering a wide range of legislation which 
affects Alaskans, (such as the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) and the 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA)). The federal
35 Government o f  Canada, Constitution Act, 1982, Section 47.
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government also regulates hunting and fishing on federal lands and waters in Alaska 
(unlike most other states) due to the impasse over subsistence harvest rights in 
Alaska. University of Alaska professor Stephen Haycox has stated that ANCSA and 
ANILCA have had major impacts on Alaska, and that, “Probably the history of no 
other region of the United States has been so thoroughly determined by just two acts
I T
of Congress.” Haycox may have overstated the case, but there can be no doubt that 
federal legislation, which is shaped by many interests beyond Alaska’s boundaries, 
has significant impacts on the state.
Constitutional change has been the “holy grail” of northerners for decades. It 
is the primary legal mechanism by which people can gain greater control over their 
lives and reduce the influence of distant decision-makers (usually officials of national 
governments that lack knowledge of, and empathy for, northern issues).
Both Alaska and Greenland have advanced constitutionally: Alaska became a 
state in 1959 and Greenland achieved Home Rule in 1979, while the Yukon’s 
constitutional progress has struggled, and the prospects for provincial status are dim.
It is hoped that a study of the conditions leading to statehood and Home Rule will 
provide some guidance to Canadian territories about how to achieve a greater degree 
of autonomy through constitutional change. At the same time, it is hoped that this 
study would also provide some better understanding of the economic 
underdevelopment of northern regions and of aboriginal populations, and provide 
some insight into how the conditions of underdevelopment might be changed. Finally,
36 Claus-M. Naske, 1973.
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I hope to demonstrate how history has shaped the economic and social relations of 
northern jurisdictions and to suggest some ways to address their social conflicts. The 
resolution of these issues is in the national interest, since the North, in its current 
underdeveloped situation, represents a drain on the national economy, and the 
problems and conflicts found there reflect poorly on national policies and on 
Canada’s image internationally. The linkages amongst these various components will 
be discussed in the methodology of this study, outlined in Chapter 2.
The Yukon has faced a number of questions from those who oppose 
constitutional change or doubt the viability of change. These can be summarized as 
follows:
1. Is the territory economically viable? Can it finance its own operations? 
Does it have a sufficient tax base (population)? If not, what are the 
prospects for development?
2. Are there opponents to change? If so, are they internal or external, or 
both?
3. Are there unresolved issues preventing change? (eg. unresolved land 
claims)
4. Are there institutional or legal impediments to change? (eg. constitutional 
constraints).
The nature of these questions point to the independent variables of this study
24
37 Stephen Haycox, Frigid Embrace: Politics, Economics and Environment in Alaska, Corvallis: 
Oregon State University Press, 2002, p. xi.
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and clarify their relationship to the dependent variable: constitutional change may be 
precluded if  national authorities perceive that there are significant political, social, 
economic, institutional or legal barriers to change. The methods to address these 
issues then are through legal actions, political action (including lobbying), 
negotiations, and economic development. The independent variables then become 
court decisions, political decisions, and negotiated agreements that effect 
constitutional change, and economic development, which affects attitudes about the 
viability of change. (See Figure la)
The correlation between independent and dependent variables becomes clear 
when, for example, a court decision results in the federal government amending a law 
which affects the powers of a provincial, territorial, state or aboriginal government. 
Similarly, the recommendations of legislative committees and the negotiation of a 
land claims agreement can also lead to changes in the governing laws that may 
enhance or reduce the powers of that government. Additionally, an amendment could 
empower one government at the expense of another. For example, the signing and 
implementation of the Tetlit Gwitchin land claim resulted in the transfer of land out 
of the control of the Yukon government and gave control of that land to a non­
resident First Nation.
The relationship between economic development and constitutional change is 
more nebulous, and the debate often contradictory. Some authors argue that the 
North’s vast resources should be managed as national resources for the benefit of the 
nation, while others point to the fact that many northern areas are poverty stricken
25
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and incapable of raising sufficient revenues to adequately fund their own 
governments. Both arguments denigrate local ownership and control of the resources. 
On the other hand, indigenous and non-indigenous northerners view local control of 
northern resources as an important element in achieving self-government.
Economic development can be measured by many indicators, such as levels of 
employment/unemployment, levels of investment, per capita income, sources and 
levels of revenues, and so on. For the purposes of this dissertation, specific indicators 
do not need to be identified, as constitutional debates seldom delve to that detail.
More important is the perception of whether or not a particular jurisdiction is “ready” 
or “able” to sustain a greater degree of autonomy. The issue of economic 
development and constitutional change will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 4.
A general framework for amending constitutions is outlined in Figure 2. The 
model suggests that constitutional change comes about as a result of demands 
originating within a country. These demands can be processed through a variety of 
mechanisms: congressional or parliamentary committees may hear public 
perspectives and make recommendations for legislative change; negotiations may 
occur between those demanding change and executive or legislative agencies; or an 
issue may be brought to the courts, resulting in a decision that has constitutional 
consequences. Bringing matters to court may also serve as an incentive to bring 
parties to the negotiating table to try to reach an out of court settlement. Other 
mechanisms, unique to particular countries, may also be utilized: for example,
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Canada has a forum of first ministers’ conferences that can negotiate agreements that 
can lead to constitutional amendments.
As noted earlier, these processes can lead to decisions and agreements that can 
result in legislative change. The changes may be in federal legislation, or in sub­
national or national constitutions. For convenience, changes to ordinary federal 
legislation and sub-national constitutions can be referred to as “lower level changes,” 
while changes to national constitutions can be referred to as “upper level changes.” 
The Role of the National Governments
It is important to point out that the common feature of all these processes is 
the need for action by the national government, which has the power to either effect 
or facilitate change, as well as the ability to veto change. Comparative political 
studies in recent decades have sought to “bring the state back in” -  to recognize the 
role of national governments as independent forces that have interests which may 
differ from those of national elites. Theorists Nicos Poulantzas and Bob Jessop argue 
that the state possesses a “relative autonomy” with respect to national elites, and must 
be considered a separate factor in equations involving national economic
-30
development. Rather than merely serving the interests of the capitalist class, the 
state can play one or more of several roles in the economy. Jessop states that, “the 
state may be seen as a legal sovereign that controls economic activity, as a referee or 
umpire that intervenes in economic disputes, as one economic agent among others, or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
as a political agent whose actions may promote or hinder economic performance.”39
The implications of this argument are significant:
the economic state apparatuses and their means of 
intervention are not neutral, but are integrated into the 
movement of capital and constitute a field of conflict 
between different interests. This means that state inter­
vention has inherent limitations in securing the conditions 
for capital accumulation and is always subject to the 
inevitable influence of various class and popular-democratic 
struggles. It also means that the adequacy of particular 
policy instruments and general forms of intervention will 
vary not only with changes in economic structure but also 
with changes in the balance of political forces. Related to 
these arguments is the further point that the forms of political 
representation also have distinct effects on the efficacy of 
forms of intervention. This in turn implies that the failure 
of specific policy measures or general instruments may be 
due to the inadequacy of the forms of political representation 
with which they are linked, rather than to mistaken economic 
analysis. It means as well that the reorganization of the state
38 Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, London: NLB and Sheed and Ward, 1973;
Robert Jessop, “Recent Theories o f the Capitalist State, ” Cambridge Journal o f  Economics, Vol. 1, No.
4, 1977, pp. 353-374. (unpaginated copy supplied by author).
39 Robert Jessop, 1977, unpaginated.
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apparatus may be necessary before economic problems can be 
resolved.40
In other words, the form of state intervention in the economy, or the lack of 
intervention, is the result of complex economic, political and social forces. A variety 
of factors can limit the ability of minorities and sub-national jurisdictions from having 
an effective voice on national issues or on regional development: state policies may 
preclude involvement and state structures and processes may not include regional or 
minority representation. When system changes are proposed other regional 
governments may block reforms or prevent inclusion (representation) and national 
economic interests may lobby for the status quo. International interests may also seek 
to maintain their privileged position in developing regions.
National governments exercise their power and authority through policy 
instruments, and the comparison of public policies toward northern peoples is an 
important element of this study. Leichter notes that comparing public policies: 
enlarges the basis for comparing and evaluating political 
systems; it allows us to test more conclusively the relationship 
between public policy and various independent variables; and 
it provides us with the opportunity to compare and evaluate the 
experiences of different nations in trying to find policy solutions 
to public problems 41
40 Robert Jessop, 1977, unpaginated.
41 H. Leichter, “Comparative Public Policy: Problems and Prospects,” in L.J. Cantori and A.H. Ziegler, 
(eds.), Comparative Politics in the Post-Behavioral Era, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1988, p. 
342.
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Summary
National governments continue to play a large role in circumpolar northern 
jurisdictions, through inordinately large expenditures of public funds (on a per capita 
basis), policy and legislative initiatives, and through land and resource ownership and 
control. They can foster or inhibit changes that have economic, political and social 
consequences. By studying the role of national policies in the evolution of northern 
jurisdictions we can assess which policies resulted in changes that were advantageous 
to northern populations, and which policies inhibited constructive development and 
created social and political conflict. We can also assess how national governments 
have responded to demands for constitutional changes and devolution of powers to 
foster local solutions to social and economic problems.
Complex social, political and economic forces that make outcomes difficult to 
predict shape the policies of national governments. Historical analyses help to reveal 
how those forces shaped the policies and processes of national governments that have 
enabled or inhibited constitutional change. We now turn to the histories of Alaska and 
Greenland, which will prove useful to those in other northern jurisdictions faced with 
the challenges of fostering political, economic, and constitutional change.
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Chapter 2 
The Circumpolar North 
Defining the Circumpolar North
The circumpolar North and the Arctic have been defined in a variety of ways. 
Kenneth Coates has noted that definitions of the region have been based upon 
geographical constructs, spatial constructs, socio-cultural factors, economic 
determinism, climatic considerations, political structures, evolutionary concepts, and 
self-definition. He argued that most of the approaches lacked credibility because they 
ignored self-definition -  the opportunity for northern people to define for themselves 
what “North” meant. He did, however, give credibility to political structures:
Perhaps the most widely-adopted definition of the 
North is encapsulated in political boundaries. In most 
countries with Northern territories, the Northern 
extremities are expressed in political structures or 
jurisdictional boundaries. In the United States, Alaska 
is an obvious politically-defined region.. ..Administrative 
units provide a sharp, functional ... definition of 
Northemess. Because of the practical operation of 
political units, such jurisdictional definitions are both 
appealing and legitimate.1
1 Kenneth Coates, “The Discovery o f  the North: Towards a Conceptual Framework for the Study o f  
Northern/Remote Regions,” The Northern Review, No. 12/13, 1994, p. 21.
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The Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade accepted Oran R. Young’s definition of the circumpolar 
region as including Alaska (except Southeast Alaska), the Canadian territories, 
northern Quebec, Labrador, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Finland, the Russian North, 
and the adjacent seas. Defined this way, the circumpolar North has geographic 
consistency but lacks political coherence: it is a mixed array of nation states and 
subnational jurisdictions with varying degrees of autonomy and many different socio­
economic characteristics. One country, Iceland, has no aboriginal population, while 
all the others have aboriginal populations that vary greatly in proportion to the non­
aboriginal population. Iceland does not fit in other ways, as Political Science 
professor James Gladden states:
The arctic as a circumpolar region cuts across the sovereign 
territory of several arctic nation-states. This division sets up 
a north-south dynamic of political conflict between the two 
regions of each country. This is true for all of the arctic states, 
except for Iceland. It is the only nation-state with sovereignty 
over a part of the arctic region that does not fit into the north- 
south category of the politics of geography. Iceland also has no 
ethnic divisions, given that its small citizen body has a shared 
culture.
2 Government o f Canada, Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges o f  Cooperation 
into the Twenty-First Century, 1997, p. 2.
3 James Gladden, “Origin o f Political Conflict in Arctic Wilderness Areas,” in A.E. Watson, L. Alessa, 
and J. Sproull, (compilers), Wilderness in the Circumpolar North: Searching fo r  Compatibility in
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To provide greater comparability, we must find a definition that permits us to 
hone in on the region’s unique features and common characteristics. One means of 
doing so would be to ascertain how the peoples within this region identify 
themselves.4 I would thus propose a definition of the circumpolar North as consisting 
of those subnational jurisdictions found substantially north of the sixtieth parallel that 
are recognized as “the North” by their subnational governments. These subnational 
jurisdictions would include Canada’s northern territories (the Yukon, Northwest 
Territories, and Nunavut), Alaska (United States of America), Greenland (Denmark), 
the province of Lapland (Finland), Norbotten and Vasterbotten Counties (Sweden), 
Troms, Nord-Trondelag, Nordland, Svalbard and Finmark (Norway), and the Oblasts, 
Okrugs and Republics found north of the sixtieth parallel in Russia. This definition 
fits well with the concept of the Northern Forum, a non-profit, international 
organization of subnational governments located in ten northern countries, established 
in 1991.5 The definition does, however, exclude independent countries (i.e. Iceland), 
which have the ability to pursue their own foreign and domestic policies, the northern 
portions of provinces, which are not separate legal entities (such as northern Quebec), 
and some regions that are included in the Northern Forum While broader definitions 
that include countries and portions of provinces are recognized and accepted, this
Ecological, Traditional, andEcotourism Values, Fort Collins: Rocky Mountain Research Station,
2002, p. 11.
4 The problem with using this method is that some jurisdictions many would not normally consider 
northern define themselves as northern. The Northern Forum has several members from Japan and 
China that are not considered part of the circumpolar North by most people in the West. Thus the 
Northern Forum has representation from 10 countries, while the Arctic Council includes the “Arctic 8” 
countries as members.
5 http://www.northemforum.org/aboutusbodv/php. February 28, 2001.
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definition will be used for the purposes of this dissertation, and the term “Arctic” will 
be used synonymously with the term “circumpolar North.”
Common Characteristics of the Circumpolar North
Kenneth Coates has suggested that the primary characteristics of 
northern/remote regions can be encompassed in four broad categories: relationship to 
the outside world, internal politics, socio-cultural characteristics, and structural 
characteristics.
In terms of the relationship to the outside world, Coates and Gurston Dacks 
both argue that external forces or authorities determine the pace and nature of change 
in northern regions. For example, they point to the large subsidies and transfer 
payments that national governments make to support northern governments and their 
operations, which help to stabilize volatile boom and bust economies, and social 
experiments conducted by national governments, (such as the Matanuska colony 
experiment in Alaska and the high arctic relocations of Inuit in the Canadian North).6
They also point to other aspects of external control that drive or inhibit change 
in northern regions, such as economic domination by national and multi-national
n
corporations, and world market forces, such as fluctuating oil and mineral prices.
With respect to internal politics, Coates argues that northern jurisdictions 
“tend to be embroiled in intense internal struggles that have limited the regions’ 
ability to present and protect their interests against outside forces.”8 These internal
6 Gurston Dacks, A Choice o f  Futures: Politics in the Canadian North, Toronto: Methuen Publications, 
1981, pp. 19-20. Kenneth Coates, 1994, p. 24;
7 Kenneth Coates, 1994, pp. 24-26; Gurston Dacks, 1981, pp. 24-25.
8 Kenneth Coates, 1994, p. 26.
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disputes stem from entrenched differences between the interests of the aboriginal and 
non-aboriginal populations in the North, between various communities and 
municipalities, and between permanent and transient populations. Examples would 
likely include the impasse over subsistence harvest rights in Alaska, the appropriate 
role of the territorial government in the Northwest Territories,9 and the debate over 
Denmark’s role in managing mineral resources in Greenland.
The socio-cultural characteristics of the North reinforce the tensions related to 
internal politics. Ethnic cleavage, racism, a large number of transients, and a sense of 
isolation contribute to a complex array of health and social problems. A variety of 
indicators of health and social well-being have indicated that northern populations 
suffer from high rates of teen suicide, alcohol abuse, drug abuse, domestic violence, 
family breakups, and other problems.10 Indeed, the health and social problems found 
in the circumpolar North tend to be far worse than in the remainder of their host 
countries. Nunavut, for example, has a crime rate that is six times the Canadian 
average. Northern populations have a higher infant mortality rate, and northerners are 
much more likely to die by accident or suicide.11 According to one recent report, 
“Alaska Natives now have a 30 percent higher risk of dying from all cancers than
9 Kirk Cameron and Graham White, Northern Governments in Transition: Political and Constitutional 
Development in the Yukon, Nunavut and Western Northwest Territories, Montreal: The Institute for 
Research on Public Policy, 1995.
10 Kenneth Coates, 1994, p. 31.
11 James B. Goes, “Health: National Trends in an Alaska Setting,” in Clive S. Thomas (ed.), Alaska 
Public Policy Issues: Background and Perspectives, Juneau: The Denali Press, 1999, p. 128; Donald 
C. Mitchell, Take My Land, Take My Life: The Story o f  Congress's Historic Settlement o f  Alaska 
Native Land Claims, 1960-1971, Fairbanks: University o f  Alaska Press, 2001, p. 533; Debra L. 
Schindler, “Theory, Policy, and the Narody Severa,” Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 64, No. 2, 1991, 
p. 74; Government o f Yukon, Health Status Report, 1998, pp. 1-2.
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1 9White Americans.. and cancer is the leading cause of death in that population. In 
addition to health problems associated with socio-economic status, northern peoples 
are also exposed to health risks based on geographic location, and decisions made by 
governments and industries in southern regions. For example, the Arctic Monitoring 
and Assessment Program recently released a report indicating that Inuit are exposed 
to high levels of environmental toxins that are deposited by wind and ocean currents, 
and that, “Canadian Inuit are exposed to higher levels of chemical toxins than
1 Tvirtually any other population group in the world....”
The structural characteristics of the circumpolar North are perhaps the most 
obvious: cold harsh climates, limited agricultural production, small populations, poor 
rural infrastructure, remoteness from the centers of power, and resource based, 
extractive economies.
Geographically, the northern subnational jurisdictions are distant from their 
national centers. They are located in the far north of their host countries, far from the 
national capital cities. It is often time consuming to travel to these regions, and once 
there, transportation infrastructure is less developed than in the southern regions of 
the country. Many communities in the circumpolar North are accessible only by boat, 
plane, helicopter, or snow machine.
The climate in the circumpolar North is normally colder than in the rest of 
their host countries. By definition, they are located North of the sixtieth parallel.
Their seasons are characterized by long daylight hours in summer, and short daylight
12 Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, August 7, 2002.
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hours in winter. They are home to large populations of migratory species, both wild 
(caribou, migratory birds, salmon, polar bear), and domesticated (reindeer in the 
Nordic and Russian North).
With the exception of a few large cities, such as Anchorage and Murmansk, 
the circumpolar North is sparsely populated, with widely dispersed, small 
communities and a low population density.14 There are large populations of aboriginal 
people living in the region, and they form a larger percentage of the population than 
in the southern regions of their host countries.15 There are also settler populations 
living in the region, often sharing communities with the aboriginal population, 
although there are also communities composed of mostly aboriginal peoples or only 
settlers.
The economy of the circumpolar region is based on resource extraction: 
mining, fishing, logging, and oil and gas production. Government spending, including 
defense spending, is also a major component of northern economies. With 
the exception of Lapland (Finland), there is little secondary processing or 
manufacturing. Long distances from markets, poor transportation infrastructure, and 
lack of investment capital and economies of scale discourage manufacturing and 
industrial enterprise. Agricultural production is largely absent, due either to poor soils 
and climate, or competition from southern producers. As a consequence, northern 
economies are subject to periodic booms and busts, spurred by sudden discoveries of
13 National Post, October 3, 2002.
14 Oran Young, Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North, London: 
University Press o f New England, 1992, p. 33.
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ore bodies or price fluctuations. Alongside the wage economy exists a mixed 
subsistence economy, utilized largely by the aboriginal population. The northern 
economy can thus be described as underdeveloped.16 The colonial nature of the 
northern economy is discussed in greater detail, below.
To underscore this description of northern characteristics, the Northern Forum 
organization states that northern regions share the following common characteristics:
• economies based upon the extraction of natural resources;
• lack of internal capital resources;
• limited infrastructural development;
• harsh climates and vulnerable ecosystems;
• diverse and relatively strong indigenous cultures; and
• sparse populations.17
The Northern Forum website elaborates on this list by noting that their regions 
also have small, youthful populations, economies reliant upon outsourcing of all 
goods, high operating costs, infrastructure that is oriented in North-South directions,
15 Stephen Haycox, Frigid Embrace: Politics, Economics and Envrionment in Alaska, Corvallis: 
Oregon State University Press, 2002, p. 8; Government o f Canada, 1997, p. 204.
16 Kenneth Coates, 1994, pp. 32-33; Stephen Haycox, 2002, p. x; Government o f Yukon, Yukon 
Development Strategy, 1986; Government o f Canada, A Northern Political and Economic Framework, 
1988; Gurston Dacks, 1981, pp. 12-27; Halldor Asgrimsson, “Address o f Halldor Asgrimsson,”in Ingi 
Sigurdsson and Jon Skaptason,(eds.), Aspects o f  Arctic and Sub-Arctic History, Reykjavik: University 
o f Iceland Press, 2000, p. 23; Victor Shnirelman, “Hostages o f an Authoritarian Regime: The Fate of 
the ‘numerically-small peoples’ o f the Russian North under Soviet Rule,” Etudes/Inuit/Studies, Vol.
18, No. 1-2, 1994, pp. 212-214.
17 Northern Forum, Activity Report, Winter 2000, p. 1.
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and, “Limited influence on national government and multinational corporate decision-
1 8making.”
The Circumpolar North and the Developing World
The parallels between development issues in northern regions and the 
developing world, formerly known as the “Third World,” have intrigued academics 
for many years, and this comparison has been reflected in conference proceedings, 
papers and books. In 1983, University of Toronto professor Franklyn Griffiths 
proposed that the Arctic be considered a part of the Third World. His hypothesis 
focused on the locus of decision-making:
The initial reaction to the hypothesis may be one of 
disbelief, « T h ird  W o rld »  suggesting tropical heat 
waves and newly independent or neo-colonial status.
Upon reflection, however, it will be recognized that the 
term also connotes underdeveloped and developing areas 
whose evolution is substantially affected by decisions 
issuing from remote metropolitan centres, and whose 
population experience both an erosion of traditional 
culture and a sense of powerlessness to determine their 
own future in the midst of externally generated change.19
18 Northern Forum, 2000, p. 1. It should be noted that the observation about “limited influence on 
national government and multinational corporate decision-making” may be somewhat subjective. 
While some people in Alaska may believe that their representatives have limited impact nationally, 
other analysts observe that, “Alaska has exceptional national influence given the seniority o f its 
congressional delegation..” G. McBeath,pers. comm., April 3, 2003.
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Griffiths also compared the capacity of the aboriginal populations of the 
Arctic with those of the developing world, and predicted that, “As the rate of 
industrialization and modernization picks up in the Arctic, the region will experience 
some of the same phenomena as have occurred in other developing areas.” 20 The 
phenomena he refers to include increased transnational collaboration among 
aboriginal peoples, a heightened readiness to block some types of development 
projects, and renewed efforts to alter the terms on which development takes place.21
Economist Lise Lyck examined Greenland’s economy and compared it to 
Third World economies. She concluded that Greenland’s economy was not a Third
World economy, despite the fact that it shared a number of characteristics of a Third
22World economy. One of these characteristics is the asymmetrical North -  South 
trade pattern that many Arctic jurisdictions exhibit.
In Canada, Gerard Duhaime, the Director of the Inuit and Circumpolar Study 
Group at Laval University, appeared before Canada’s House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and linked the problems of 
northern economies to the social crises in the North:
[He]... described the “Third World” character of
19 Franklyn Griffiths, “Arctic Third World: Indigenous People and Resource Development,” Cold 
Regions Science and Technology, Vol. 7, 1983, p. 350.
20 Franklyn Griffiths, 1983, p. 352.
21 Franklyn Griffiths, 1983, p. 352.
22 Lise Lyck, Arctic International Trade: A Study on the Greenlandic International Trade Regime, 
Copenhagen: New Social Science Monographs, 1999.
23 Nafziger identified 17 characteristics o f underdeveloped countries. Lyck applied these to Greenland, 
and noted that Greenland had some o f the characteristics o f an underdeveloped country, but not others. 
She noted that Greenland was a democracy; that it did not have a high proportion o f the labor force 
engaged in agriculture or the subsistence economy; that it did not have inadequate technology or
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extractive export-oriented resource exploitation that 
brings little positive benefit to local economies, the extreme 
dependence on the “industry” of government (and on many 
imported inputs, including food supplies), and a social crisis 
that cannot easily be addressed.... These trends are apparent 
throughout the circumpolar North .. ,.24 
The idea that regions in the circumpolar North share characteristics with the 
developing world includes Alaska, the richest of the North’s subnational jurisdictions. 
Disaffected Alaskans have pointed out that:
Bound politically to the United States, a First World industrialized 
country, Alaska has many attributes which make it more a Third 
World nation. Except for some oil refining, fish, wood products 
and natural gas processing, Alaska has virtually no manufacturing.
It is dependent for its survival on the development and sale of its
9c
raw natural resources.
This perspective was echoed by Alaska economist George W. Rogers, who wrote:
The natural resource, raw material base of the Alaska economy 
might lead to the state being likened to a Third World economy 
with external forces determining and benefiting from economic 
activity at the expense of the local population. Certainly, the
capital; it did not have low savings rates; it did not have rapid population growth; and it did not have 
low literacy and school enrollment rates.
24 Government o f  Canada, 1997, p. 136.
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raw material/external influences/outside investor element of the 
analogy is accurate, but whether Alaska is a “colony” of the lower 
48 is very debatable.26 
While some Alaskans, such as history professor Stephen Haycox, still assert
97that Alaska has a colonial economy, most Alaskan economists feel that Alaska has 
transcended economic colonialism, although they remain concerned about Alaska’s 
ongoing dependency on oil extraction for the state’s economic good fortune.
However, one can argue that, as a developing region, the circumpolar North 
faces severe competitive disadvantages relative to the southern developing world: the 
long distances from markets, lack of infrastructure, and high construction and 
operating costs make it difficult to compete with other exporting countries. The 
Usibelli coal mine in Alaska is a case in point. The mine recently lost a contract to 
supply coal to Hyundai Merchant Marine Company Limited because Usibelli was 
underbid by two coal suppliers in Indonesia, which were closer to Hyundai’s 
operations in Korea. The loss of the contract resulted in the loss of mining jobs in 
Alaska and cutbacks in rail service and maintenance on the Alaska Railroad.28 These 
disadvantages can be offset to some extent if subsidies are provided to northern 
businesses, and Alaska has been able to provide some support to local businesses
25 M. B. Roberts, Going up in Flames: The Promises and Pledges o f  Alaska Statehood Under Attack, 
Anchorage: Alaska Pacific University Press for Commonwealth North, 1990, p. 12.
26 George W. Rogers, “The Alaska Economy and Economic Issues: An Historical Overview,” in Clive 
S. Thomas, (ed.) Alaska Public Policy Issues: Background and Perspectives, Juneau: The Denali Press, 
1999, p. 30.
27 Stephen Haycox, 2002, p. x.
28 Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, September 18, 2002. Contracts for Usibelli coal were subsequently 
renegotiated with Hyundai and Korea East-West Power in October, 2003. See Fairbanks Daily News- 
Miner, October 17, 2003.
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because of its oil wealth. Other northern regions have to rely on subsidies from 
federal programs.
A further difficulty is that subnational jurisdictions lack the bargaining power 
that developing nation states possess when negotiating with trans-national 
corporations (TNCs). Developing nations have greater capacity to develop or 
purchase expertise, leverage financing, nationalize industries, form cartels, alter 
foreign policies, and influence trade agreements, amongst other things, which enables 
them to negotiate favorable terms with TNCs. In contrast, subnational jurisdictions 
lack sovereignty, and often have to negotiate with their national governments to try to 
obtain exemptions from policies that restrict their trade practices, ability to leverage 
financing, etc. Alaska’s experience with the Jones Act and the Export Administration
29Act are cases in point. In the Canadian North, the federal government maintains the 
ability to approve or veto loans the Yukon government negotiates.30
Finally, it should be noted that resource extractive economies do not escape 
dependency even where state or government intervention is successful in negotiating 
favorable agreements or obtaining control of extractive industries. Sociology 
professor Peter Evans has pointed out that:
Nowhere has increased state control over local productive 
facilities provided escape from the negative features of 
dependence on international markets. An expanded state role
29 M.B. Roberts, 1990; Alaska Statehood Commission, More Perfect Union: A Plan fo r  Action, 1983, 
pp. 11-13.
30 Government o f  Canada, The Yukon Act, 2001, S. 23.
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has not only been unable, with the temporary exception of 
OPEC, to force favorable raw material pricing changes, it 
has also failed to reduce price variability.31
While the circumpolar North, as a region, may be characterized as 
underdeveloped, there are some within the northern economy who are more 
disadvantaged by its colonial structure than others. The concept of northern 
underdevelopment can also be viewed from the narrower perspective of strictly 
aboriginal underdevelopment. Thomas Berger, who studied aboriginal communities 
and living conditions in the Yukon, Alaska and British Columbia, describes it this 
way:
With the independence of so many Third World nations, 
the condition of and the claims of indigenous peoples who 
are locked into nations they can never hope to rule must now 
be considered. They constitute the Fourth World, and it extends 
from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego; it encompasses the Ainu of 
Japan, the Aborigine of Australia, the Maori of New Zealand, 
the Sami of Scandanavia, and the tribal peoples of the Soviet 
Union, China, India, and Southeast Asia.
Attempts by the indigenous peoples of the Fourth World to 
achieve self-determination face greater odds than most
32nations of the Third World have had to meet.
46
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The conditions Berger refers to include, on average, higher rates of 
unemployment, lower levels of education, and higher rates of illness, incarceration, 
and death. Lacking education and skills for competing in an increasingly 
technological and internationally oriented economy places this population at an 
ongoing risk of economic displacement. At the same time, many aboriginal people 
maintain an attachment to a subsistence economy or subsistence lifestyle for their 
livelihood, or for supplementary income, including such activities as reindeer 
herding, trapping, whaling, hunting and sealing. A significant amount of conflict in 
the circumpolar North today relates to subsistence harvest rights and the impacts of
•5-5
the industrial economy on lands and waters that sustain subsistence lifestyles.
The idea that northern jurisdictions share characteristics with developing 
countries suggests that the rich literature on development may be useful for analyzing 
development issues in the circumpolar North. Before proceeding, however, it is 
important to clarify that the circumpolar North is not part of the developing world.
The fundamental difference is that much of the circumpolar North resides within 
advanced western democracies -  within countries that can be considered part of the 
“core” or “center” in center/periphery terminology. Another large segment exists
31 Peter Evans, “Foreign Capital and the Third World State,” in Myron Weiner and Samuel 
Huntington, (eds.), Understanding Political Development, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1987, 
p. 330.
32 Thomas R. Berger, Village Journey: The Report o f  the Alaska Native Review Commission, New  
York: Hill and Wang, 1985, pp. 176-177.
33 Richard Caulfield, Greenlanders, Whales, and Whaling: Sustainability and Self-Determination in the 
Arctic, Hanover: University Press o f New England, 1997; Stephen Haycox, 2002, pp. 152-156; D. L. 
Schindler, “Theory, Policy, and the Narody SeveraJAnthropolgical Quarterly, Vol. 64, No. 2, 1991; 
Peter J. Usher, The Value o f  Wildlife in Northern Canada, P.J. Usher Consulting Services, 1983; 
Edward R. Weick, “Northern Native People and the Larger Canadian Society: Emerging Economic
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within the former “Second World,” the Russian North, which underwent rapid 
modernization in the context of a Soviet model of development.34 The 2002 United 
Nations Human Development Index, which ranks 173 countries on a composite scale 
incorporating life expectancy, income and education indicators, ranked Norway, 
Sweden, Canada, the United States, Iceland, Denmark and Finland amongst the top
->c
14 counties in the world. Russia ranked somewhat lower, at number 60. One 
consequence of being located within core countries is that national governments have 
the ability to subsidize, directly and indirectly, northern populations, governments 
and industries. Thus northern residents in core countries receive a disproportionately 
large amount of federal funding as compared to residents of southern jurisdictions. In 
Alaska, this amounted to about $13,000 Can. per person in 1999 (the highest in the 
United States); in Greenland, $10,500 Can. per person, and in the Yukon Territory, 
approximately $12,000 Can. per person, in 2002.36
Another critical difference is the socio-economic context of the circumpolar 
North. Many developing countries possess large numbers of people living on 
marginal agricultural plots - which might be referred to as peasant populations.
Relations,” The American Review o f  Canadian Studies, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, 1988, p. 318; Government 
o f Yukon, Yukon Development Strategy: A Public Discussion Paper, 1986. Thomas Berger, 1985.
34Debra L. Schindler, 1991; Graham Smith, (ed.), The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, New  
York: Longman Inc., 1990, pp. 304-309; Nicolai Vakhtin, “Native peoples in the Russian Far North,” 
Polar Peoples: Self-Determination and Development, London: Minority Rights Group, 1994, pp. 29­
70.
35 The Globe and Mail, July 23, 2002.
36 Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, April 18, 2000, p. A-3; Paul Harris, per s. comm., Oct. 1, 2002; Globe 
& Mail, Feb. 18, 1999, p. A25. The figure for Greenland was calculated from the information provided 
in the Globe & Mail article: the Danish subsidy o f $588 million divided by the Greenland population 
figure o f 56,000, yielding an average $10,500 per person in 1999. Finn Larsen estimated the subsidy at 
$14,000 Can. per person in 1992. See, Finn Larsen, “The Quiet Life o f a Revolution: Greenlandic 
Home Rule 1979-1992,” Inuit Studies, Vol. 16, Nos. 1-2,1992. p. 214.
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Samuel Huntington, Theda Skocpol, and other theorists have noted the importance of 
this class to important social revolutions that have resulted in rapid development.37 
This contrasts with the generally small amount of agricultural activity and low 
population density in the circumpolar North, and the migratory nature of northern 
populations -  both aboriginal and non-aboriginal -  until the 1950s when settlement 
was forced on many aboriginal populations. Hugh Brody contrasts the aboriginal 
hunter/gatherer heritage with that of the farmer heritage, and demonstrates how the 
pursuit of agriculture has led to the colonization of hunter/gatherer societies.38 
Furthermore, northern regions continue to have a large number of non-aboriginal 
transient workers who migrate in and out in order to take advantage of seasonal job 
opportunities, or employment in “fly-in, fly-out” operations, such as at Prudhoe Bay 
in Alaska. Kenneth Coates maintains that tensions between permanent residents and 
transients is one of the defining characteristics of northern regions.39 Furthermore, it 
seems clear that transients have less of a stake in the long-term issues affecting the 
North, and are less likely to fight for changes that would benefit the North.
A third major difference between the developing world and northern societies 
relates to the structure of land ownership and management. In the circumpolar North, 
vast areas of land remain under public ownership and control to this day. Most of the
37 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968; Barrington Moore, Social Origins o f  Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the 
Making o f  the Modern World, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966; Theda Skocpol, States and Social 
Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis o f  France, Russia and China, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979.
38 Hugh Brody, The Other Side o f  Eden: Hunters, Farmers, and the Shaping o f  the World, Toronto: 
Douglas and McIntyre, 2000.
39 Kenneth Coates, 1994, pp. 38-39.
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land in the Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Alaska, Greenland and the 
Russian North is owned and managed as a public resource. This means that national 
or regional governments still have a strong role to play in determining how the land 
base will be utilized and managed. This differs significantly from many developing 
countries where the productive land base was alienated to private ownership since 
colonial times, thus reducing the role of public policy makers or requiring 
governments to expropriate land for public purposes. In many developing countries, 
the issue of land reform has been one of the most significant political issues, while in 
the North, land planning has been the issue of contention, with national, regional, and 
increasingly, aboriginal, governments involved.
Theories of Development and Underdevelopment
If we accept the premise that the circumpolar North constitutes a unique, 
underdeveloped region of the world, with characteristics that differ from those of the 
developing world, the problem we are faced with is to explain why the region is 
underdeveloped, and what can be done to effect development. Two streams of 
thought have guided comparative analysts and dominated development theory in the 
twentieth century: modernization theories and dependency theories.40 Modernization 
theory evolved after World War II and built upon advances in sociology, social 
psychology, and political anthropology. It developed, in part, as a reaction to 
Marxism and the perceived threat of revolution in developing countries. Its approach 
is generally linear -  suggesting that societies proceed through a series of stages on the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
path to political and economic development toward a western style of democracy. 
Many western countries believed they could assist the process of modernization by 
providing targeted economic assistance.41 Modernization studies focused on the 
process of social change and the impacts of urbanization, secularization and 
industrialization on traditional cultures.42 The problems, or “crises,” of identity, 
legitimacy, penetration, distribution, and participation often characterize this
43process.
Dependency theory evolved from the Marxist tradition of dialectical analysis 
and depicts the world as consisting of a “centre,” (or “core”), the developed, 
industrialized states, and the “periphery,” also known as the developing world. Later, 
the concept of “semi-periphery,” was added, which consisted of states that existed 
somewhere between the developed and developing regions. This relationship 
developed as a consequence of the growth of capitalism since the sixteenth century.44
The conception of the circumpolar North as “periphery” has gained wide 
acceptance in the academic world amongst northern historians. For example, 
economic historian Halldor Bjamason states that:
The theme ‘Centre and Periphery’ with regard to the Arctic
40 David E. Apter, “Comparative Politics, Old and New,” in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter 
Klingemann (eds.), Handbook o f  Political Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 381.
41 Samuel Huntington, 1968.
42 Samuel Huntington, 1968; Janet M. Billson, “Social Change, Social Problems, and the Search for 
Identity: Canada’s Northern Native Peoples in Transition,” The American Review o f  Canadian Studies, 
Vol. XVIII, No. 3, 1988, pp. 307-308.
43 Leonard Binder, et.al., Crises and Consequences in Political Development, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971.
44 Thomas D. Hall, (ed.), A World-Systems Reader: New Perspectives on Gender, Urbanism, Cultures, 
Indigenous Peoples, and Ecology, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000, p.5;
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and Sub-Arctic region is a highly relevant one. This particular 
kind of relations is an important and intrinsic part of its 
history. By definition, the pair of terms describes a pattern of 
imbalance, where a core or centre of power exercises its impact 
on a less powerful area, be it a hinterland or separate region lying 
far off. Hence, this type of relations pertains not only to external 
relations .... but also to internal relations. History shows that 
when this kind of power imbalance ... arises, it can cover a wide 
range of political, economic, social, and cultural issues.45
In his book, Internal Colonialism, Michael Hechter sets out the differences in 
the two models quite clearly. He refers to the modernization approach as the 
diffusion model of development, and the dependency approach as the internal 
colonialism model. Under the diffusion model, increased contact between the core 
and periphery results in industrialization, cultural integration, and economic 
development. The industrialization process results in social dislocation and the 
disruption of traditional societies and economies, until the traditional populations are 
integrated into the dominant society.46
Hechter makes two important points about the diffusion model of interest to 
this study: the importance of national government action to the formation of political
Immanuel Wallerstein, Unthinking Social Science: The Limits o f  Nineteenth Century Paradigms, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, p. 109-115.
45 Halldor Bjamason, “Centre and Periphery: Introduction,” in Ingi Sigurdsson and Jon Skaptason, 
(eds.), 2000, p. 35.
46 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536­
1966, Berkely: University o f California Press, 1975, pp. 6-8.
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culture, and the weakness of the model for explaining underdevelopment in 
developed economies. With respect to the former, Hechter notes that the interaction 
of cultural groups, by itself, does not foster national development. Instead:
The active role of the central government is stressed, 
particularly in the establishment of what is often termed 
a national ‘political culture’. Control of the national 
information network enables a regime to set national goals, 
create a national identity, teach needed skills, centralize its 
power, extend the effective market, confer status on certain 
groups at the expense of others, and generally manipulate 
large numbers of individuals through well-developed techniques 
of mass persuasion.47
Hence, the role of national governments in fostering social and economic 
change is vital in the modernization, or diffusion, model of development.
With respect to the appropriateness of the model for explaining 
underdevelopment within industrialized nations, Hechter notes that the hypotheses 
generated by cultural diffusion theories “were derived from considering Third World 
failures of the integration process, [and thus] they are not very applicable to the 
collectivities in developed societies. It is difficult to argue that peripheral groups in
47 Michael Hechter, 1975, p. 25.
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industrial societies are economically, politically, and culturally isolated from the 
core.”48
Hechther contrasts the internal colonialism model with the modernization 
model: “The internal colonial model does not predict national development following 
industrialization, except under exceptional circumstances.”49 Instead, the core 
exploits the periphery socially and economically:
The spatially uneven wave of modernization over state terri­
tory creates relatively advanced and less advanced groups.
As a consequence of this initial fortuitous advantage, there is 
crystallization of the unequal distribution of resources and 
power between the two groups. The superordinate group, or 
core, seeks to stabilize and monopolize its advantages through 
policies aiming at the institutionalization of the existing 
stratification system.50
Hechter characterizes this relationship as a “cultural division of labor,” which 
serves to prevent acculturation, rather than foster it.
The core/periphery relationship also determines the type of economic 
development that will occur within the periphery. The economy of the core region has 
a diversified industrial structure, while the economy of its periphery is dependent 
upon, and complementary to, the core. The peripheral area will supply the core with 
raw materials for its industries. Industrial development in the periphery, if  any exists,
48 Michael Hechter, 1975, p.26.
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would be specialized and export-oriented. Compared to the core, the peripheral 
economy will be sensitive to price fluctuations that are set in the international market 
place. Furthermore, “Decisions about investment, credit, and wages tend to be made 
in the core. As a consequence of economic dependence, wealth in the periphery lags 
behind the core.”51
World-system theorist Immanuel Wallerstein asserts that racism and 
underdevelopment are inextricably linked with the world capitalist system:
Racism and underdevelopment... are more than 
dilemmas. They are ... constitutive of the capitalist 
world-economy as a historical system. They are 
primary conditions and essential manifestations of 
the unequal distribution of surplus-value. They make 
possible the ceaseless accumulation of capital, the 
raison d ’etre of historical capitalism. They organize 
the process occupationally and legitimate it politically.
It is impossible to conceptualize a capitalist world- 
economy which did not have them.
Dependency theorist, Dale Johnson elaborated on the concept of internal 
colonialism by defining it this way:
Economically, internal colonies can be conceptualized as
49 Michael Hechter, 1975, p. 9.
50 Michael Hechter, 1975, p. 9.
51 Michael Hechter, 1975, pp. 9-10.
52 Immanuel Wallerstein, 1991, p. 92.
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those populations who produce primary commodities for 
markets in metropolitan centres, who constitute a source 
of cheap labour for enterprises controlled from the metro­
politan centres, and/or who constitute a market for the products 
and services of the centres. The colonized are excluded from 
participation or suffer discriminatory participation in the 
political, cultural, and other institutions of the dominant society.
An internal colony constitutes a society within a society based 
upon racial, linguistic, and/or marked cultural differences as well 
as differences of social class. It is subject to political and admini­
strative control by the dominant classes and institutions of the 
metropolis. Defined in this way, internal colonies can exist on a 
geographic basis or on a racial cultural basis in ethnically or 
culturally dual or plural societies.53
Utilizing this definition we can identify two manifestations of internal 
colonialism in the circumpolar North: the political and economic colonialism of sub­
national jurisdictions, and the cultural colonialism of aboriginal peoples. Some 
regions and populations, such as Alaska, have developed more than others, but it can 
be argued that all regions in the circumpolar North continue to experience some form 
of dependency related to internal colonialism. This includes the Russian North, where 
Anthropologist Debra L. Schindler argues that:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
In a system which is similar in many respects to 
Hechter’s (1975) model of internal colonialism, 
the Far North functions as an internal colony, which 
is politically, economically, and culturally dominated 
by non-indigenous personnel (primarily Russians) 
from the core. Social stratification, which places 
members of the indigenous populations at the bottom 
of the ladder reinforces the cultural distinctions between 
core and periphery. Northern development within this 
context reflects the concerns of the core: modem industrial 
extraction of resources from the periphery; efficient trans­
portation of raw materials; and the training and retention 
of a qualified labor force.54
Some dependency theorists, such as Andre Gunder Frank, prescribed 
socialism or withdrawal from the world capitalist system as the cure for dependency: 
the power of the multi-national corporations could only be countered by socialist 
policies that placed the means of production in the hands of the state.55 However, in 
his 1984 book, The Economics o f Developing Countries, E. Wayne Nafziger critiques 
Frank’s version of dependency theory by noting that there were examples of 
developing countries that actually developed while extensively penetrated by foreign
53 Dale Johnson, James D. Cockcroft, and Andre G. Frank, Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin 
America’s Political Economy, Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1972, p. 277.
54 Debra L. Schindler, 1991, p. 71.
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capital: “Taiwan and South Korea both experienced real per capita growth of over 6 
percent per year, and decreased income inequality during the 1960s and 1970, while 
highly dependent upon trade, assistance, and investment from the United States and 
other capitalist countries.”56 He went on to suggest that:
The solution to these problems is not withdrawal from 
the world capitalist system, but, rather, a more selective 
policy in dealings with capitalist countries. Trade, economic 
aid, capital improvements, and technological borrowing 
from developed countries should be such that investment is 
directed into priority industries. Discouraging foreign mono­
poly power; encouraging domestic enterprise; preventing heavy 
debt burdens; avoiding substantial technological dependence on 
outsiders; and protecting infant, domestic industries should all 
be part of this selective strategy.57
Nafziger’s recommendations are supported by Peter Evans’ study of the 
technology development strategies of South Korea, Brazil and India published in 
1995. Evans discovered that states exhibiting “embedded autonomy” had the ability 
to foster developmental strategies and policies in targeted economic sectors, and
55 Teresa Hayter, Aid as Imperialism, Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1971; E. Wayne Nafziger, The 
Economics o f  Developing Countries, Belmont: Wadsworth, 1984, p. 165.
56 E. Wayne Nafziger, 1984, p. 166.
57 E. Wayne Nafziger, 1984, p. 167.
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demonstrated that these policies could promote national economic development, often
co
in partnership with foreign companies.
Nafziger’s recommendations appear to presuppose state capacity to develop 
and implement effective policies of economic development. Evans, on the other hand, 
qualifies his findings by noting that not all states possess embedded autonomy, and 
for countries that do not, development may not be an option. Thus the capacity of a 
state becomes a crucial variable in whether or not policies leading to development can 
be formulated and carried out. Wallerstein notes a second factor related to this 
question:
The great argument in favor of state-organized attempts 
to retain surplus created within the frontiers is that the 
state is the only agency potentially capable of going 
against the strong currents of unequal exchange flows 
structurally central to the functioning of the capitalist 
world-economy. This is a very strong argument and has 
secured wide support. The great negative, however, of that
58 Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995. Evans’ work is a small part o f the broader literature on the developmental state 
model. Interested readers should consult the following texts for a fuller understanding o f the model: 
Chalmers Johnson, M/77 and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth o f  Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982; Marco Orru, Nicole Woolsey Biggart, and Gary G. 
Hamilton, The Economic Organization o f  East Asian Capitalism, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 
1997; Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role o f  the government in East 
Asian Industrialization, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990; Masahiko Aiki, Hyung-Ki Kim, 
and Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara (eds.), The Role o f  Government in East Asian Economic Development, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997; Samantha F. Ravich, Marketization and Democracy: East Asian 
Experiences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000; Jose Edgardo Campos and Hilton L. 
Root, The Key to the Asian Miracle, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1996; and, Gary Gereffi and
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argument is that the state as an agency requires decision­
making actors, those who occupy the key political and 
bureaucratic posts. And these persons have a direct interest 
as a subgroup in the choice of priority between an emphasis 
on growth/catching up and equality. It is clear that economic 
self-interest pushes them towards the growth and “catching- 
up” goal.... As long as solutions are framed and sought at the 
national level, the dilemma will remain.. ,.59
The issue of capacity is more significant for developing countries than for 
developed countries, and there would appear to be no question that the “Arctic Eight” 
nations (other than, perhaps, Russia) possess “embedded autonomy,” and thus the 
capacity, to implement policies of economic change in their underdeveloped regions. 
The issue, then, as Wallerstein appears to suggest, becomes one of willingness to 
adopt and implement policies that foster internal equality instead of, or in addition to, 
economic growth.
In a 1988 paper in Arctic, political scientist Michael Pretes utilized the 
dependency approach to compare underdevelopment in the Canadian North with 
underdevelopment in the Amazon basin of Brazil. He commented that, “dependency 
theory is particularly effective in explaining the underdevelopment of some regions 
within a developed state, and this is where much of the future applicability of the
Donald L. Wyman, Paths o f  Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990.
59 Immanuel Wallerstein, 1991, p. 120.
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model lies.”60 Pretes concluded that the model proved useful for explaining 
underdevelopment in the Canadian North
Despite the foregoing, it should be noted that dependency theory has been 
criticized from many perspectives, and it has never been a reigning theoretical 
paradigm. Pretes summarized many of the criticisms of dependency theory, and of 
Andre Gunder Frank’s approach in particular. He noted that criticisms of the theory 
suggested that: it de-emphasizes the importance of class relationships; terminology 
and definitions in the theory tend to be vague; it emphasizes external exploitation, and 
ignores possible internal explanations that might complement the external 
exploitation; it fails to recognize the existence of traditional economies; and, it 
focused too much on the world system.61
Another author, David G. Becker, a government professor at Dartmouth 
College, has argued that the predictions of dependency theorists have not proven 
accurate:
The conduct of many ‘associated’ bourgeois sectors during 
and since the transition to constitutional governance has not 
conformed to dependency predictions. And a glance at recent 
world and regional affairs turns up a truth that should prove 
fatal to all conceptions of capitalist imperialism. Whereas 
‘national interests’ ... and the interests of dominant classes are 
increasingly congruent throughout Latin America and the rest
60 Michael Pretes, “Underdevelopment in Two Norths: The Brazilian Amazon and the Canadian
61
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of the Third World, the two sets of interests are increasingly
f\0divergent from each other in the metropolitan capitalist countries.
In other words, the alignment of interests within nations in both the developing and 
developed worlds is contrary to what dependency theorists predicted.
With respect to the application of colonialism and neo-colonialism theories to 
the North, anthropologist Paul Nadasdy has criticized these approaches as being over 
simplistic. He notes that First Nation societies have resisted assimilation and many 
continue to live their complex cultures. At the same time, he comments that these 
theoretical approaches have tended to treat the state as a monolithic entity, and have 
not adequately addressed the complexity of modem state governments, which have
/r -5
competing and often contradictory interests.
Despite these criticisms, many of the elements of dependency theory remain 
useful and cogent, as Wallerstein’s world systems theory demonstrates. As well, 
Michael Pretes’ comparative analysis of “Two Norths,” and Michael Hechter’s 
analysis of intercultural relations and regional disparities in Great Britain, 
demonstrate the utility of this approach for understanding underdevelopment within 
core countries, and consequently, for analyzing intercultural relations and regional 
disparities within the circumpolar North. This dissertation focuses on Michael 
Hecther’s approach, rather than Andre Gunder Frank’s world system approach.
Arctic,” Arctic, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1988, p. 110.
61 Michael Pretes, 1988, p. 111.
62 David G. Becker, “Beyond Dependency: Development and Democracy in the Era o f International 
Capitalism,” in D.A. Rustow and K.P. Erickson, (eds.) Comparative Political Dynamics: Global 
Research Perspectives, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991, p. 107.
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Hechter’s model of internal colonialism examines the impact of national policies on 
newly incorporated regions. This approach is useful because Alaska, the Yukon, and 
Greenland were all regions which were incorporated into larger countries as a result 
of the actions of national governments, and the peoples who lived there were 
subjected to national policies designed to incorporate the new region into the larger 
core. The dissertation makes a qualified application of the internal colonialism 
hypothesis to Alaska, the Yukon, and Greenland by adding the concept of the 
developmental state to the equation. It is, in essence, a hybrid of internal colonialism 
and developmental state approaches, with a focus on specific social forces and 
historical experiences.
This approach is complicated by the fact that dependency theories are rooted 
in the histories of Latin American countries, while the developmental state model is 
based on the experiences of the “miracle economies” of East Asia. The colonization 
and decolonization histories of these regions differ significantly from each other, and, 
of course, from the histories of jurisdictions in the circumpolar North. It is hoped that 
systematically testing the applicability of these theoretical approaches in the 
circumpolar North will prove useful for understanding the dynamics of the 
decolonization.
Summary
The subnational jurisdictions of the circumpolar North exhibit economic 
characteristics that can be found in many developing countries: resource extractive
63 Paul Nadasdy, Hunters and Bureaucrats: Power, Knowledge, and Aboriginal-State Relations in the
63
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(colonial) economies; external decision-making over issues that affect economic 
development; reliance on “Outside” investment capital; and a dual economy. 
Furthermore, these jurisdictions are frequently tom by issues related to race, or 
racially defined rights. Some jurisdictions, like Alaska and Greenland, have greater 
autonomy granted to them by national governments, and thus a greater range of 
jurisdiction and more options for dealing with social and economic issues. Yet, it 
appears unlikely that these jurisdictions will be able to overcome their dependency 
issues or their social/racial issues without some form of national government 
intervention.
Dependency theorists suggest that the evolution of world capitalism has 
shaped the international economy as we know it today. Wallerstein and Hechter 
expanded dependency theory to demonstrate how race relations within advanced, core 
countries could also be explained. We can refer to these economic and social 
relationships as forms of internal colonialism. Comparativists, such as Peter Evans, 
have demonstrated that some countries with sufficient capacity and certain 
characteristics (embedded autonomy) have been able to reduce their dependency 
through deliberate policy formulation and implementation.
Can subnational jurisdictions in the circumpolar North overcome their 
economic dependency? This dissertation will examine the issue from a historical and 
public policy perspective. The issue of race relations (aboriginal rights) is related to 
economic development in several ways: the ongoing existence of a subsistence
Southwest Yukon, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003.
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economy and subsistence harvest rights raises questions about land management and 
development (eg. should the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge be opened to oil 
development?); aboriginal land claims have raised significant issues about land 
ownership and the jurisdiction of aboriginal governments; and, as Kenneth Coates 
argues, struggles between aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples in the North have 
prevented northerners from focusing on the real issues of northern development.64 In 
other words, the resolution of outstanding issues related to race-based rights can 
contribute to economic development and self-government.
Constitutional development in the North is important to economic 
development as well. By defining “constitution” broadly to include important federal 
legislation such as ANCSA, we capture important policy instruments of economic as 
well as social significance. Thus constitutional change can foster or hinder economic 
development, and subnational governmental involvement in such change is important.
This dissertation takes the position that constitutional change can play a key 
role in addressing the issues of importance to northern peoples. Comparing the 
processes of constitutional change in three circumpolar jurisdictions will help us to 
understand the dynamics of change, and provide lessons on how the process can be 
made more effective.
Internal colonialism theory will assist us in understanding how economic and 
social relations evolved in the North by showing how increasing contact between 
aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples resulted in the subjugation of aboriginal
64 Kenneth Coates, 1994, p. 41.
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interests to those of the non-aboriginal population. This subjugation was aided by 
national government policies of internal colonialism. These policies also subjugated 
the interests of the non-aboriginal northerners to those of southern interests, resulting 
in colonial economic and political relationships.
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Chapter 3 
The Evolution of Indian Policy in North America
This chapter reviews the history of the evolution of Indian policy in the 
United States, Canada, and their subnational units Alaska and the Yukon. Its purpose 
is to consider the evidence in support of the thesis that the indigenous peoples1 of 
North America were treated as internal colonies of Canada and the United States, and 
specifically, to discuss how those policies were applied differently in Alaska and the 
Yukon than in the provinces and the lower 48 states. While northern indigenous 
peoples were as much internal colonies as southern indigenous peoples, their 
demands for equal treatment with their southern counterparts (the right to enter into 
treaties) were rebuffed by national governments until the twentieth century. 
Furthermore, the agreements reached with northern indigenous peoples differed 
considerably from the treaties that were made in the provinces and lower 48 states. 
Indian Policy in the Colonial Context
Historian Sarah Carter has noted that:
Historians of Western Canada have been reluctant to 
consider that what took place here was part of a global 
pattern of intensified conflict over land and resources.
Rather, the dominant narrative has stressed the unique 
nature of the society that has taken root, devising Western
1 Note: there is no consistent terminology for referring to aboriginal peoples in the circumpolar North, 
which consist o f Indians o f many tribes, Metis peoples, Inuit, and many others. In general, the term 
Natives is preferred terminology in Alaska, First Nations is commonly used in Canada, and Inuit or
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Canada’s own brand o f ‘exceptionalism.’ Historians tended 
to assign good marks to what they see as the orderly and 
peaceful development of the West through sound federal 
preparatory measures (national policies): the treaties, the 
North-West Mounted Police, the railway, and the Dominion 
lands policy.2
These policies are frequently contrasted with the violence associated with the 
pacification of the American West, often ignoring that western expansionism in 
Canada sparked two violent rebellions. A brief review of the settlement history of 
North America is necessary to put aboriginal/settler relationships into perspective and 
to provide an understanding of how national policies towards aboriginal peoples 
evolved. (Figure 3 provides a concise version of this comparison).
North America was originally viewed as an economic opportunity to be 
exploited for its resources, and settlement was not the objective. Thomas Berger, a 
former Canadian judge and sympathetic observer of aboriginal peoples, commented 
that:
In much of North America, especially in what is now Canada, 
the Europeans at first had no intention of settling the country.
They cared only that fur was abundant and could be marketed 
in Europe. The fur trade was a partnership between European
Greenlanders in Greenland. When referring to multiple ethnic groups, the terms “aboriginal people” or 
“indigenous peoples” will be utilized.
2 Sarah Carter, Aboriginal People and Colonizers o f  Western Canada to 1900, Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1999, p. 101.
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1831 Marshall decision (ignored by President) 1849 BIA transferred to Dept, of Interior (detribalizationpolicy)
1867 Confederation (Indians fed. resp.) 1867 Purchase of Alaska
1871-1929:13 treaties signed 1871 Indians become wards of state (end of treaties) 1876 First Indian Act passed
1887 Dawes Act (reserves broken up - individ. parcels)
1924 Indians become citizens 1934 Indian Reorganiz. Act - tribal gov'ts established
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1984 COPE Claim settled 
1994 - 4 Yukon claims settled
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1978 BIA accepts reinstatement of tribes w/treatyrights
Figure 3
The Evolution of Indian Policy in North America
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traders and the Indians who, as hunters and trappers, gathered 
the furs.3
Canadian columnist, political commentator, and author, Peter C. Newman 
concurred with Berger’s assessment, pointing out that, other than allowing Lord 
Selkirk’s Red River experimental settlement, the Hudson’s Bay Company actively 
discouraged settlement in the area under its control.4
On the west coast, the Russians reached Alaska in 1741, but here too, 
settlement was not the objective. As Claus-M. Naske and Herman Slotnick remark in 
their history of Alaska: “Following Bering, Russian influence in Alaska was felt in 
varying degrees, but at no time was there ever more than a fraction of the Native 
population or land under Russian control. Those Russians who came were mainly 
private individuals interested in the fur trade. Few settled permanently.”5
Thus, the pattern was the same on both coasts: state sponsored expeditions 
leading to discovery, followed by small scale private exploitation of furs, in turn 
displaced by state sanctioned monopoly exploitation by large capitalist corporations: 
the Hudson’s Bay Company and the Russian-American Company.6 Settlement took
3 Thomas R. Berger, A Long and Terrible Shadow: White Values, Native Rights in the Americas, 1492­
1992, Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1991, p. 55.
4 Peter C. Newman, Empire o f  the Bay: The Company o f  Adventurers that Seized a Continent, Toronto: 
Penguin Books, 1998, p. 17.
5 Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, Alaska: A History o f  the 49th State, Norman: The 
University o f Oklahoma Press, 1987, p. 23.
6 Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, pp. 23-30; Peter C. Newman, 1998.
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place in large measure to facilitate fur trade activities and to fulfill, often grudgingly,
n
the terms of company charters.
International events had profound implications for North Americans, even at 
the early stages of colonization. European wars were extended to North American 
soil, where Indians were recruited as allies by both sides in the conflict. Treaties 
signed in Europe moved boundaries and changed land ownership without regard for
o
aboriginal interests in the land.
In the early years of colonization, the Indian tribes, such as the Iroquois, were 
organized military forces to be taken seriously in all military campaigns, as well as 
the key to success in the fur industry. Indian tribes negotiated effectively for tools and 
luxury items that made their lives easier, and protected their strategic and economic 
interests through military alliances. However, their populations dwindled as European 
diseases swept across the continent in periodic epidemics, and their military power 
waned as the European population swelled.9 Trade relations also resulted in the 
gradual increase in dependency on the manufactured goods provided by traders. One 
historian summarizes this group dependency:
It was not until the commercialization of trapping and 
whaling that native people ... became inextricably inter-
7 Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, pp. 36-37.
8 Thomas R. Berger, 1991, pp. 56, 61. Peter C. Newman, 1998, p. 357.
9 Thomas R. Berger, 1991, pp. 32-34, 56-57; Janet M. Billson, “Social Change, Social Problems, and 
the Search for Identity: Canada’s Northern Native Peoples in Transition,” The American Review o f  
Canadian Studies, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, 1988, p. 302; Kenneth Coates, Best Left as Indians: Native- 
White relations in the Yukon Territory, 1840-1973, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press,1991, 
p. 13; Vine Deloria and David E. Wilkins, Tribes, Treaties, and Constitutional Tribulations, Austin: 
University o f  Texas Press, 1999, pp. 19-20.
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twined with white economic and social institutions....
For the Dene, the fur trade stimulated and perpetuated 
by the Hudson’s Bay Company and the rival North West 
Company created a significant dependence on non-native 
material culture.10
During the fur trade years, the Indians generally worked with, and allied with, 
European powers in North America. Conflict was often internal -  tribes and nations 
warred with each other for economic advantage in trade relations.11 However, as the 
American colonies grew, pressure to move westward and settle new lands also grew. 
Conflicts between Indians and settlers increased and the British authorities felt that 
action needed to be taken to reduce tensions. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was 
intended to provide a legal and rational mechanism for acquiring Indian lands and to 
protect the interests of Indian tribes. However, it was resented by the New England
settlers, who wanted to move West, and it became one of the grievances launched
12against the British government in the Declaration of Independence.
This is perhaps the key to understanding the difference between the evolution 
of British and American policies towards Indians in North America: the British (and, 
at the same time, the Russians in Alaska), viewed the Indians as positive economic 
forces which provided the labor for the efficient exploitation of the fur resources of 
North America. Historian Sarah Carter noted the Northwest fur trade dictated that:
10 Janet M. Billson, 1988, p. 300.
11 Augie Fleras and Jean L. Elliott, The Nations Within: Aboriginal-State Relations in Canada, the 
United States, and New Zealand, Toronto: Oxford University press, 1992, p. 135.
12 Augie Fleras and Jean Elliott, 1992, p. 134.
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In order to acquire this resource, Aboriginal people 
could not be enslaved, captured or forced into labour.... 
rather, their assistance was essential, as both trapping 
and transporting required the expert knowledge of those 
best acquainted with the environment.
Europeans had little or no interest in encouraging in­
tensive colonization that would irrevocably alter the 
environment on which the trade depended. The way that 
relations evolved was also determined by the interests, 
calculations, and activities of the Aboriginal participants.13
The British and Russians desired the ongoing cooperation of the Indian tribes, 
while the Americans sought to utilize their lands for settlement and agriculture. In the 
American colonies, the Indians were viewed as impediments to settlement and 
economic expansion. The policies of the Hudson’s Bay Company discouraged 
settlement in the West, which might disrupt the fur economy, while the American 
colonies along the eastern seaboard sought the freedom to acquire Indian lands to 
exploit for other economic purposes. Thus, economic interests dominated the 
structure of North American policies toward aboriginal peoples in their earliest 
iterations.
73
13 Sarah Carter, 1999, p. 36.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Internal Colonialism
Internal colonialism commences at the point where a national government 
displaces a foreign government as the colonial power, and establishes policies and 
practices which discriminate against a population or region.
The theory of internal colonialism model suggests that increased contact 
between center and periphery results in a cultural division of labor that fosters and 
maintains a relationship of exploitation and social stratification. Racism and racist 
policies are an expected outcome, including policies that serve to exploit or 
marginalize the subordinate populations. A review of state relations with, and state 
policies towards, aboriginal populations in North America will serve to clarify the 
evolution of state policies respecting aboriginal peoples in Alaska and northern 
Canada.
The Evolution of American Indian Policy
In the United States, the policies of internal colonialism began with the War of 
Independence. The Declaration of Independence sets out the views of the American 
colonists clearly: while “ .. .all men are created equal,” and “.. .endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights....”, the colonists viewed the Indians as 
“ .. .the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule 
of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.”14 
Indians were not considered citizens of the United States, and the Declaration set the 
tone for U.S. Indian policy for the next several decades. As the state expanded
14 www.law.indianna.edu/uslawdocs/declaration, Sept. 26, 2002.
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westwards, it encountered tribes who resisted the expansion, resulting in guerrilla 
style wars that lasted until the 1890s.
The responsibility for developing policy on Indians was assumed by the U.S. 
Congress, (successor to the continental congresses) which proclaimed in 1783 that 
white people could not settle on, or purchase, Indian land without the permission of 
Congress. Then, in 1787 the framers of the U.S. constitution gave to Congress 
exclusive jurisdiction to make treaties with Indians.15 Indian issues were scattered 
across government departments, including the War Department, from 1789 until 
1834, when they were consolidated in the Bureau of Indian Affairs.16 President 
Washington adopted a three part Indian policy in 1789 that sought to: regulate trade 
and land transactions with Indians, conclude treaties for land cession, and assimilate
1 7Indians by encouraging their “addiction” to white products. The federal government 
entered into a number of treaties with Indians between 1789 and 1871, but these did 
not prevent encroachment on Indian lands or eliminate conflict. In the early years, the 
federal government lacked the capacity to prevent state encroachment on Indian
1 ftlands, while later on it lacked the willingness to recognize Indian rights. The policy 
of removal was adopted by James Monroe in order to acquire Indian land, and legal
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15 Thomas R. Berger, 1991, pp. 69-70; Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: 
Native Societies in a Modem Constitutional Democracy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, p. 8.
16 Vine Deloria and David Wilkins, 1999, p. 40.
17 Donald C. Mitchell, Sold American: The Story o f  Alaska Natives and Their Land, 1867-1959: The 
Army to Statehood, Hanover: University Press o f New England, 1997, pp. 18-19.
18 Thomas R. Berger, 1991, pp. 70-72; Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, pp. 17-19.
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decisions, such as those issued by Justice John Marshall in the 1820s and 30s, were 
overridden.19
Chief Justice John Marshall issued three decisions in the 1820s and 30s that 
provided the foundation for U.S. laws towards its aboriginal peoples thereafter. In 
Johnson v. M ’Intosh (1823), Justice Marshall determined that tribes retained 
aboriginal title to lands they transferred to other parties, unless the lands were 
disposed of by, or to, the federal government.20 In his Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 
decision (1831), Justice Marshall “laid down the principle of the trust relationship: 
the legal and moral responsibility of the federal government to protect the vital 
interests o f ‘dependent sovereign’ tribes.”21 Finally, in Worcester v. Georgia (1832) 
Marshall determined that “the laws of Georgia were void within the borders of the
99Cherokee Nation.” Davis S. Case, an authority on Alaska Native law, noted that, 
taken together:
Three elements of the federal-Native relationship emerge 
from the rule of discovery and Marshall’s analysis of 
aboriginal title. The first is a federal obligation to protect 
the Indian right of occupancy from incursion or trespass.
The second is the power of the federal government to 
extinguish aboriginal title.... [and third is] the right to
19 Thomas R. Berger, 1991, pp. 73-84.
20 David S. Case, Alaska Natives and American Laws, Fairbanks: University o f Alaska Press, 1984, p. 
49.
21 Gerald A. McBeath and Thomas A. Morehouse, Alaska Politics and Government, Lincoln: 
University o f Nebraska Press, 1994, p. 99.
22 David S. Case, 1984, p. 50.
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compensation for any further taking of the reserved (recog­
nized) lands.23
Unfortunately for the Indians, the federal government of the day refused to 
enforce Marshall’s decisions, and the benefits of those decisions were not to be 
realized for many decades. In the interim, the relationship between Indians and the 
federal government changed considerably. Congress passed legislation in 1834 that 
established the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and “the rights of most Indian tribes became 
a matter of administrative option rather than nationally enforceable law.”24
The policy of removal was no longer feasible once settlers reached the west 
coast, as there was no longer any place to remove Indians to. Consequently, a new 
policy had to be found. Congress approved a new form of removal, whereby Indians 
were placed on surveyed reservations that were to be protected from encroachment by 
settlers.25
The new policy did not bring peace to the West, as Indians were forced onto 
smaller and smaller reserves. Resistance against settlers and federal forces continued 
until the 1890s. By then, their population had been reduced by disease, warfare and 
starvation to less than 250,000.26
The Bureau of Indian Affairs was transferred to the Department of the Interior
• 27in 1849. As the Indian wars began to wane, the department launched new policy
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23 David S. Case, 1984, p. 50.
24 Vine Deloria and David E. Wilkins, 1999, p. 40.
25 Thomas R. Berger, 1991, p. 87.
26 Augie Fleras and Jean Elliott, 1992, 142.
27 Vine Deloria and David Wilkins, 1999, p. 40.
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initiatives that were designed to promote the assimilation of Indians into the dominant 
society.
Federal policy was altered in 1871, when Congress declared that Indian 
nations and tribes would no longer be recognized as nations with which the United 
States would contract by treaty, although the federal government continued to
98negotiate agreements with Indian tribes that served as “treaty substitutes.” Indians 
became wards of the state and could only exercise powers that were delegated to them 
by Congress. In 1887 the Dawes Act (General Allotment Act) was passed by 
Congress, which broke up communally held reservation land into individually held 
parcels; any surplus remaining after division was to be sold to non-Natives.
According to sociologists Fleras and Elliott, “the Dawes Act was the first piece of 
legislation explicitly intended to destroy indigenous cultural organization.”29
The Bureau of Indian Affairs managed the detribalization process through the 
reserve system, and, as Fleras and Elliott note:
By the end of the century its success was evident; the 
reserve system had effectively destroyed the cultural, 
social, economic, and political systems of the aboriginal 
peoples. The BIA had the mandate to fill this vacuum -  
to acculturate and govern the Native people....
The result in this case was a continuation of the greed, 
incompetence, and exploitation that had already come
28 Charles F. Wilkinson, 1987, p. 8.
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to characterize the behaviour of the larger American 
society towards the aboriginal people.
Indians were recognized as citizens of the United States in 1924, and in 1934 
the New Deal Administration of F.D. Roosevelt embarked on a program to strengthen 
Indian self-government. However, as with past administrations, the Indian tribes were 
not consulted on the new initiative.
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 was also designed to assimilate 
Indians into American society, but the basic tenets of the law were substantially 
different from detribalization. Tribes were encouraged to hold common lands and the 
breaking up of reserves into individual plots was halted. Bands and tribes were 
encouraged to adopt their own constitutions. But traditional forms of governance 
were not encouraged, and the Bureau maintained a strong hand in the day to day 
affairs of reserves.31
In 1941, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Walapai 
(Hualpai) Indians versus the Santa Fe Railroad. According to historian Stephen 
Haycox, the court determined that Indians retained “aboriginal title over formerly 
used but abandoned lands. The decision ... meant that even if  the U.S. had taken and 
disposed of lands formerly used by Indians, if the Indians could prove their former 
use of the land and its resources, they could sue the U.S. for damages.”32 This was a 
significant departure from previous legal interpretations, which assumed that
29 Augie Fleras and Jean Elliott, 1992, p. 144.
30 Augie Fleras and Jean Elliott, 1992, pp. 146-47.
31 Augie Fleras and Jean Elliott, 1992, pp. 148-49.
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abandoned Indian lands could be disposed of by the government as unencumbered 
land.33
World War II changed many Americans’ perspective of the world, and, 
according to historian Kenneth Philp, “Many Indians who returned home after the 
war wanted the country to honor the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924. This legislation 
had made all Indians citizens. A substantial number of Indians wanted freedom from 
the 2,200 federal regulations that, in practice, still made them wards of the 
government.”34 But the Indian perspective on appropriate Indian policy, which 
“emphasized that federal trusteeship, tax-free land, and Indian self-government were 
vested legal rights,”35 differed significantly from the prevailing attitudes of Indian 
Commissioner Dillon S. Myers and others in the Indian Bureau, who advocated the 
elimination of all special rights for Natives. Furthermore, Myers “rejected the idea of 
a referendum to determine whether tribal groups favored termination legislation.”36 
In 1953, Congress adopted the ultimate assimilationist policy: “termination.” 
According to Fleras and Elliott, termination programs, such as “Operation 
Relocation,” were designed by conservatives in the federal government who: 
wanted to terminate the special relationship, based 
on the treaties, that aboriginal peoples had with the 
federal government. Termination was to take place on
32 Stephen Haycox, “Economic Development and Indian Land Rights in Modem Alaska: the 1947 
Tongass Timber Act,” The Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. XXI, No. 1, 1990, p. 26.
33 Stephen Haycox, 1990, p. 26.
34 Kenneth R. Philp, “Dillon S. Myer and the Advent o f Termination: 1950-1953,” The Western 
Historical Quarterly, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1988, p. 45.
35 Kenneth R. Philp, 1988, pp. 45-46.
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a tribe-by-tribe basis since some tribes were better 
prepared for cutting all ties to the BIA than others.
Ultimately, however, all tribes would be terminated; 
the BIA would be defunct, and the US government
■57
would be out of the ‘Indian business.’
•no
Termination policies were adopted without consultation, and they created a 
strong reaction in the American Indian community, with the advent of the Red Power 
movement in the 1960s, a march on Washington, D.C. in 1972, and the occupation of 
Wounded Knee in 1973. Fleras and Elliott argue that, in the United States: 
the Red Power movement was reacting against the 
terminationist ideology that strove to put aboriginal 
peoples on an equal footing with all other Americans....
Red Power was engaged in a struggle to regain a land 
base for aboriginal peoples and have their collective 
rights as nations acknowledged alongside their individual
• 1 • • 39rights as citizens.
The strong rejection of the termination policy by American aboriginal peoples 
resulted in its abandonment in 1970, and a return to more moderate assimilationist 
policies in the 1970s and 1980s.40
36 Kenneth R. Philp, 1988, p. 44.
37 Augie Fleras and Jean Elliott, 1992, p. 150.
38 Kenneth R. Philp, 1988, p. 53.
39 Augie Fleras and Jean Elliott, 1992, p. 151.
40 Donald C. Mitchell, Take My Land, Take My Life: The Story o f  Congress's Historic Settlement o f  
Alaska Native land Claims, 1960-1971, Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 2001, p. 389.
81
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Indian Policy in Alaska: 1867 -1945
Alaska was purchased by the United States in 1867, and, from the outset, 
federal policies towards Alaska’s indigenous population appeared to treat them 
somewhat differently from the indigenous peoples in the Lower 48. For example, no 
efforts were made to treat with the indigenous peoples of Alaska, despite the fact that 
Alaska was purchased four years before the end of treaty making, in 1871. The Treaty 
o f Cession of 1867 and the Organic Act of 1884 both promised that aboriginal use 
and occupation of lands would be protected, but the acts were largely ignored.41 
According to David Case:
It was generally assumed that these acts equated Native 
possession with non-Native possession and entitled Alaska 
Natives only to land which was in their individual and actual 
use and occupancy. The unspoken implication seems to have 
been that Alaska Natives, unlike other Native Americans, 
did not have claims of aboriginal title to vast tracts of tribal
42property.
In the area of education, Natives were technically equal to non-Natives: under 
the Organic Act, federal educational services were to be provided without “regard to 
race,” and the federal Bureau of Education, rather than Indian Affairs, was 
responsible for the education of Alaska Natives until 1931.43
41 Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, p. 187.
42 David S. Case, 1984, p. 6.
43 David S. Case, 1984, p. 6-7, 9.
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The biggest concern about the aboriginal populations of Alaska in the early 
years appeared to be their potential to resist American authority, and this concern 
continued until 1879, when the Navy was called in by the citizens of Sitka because 
they feared they would be attacked by Tlingit Indians.44
The tensions at Sitka may have been the result of a combination of racism and 
alcohol. Yukon historian Allan Wright has written that:
The importation of liquor into the territory was supposed 
to be prohibited, but whiskey was sold openly: among the 
best customers for it were the soldiers who were supposed 
to be the upholders of law and order. Only the Tlingit Indians 
were ever arrested for drunkenness, and it was not surprising 
that they could evoke little enthusiasm for American justice 
‘when they found themselves in the guardhouse, but never 
saw the officers in when in [sic] like conditions.’
In this atmosphere of permissiveness for the whites and 
repression for the Indians, some unknown opportunist... taught 
the Tlingits the technique for distilling liquor from molasses and
45sugar.
The Tlingit Indians were also effective in protecting their trading monopoly 
with Indians in the interior of the Yukon by intimidating whites and preventing their
44 Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, p. 25; Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, pp. 67-68.
45 Allen A. Wright, Prelude to Bonanza: The Discovery and Exploration o f  the Yukon, Sidney: Gray’s 
Publishing Ltd., 1976, pp. 119-120. Subquote from, Morgan B. Sherwood, “Ardent Spirits: Hooch and 
the Osprey Affair at Sitka,” Journal o f  the West, Vol. iv, No. 3, July, 1954, p. 312.
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access up the Chilkoot Trail. Once again the Navy was called upon and Captain 
Beardslee negotiated access for a party of miners up the trail in 1879. Thereafter 
prospectors could freely access the interior, although they greatly resented the high 
prices the Chilkat Indians demanded for packing their supplies up the trail.46 The 
Klondike Gold Rush eliminated the Indians’ monopoly on packing services however, 
as, “Expanded use of pack trains and tramways and eventually the opening of the 
White Pass and Yukon Route Railway, connecting tidewater and Whitehorse, 
undercut the Indians’ packing enterprise.”47
The growth of the white population in Alaska following the purchase of 
Alaska resulted in increasing competition and conflict over the exploitation of 
resources, particularly salmon. Canneries began exploiting aboriginal labor and began 
disrupting traditional aboriginal harvesting practices on salmon streams. Complaints 
were often resolved in favor of the canneries, which could call upon the Navy to
48intimidate Natives into complying with their wishes.
On the Pribilof Islands, Russian-American Company exploitation of the 
Aleuts and the fur seals was replaced by Alaska Commercial Company and Treasury 
Department exploitation, until 1910, when the Department of Commerce and Labor 
took over full responsibility. Federal responsibility did not improve the lot of the 
Aleuts, however, who continued to live in poverty and were compelled to harvest 
seals for the government at obscenely low wages. Furthermore, they had to endure
46 Allen A. Wright, 1976, pp. 134-37; Kenneth Coates, 1991, pp. 34-35,41.
47 Kenneth Coates, 1991, p. 41.
48 Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, pp. 107-110, 156-57.
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assimilationist and racist policies designed to abolish their language and cultural 
practices.49
Lands in Alaska were appropriated for railways, national forests, parks and 
other government purposes without any effort to consult the indigenous peoples 
affected by the removals. And in 1902 the Alaska Game Act was passed without 
consultation with Natives, despite the fact that the Act had a significant impact on the 
aboriginal subsistence economy. Efforts by the indigenous peoples to get the law 
changed were ignored.50
The assimilationist policies employed in the lower 48 were extended to 
Alaska in the early 1900s. Claus-M. Naske and Hermann Slotnick stated that:
In 1906 the passage of the Native Allotment Act 
enabled Alaska Natives to obtain legal title to 160- 
acre homesteads to be selected from the unapprop­
riated and unreserved public domain. Although it 
enabled Natives to gain title to land, it was a regressive 
piece of legislation since it endeavored to turn hunters 
and food-gatherers into homesteaders.51
But the policies of assimilation were effective in parts of Alaska. Many 
Indians joined the Alaska Native Brotherhood (ANB), whose objectives were to 
lobby for recognition of aboriginal citizenship rights, education, and the elimination
49 Dorothy Jones, A Century o f  Servitude: PribilofAleuts Under U.S. Rule, 1980,
http://arcticcircle.uconn.edu/ArcitcCircle/HistoryCulture/Aleut/Jones/jones.html
50Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, pp. 160-187; Theodore R. Catton, “Glacier Bay National Monument, the
Tlingit, and the Artifice o f Wilderness,” The Northern Review, No. 11, 1994, pp. 56-82.
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o f ‘“ aboriginal customs.’” The ANB was somewhat successful in its efforts: Alaska 
adopted legislation in 1915 that enabled Natives to become citizens if  they could 
prove they were “civilized.”53 But becoming citizens did not eliminate discrimination. 
For example, passage of a literacy law in 1925 prevented many aboriginal citizens 
from exercising their right to vote. Furthermore, social pressures usually resulted in 
Natives living in separate communities from whites, and they were frequently barred 
from entering saloons, theatres, hotels, and restaurants, or forced to sit in segregated 
areas within those establishments.54
The Alaska Native Brotherhood reacted to racism by organizing boycotts of 
establishments that discriminated against aboriginal citizens, which proved somewhat 
successful in Southeast Alaska.55 However, this had relatively little impact on the 
situation throughout Alaska.
In 1936 the Indian Reorganization Act was extended to Alaska, and the 
Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, used the opportunity to create seven 
reservations in the state. Stephen Haycox noted that the Act “enabled natives to 
establish village self-government, and borrow money from a federal credit fund, but 
implementation of other provisions of the act failed in the territory, due to poor
86
51Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, p. 188.
52 David S. Case, 1984, p. 406.
53 Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, p. 188; Terrence M. Cole, “Jim Crow in Alaska: The 
Passage o f the Equal Rights Act o f 1945,” The Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. XXIII, No. 4,
Logan: Utah State University, 1992, p. 432.
54 Terrence M. Cole, 1992, pp. 430-437.
55 Terrence M. Cole, 1992, pp. 434-435.
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administration by the Office of Indian Affairs, inadequate funding by the Congress, 
and confusion and inconsistency in defining policy.”56
The appointment of Ernest Gruening as Governor of Alaska and the advent of 
World War II brought new forces to bear on the problem of racism in Alaska. The 
segregationist policies of General Simon B. Buckner, commander of the Alaska 
Defense Force, and the botched evacuation of Aleuts from the Aleutian Islands, 
reflected poorly on the federal government and federal policies, which appeared to 
tolerate racism by federal officials. However, Governor Gruening worked tirelessly to 
bring forward policies to eliminate racist practices in the territory, and the 
involvement of aboriginal people in the war effort served to add impetus to the issue. 
According to Terrence Cole, “The war provided a strong rationale for legislative 
action.”57
Alaska historian Terrence Cole also noted that Governor Gruening realized 
that the aboriginal vote could be harnessed to counter colonialist forces in Alaska: 
Gruening recognized the Native vote as a potentially 
powerful constituency in his fight against the Seattle 
fishing and mining interests that controlled the legislature, 
and blocked his efforts to increase taxes on the huge 
profits of the canned salmon industry. In addition, the 
governor hoped that the grip of the ‘interests’ on the 
territorial legislature would be loosened by the congres-
56 Stephen Haycox, 1990, p. 21.
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sionally authorized 1944 reapportionment of the legislature, 
doubling the size of the senate ... and increasing the 
house by fifty percent.... He actively campaigned across 
Alaska to ensure that some of the new lawmakers would 
be Alaska Natives.58
Gruening’s anti-discrimination bill was approved by the Alaska legislature in 
1945, marking a significant beginning to the process of ending Jim Crow practices in 
Alaska.59
Governor Gruening was also a staunch advocate of economic development in 
Alaska, and he saw Secretary Icke’s moves to establish Indian reservations in Alaska 
as counterproductive. The issue came to a head during the debate over the Tongass 
Timber Act, which permitted the sale of timber resources in the Tongass National 
Forest. Despite strong Native protests that their land rights were not adequately 
protected, the Act was passed in 1947.60
Indian Policy in Alaska, 1947-1971: Settling Native Land Claims
Lawyer Donald Mitchell argues that:
From the beginning of the nineteenth century Native 
Americans and the governments of their states had been
57 Terrence M. Cole, 1992, p. 436.
58 Terrence M. Cole, 1992, p. 440.
59 Dr. Gerald McBeath notes that there was a literacy test in the Alaska constitution until deleted in a 
1970 constitutional amendment, and for that reason Alaska fell under the Voting Rights Act o f  1965, 
pers.comm., March 26, 2003. See also, Gordon Harrison, Alaska’s Constitution: A Citizen’s Guide, 4th 
ed., Juneau: Alaska Legislative Research Agency, 2002, p. 107.
60 Stephen Haycox, 1990; Claus-M. Naske, “Ernest Gruening and Alaska Native Claims,” Pacific 
Northwest Quarterly, Vol. 82, No. 4, 1991, pp. 140-148.
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bitterly estranged. Most Indians lived on geographically 
isolated reservations, which was (and today remains) one 
cause for the estrangement. However, because Alaska’s 
harsh climate and hopeless economics had discouraged 
white settlement, Alaska Natives not only had not been 
forced onto reservations, but because their labor was need­
ed, they had been allowed to participate in the white cash 
economy.61
However, the federal government did attempt to foster the establishment of 
reservations in Alaska in the 1940’s. As noted earlier, these efforts were staunchly 
opposed by Governor Gruening and advocates of economic development, as well as 
by the ANB and most Alaska Native leaders who feared reservations would result in 
ghettoes. Federal supporters of reservations viewed them as a means of maintaining 
the aboriginal subsistence economy. Ultimately, federal efforts resulted in little 
success, and in 1953 federal policy was reversed to promote the elimination of 
reservations. However, the federal government efforts did renew the debate over 
aboriginal land rights in Alaska, and various efforts were made to have Congress 
eliminate those rights during the termination era.
One example of termination policies being extended to Alaska was the 
imposition of Public Law 280 in 1958. This measure allowed the territorial 
government to exercise limited criminal and civil jurisdiction on Native lands in the
61 Donald C. Mitchell, 2001, p. 118.
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territory.64 This law was enacted after only cursory consultation with the ANB, and 
without the consent of the aboriginal population.65 According to criminal justice 
professors David Blurton and Gary Copus, Public Law 280, “creates obstacles that 
interfere with tribal prosecution of criminal behavior .. ..This interference exists even 
when the state and the tribes may both agree local control is desirable.”66 Public Law 
280 was extended to Alaska as a result of a court case which determined that some 
Indian Country existed in Alaska, and that the territory lacked full jurisdiction to 
enforce certain laws in Indian Country.67
By the 1960s, a complex, tripartite system of education had evolved in 
Alaska, two parts of which were under the administration of the State of Alaska, and, 
“The third element... [was] the federal system of rural schools for Alaska Natives 
operated directly by the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs.”68 
Education policy was inconsistent, with fluctuating goals and policies, and, “at times 
there was a hiatus between goals stated in Washington and policies carried out in 
Alaska.”69 However, “From the very beginning of educational programs in the North 
through current times programs and goals have been the programs and goals of the
62 Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, p. 298.
63 Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, pp. 333-357.
64 David S. Case, 1984, p. 453.
65 David M. Blurton and Gary D. Copus, “Administering Criminal Justice in Remote Alaska Native 
Villages: Problems and Possibilities,” The Northern Review, No. 11, 1993, pp. 118-126.
66 David M. Blurton and Gary D. Copus, 1993, p. 118.
67 David M. Blurton and Gary D. Copus, 1993, pp. 121-122.
68 Frank Darnell, “The Pedagogical Situation,” in Frank Darnell, (ed.), Education in the North:
Selected Papers o f  the First International Conference on Cross-Cultural Education in the Circumpolar 
Nations and Related Papers, Fairbanks: University o f  Alaska and the Arctic Institute o f  North 
America, 1972, pp. 293-294.
69 Frank Darnell, 1972, p. 302.
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dominant ‘western’ culture.” The results were disappointing for Alaska’s 
indigenous population, which suffered high drop out rates in high school and low 
enrollment in post-secondary institutions. In 1960, only 8 percent of Alaska Natives 
had completed high school, and “a fraction of only one percent had completed four
71years or more [of post secondary education].”
Court decisions also resulted in the recognition of aboriginal title in Alaska. In 
1955, the Tee-Hit-Tons of Alaska lost a court battle to have their claims for 
compensation recognized. However, the Court recognized “ that aboriginal title 
existed, implied that throughout most of the territory it had not been extinguished, 
and acknowledged that aboriginal title protected Alaska Natives’ occupancy of the 
land it colored ‘against intrusion by third parties.’”72 (i.e., Natives might own the land 
in question).
The statehood movement, which was renewed by Ernest Gruening, Anthony 
Dimond and Bob Bartlett in the 1940s, ran into opposition when Bartlett’s 1947 bill, 
H.R. 206, excluded any reference to aboriginal land rights. Industry lobbyist W.C. 
Arnold argued that statehood should be delayed until aboriginal land claims were 
settled. The debate over the issue continued through subsequent iterations of the bill, 
and the ANB lobbied vigorously to ensure their interests were recognized in the 
legislation. In the end, aboriginal title was recognized in the statehood bill, and Native
7-3
claimed lands were protected from selection by the state.
70 Frank Darnell, 1972, p. 305.
71 Frank Darnell, 1972, pp. 313-314.
72 Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, p. 358.
73 Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, pp. 358 -  375; Public Law 85 - 508, 1958, s. 4.
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The passage of the Statehood Act prior to the settlement of land claims in 
Alaska resulted in gridlock when the state attempted to make its land selections.74 
Efforts to resolve the impasse began in 1963, when a federal Native affairs task force 
released its report with recommendations to withdraw small parcels around villages 
for their exclusive use and the creation of a tribunal to adjudicate aboriginal claims. 
The proposals were quickly rejected by representatives of Alaska’s aboriginal 
organizations, and the search began for another legislative solution.75
The process of identifying lands for transfer to the state generated interest and 
concern amongst the indigenous peoples of Alaska, who began to organize in 
response. In October, 1966 representatives of aboriginal organizations and numerous 
villages met in Anchorage to form an organization that became the Alaska Federation 
of Natives (AFN), in 1967. The purpose of the AFN, as set out in its constitution, was 
to secure Native rights and benefits, educate Alaskans about Natives, preserve Native 
culture, seek an equitable solution to their land claims, promote the common welfare 
of Alaska Natives, and foster loyalty to Alaska and the United States.76
On December 11, 1968, Secretary of the Interior, Stuart Udall, ordered a 
moratorium on patenting state land selections in order to preserve the status of Alaska 
lands until the Natives’ claims were settled, a move that enraged Governor Hickel.77 
The search for a solution to the impasse was given added impetus with the discovery 
of oil at Prudhoe Bay, on Alaska’s North Slope the same year. The only way of
74 Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, pp. 379-380; Claus-M. Naske, 1991, p. 147.
75 Donald C. Mitchell, 2001, pp. 103-04.
76 Claus -M . Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, p. 200.
77 Donald C. Mitchell, 2001, p. 189.
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realizing the value of the oil was by shipping it to southern markets, and this could 
only be accomplished by building a pipeline which would cross lands that were 
claimed by aboriginal villages.
The main issues in the debates over settlement of land claims in Alaska were 
land quantum and appropriate monetary compensation, and these were issues that 
many legislators had strong feelings about. The positions of the parties trying to 
resolve the impasse appeared to be relatively consistent from 1963 to 1971. Non­
Native Alaskans (as represented by Senators Gruening and Bartlett and 
Representatives Gravel and Young), supported relatively small land grants to Natives 
initially, although they later supported larger land grants in order to expedite a 
settlement. The Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) started negotiations with a 
position that they should receive 40 million acres, and attempted to leverage an 
additional 20 million acres later in the negotiations. Non-Native Alaskans did not
-JO
support the idea of Alaska’s indigenous peoples receiving 40 million acres.
Relations between state politicians and aboriginal leaders during the land 
claim legislative process were strained. Governor Hickel’s Attorney General, Donald 
Burr, did not believe that the indigenous population had an interest in the federal land 
they claimed, and Governor Hickel initially advocated a largely monetary settlement 
of the claim, with minimal land transferred to the Natives. However, Hickel soon
70became more pragmatic, and backed a larger land settlement of 40 million acres.
78 Donald C. Mitchell, 2001, p. 299.
79 Donald C. Mitchell, 2001, pp. 139-154.
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Hickel also sponsored a land claims task force that included aboriginal leaders, and
paid their travel expenses.
However strained state and Native relations were, the federal-Native
relationship was worse. Byron Mallott, the mayor of Yakutat, issued a statement that,
“ ‘The Bureau of Indian Affairs, indeed almost every governmental agency with some
responsibility toward them, is resented, feared, and distrusted by the Alaskan Native.’
” Alaska’s indigenous population sought to divorce itself from BIA administration,
and their solution was the corporate structures to be established by the Alaska Native
81Claims Settlement Act.
The Department of the Interior (DOI) was also reluctant to accept the 
settlement terms proposed by the aboriginal organizations, and weakly supported by 
the State of Alaska, in large measure because DOI officials knew that the Bureau of 
the Budget would not support the terms. The DOI bill tabled in early 1967 proposed a 
land quantum of only 10 million acres, and a payment of $ 180 million -  much less 
than was sought by the aboriginal organizations.
The courts also played a significant role in expediting the land claim process, 
first by upholding the federal land freeze preventing the state from making land 
selections under the Statehood Act, then by issuing injunctions against the 
construction of the pipeline until environmental assessments had been completed. 
These decisions helped to convince the pipeline proponents and oil companies that
80 Donald C. Mitchell, 2001, p. 163.
81 Donald C. Mitchell, 2001.
82 Donald C. Mitchell, 2001, pp. 165-166.
83 Donald C. Mitchell, 2001, pp. 267, 326.
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“TAPS would not be authorized to begin construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline 
until Congress settled Native land claims.”
The main arena for resolving the claims issue thus was Congress, and all 
interested parties focused their efforts on influencing congressmen, and the members 
of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, in particular. In this way, 
“Outside” forces, including congressmen from the lower 48 states, were given 
significant power over the terms of the final legislation settling the Alaska Natives’
o c
land claim. Environmental groups, in particular, used the opportunity to lobby 
congressmen to include land use planning and land protection provisions in the bill. 
The National Park Service also capitalized on the opportunity to request lands for its
o /r
National Parks system.
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act was approved by the AFN on 
December 18, 1971, and signed into law by President Richard Nixon that same day. 
The settlement package granted Alaska’s aboriginal population title to 44 million 
acres of land (including surface and subsurface rights), and $962.5 million dollars 
from the federal and state governments. Twelve regional corporations were 
established immediately, followed by a thirteenth, for non-resident beneficiaries.
o 7
More than 200 village corporations were also created.
The corporations were the primary vehicle for implementing the settlement. 
Village and regional corporations selected and administered the land, resources and
84 Donald C. Mitchell, 2001, p. 329.
85 Donald C. Mitchell, 2001.
86 Donald C. Mitchell, 2001, pp. 443-446; 466-470; Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, p. 
225.
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cash transferred to them under the act, and regional corporations were required to 
share 70 percent of their revenues from timber and subsurface production with other 
regional corporations and village corporations. Alaska Natives living at the time 
ANCSA was enacted were enrolled as beneficiaries and each received 100 shares of 
stock in a regional corporation, and if a village resident, 100 shares of stock in a 
village corporation. However, anyone bom after the date of enactment was not
n o
entitled to shares.
Government and Aboriginal Relations After ANCSA
According to David Case:
ANCSA was but the first in a line of five major pieces of 
self-determination legislation. Together these statutes 
cement in place a federal policy which permits Native 
Americans to exercise real control over federal programs 
without the threat that the price of their independence 
will be termination of either the programs or the tribe’s 
federal relationship. The keystone of the policy is the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 
of 1975....
Each of these acts define Alaska Native villages as 
described in ANCSA as “tribes” eligible for the various 
contract, grant and loan programs available to implement
87 Thomas R. Berger, 1985; Public Law 92 -  03, 1971.
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OQ
the new laws.
Within ten years of its passage, Alaska’s indigenous peoples began 
questioning the wisdom of their land claims settlement. Implementation problems, 
lawsuits, and fears that ownership and control of their lands would be lost after 1991, 
when shares could be alienated from aboriginal ownership, surfaced. The Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference established the Alaska Native Claims Review Commission 
in 1983 and hired a former Canadian judge, Thomas Berger, to conduct a detailed 
review of ANCSA.90 Berger made a number of recommendations that, if 
implemented, would have strengthened protection for aboriginal landholdings, tribal 
government, and subsistence rights.91 Berger’s recommendations for changes to 
ANCSA were largely ignored, but amendments were made which provided some
O'-)
comfort to Alaska Natives. However, the Native sovereignty movement has 
continued to grow in Alaska, and many aboriginal people, particularly in rural 
Alaska, have seen few benefits from ANCSA.93 Some Native corporations, such as 
Arctic Slope, have reaped huge financial rewards from the settlement, while others 
have struggled on the verge of bankruptcy, and have paid few dividends to 
shareholders.
97
88 Thomas R. Berger, 1985.
89 David S. Case, 1984, p. 449.
90 Thomas R. Berger, 1985.
91 Thomas R. Berger, 1985, pp. 166-172.
92 Fae L. Korsmo, “Native Sovereignty: An Insoluble Issue?” in Clive S. Thomas, (ed.), Alaska Public 
Policy Issues: Background and Perspectives, Juneau: Denali Press, 1999, p. 271; Leonard Sillanpaa, 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: The First Twenty Years, Ottawa: Circumpolar and Scientific 
Affairs, Government o f Canada, 1992, pp. 13-15, 17-22; Donald C. Mitchell, 2001, pp. 504-508.
93 Fae L. Korsmo, 1999, p. 263; Donald C. Mitchell, 2001.
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A major disappointment of ANCSA was its failure to conclude the subsistence 
debate in Alaska. Although ANCSA extinguished all subsistence harvest rights of 
aboriginal Alaskans, the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) 
restored these rights to all rural Alaskans in 1980. Congress had originally proposed 
to grant subsistence rights only to Alaska Natives, but vigorous lobbying by the 
Alaska government resulted in the right being granted to all rural residents in the 
state. Lawsuits were launched challenging subsistence rights, and Alaska courts found 
that they violated the state constitution. Repeated efforts to have the state constitution 
amended have been thwarted by the Alaska legislature, and, as a consequence, the 
federal government took over management of fish and game resources on federal 
lands. A lawsuit launched in 1990 (.Katie John, et. al., v. United States), resulted in 
federal subsistence laws being applied to navigable waters in the state on October 1, 
1999. Alaska Natives have been angered by the constitutional impasse and their 
inability to convince the legislature of the need to amend the state constitution.94 
The Evolution of Canadian Indian Policy
British policy toward Indians remained in effect until Canada emerged as an 
independent country in 1867, and acquired Rupert’s Land from the Hudson’s Bay 
Company in 1870. Until that time, Indian policy in the Northwest was largely 
administered by the Hudson’s Bay Company, which, as the owner of all lands
94 Alaska Natives Commission, Final Report, Vol. Ill, Anchorage: Joint Federal-Sate Commission on 
Policies and Programs Affecting Alaska Natives, 1994, pp. 11 - 42; Thomas F. Thornton, 
“Subsistence: The Politics o f a Cultural Dilemma,” in Clive S. Thomas, (ed.), Alaska Public Policy 
Issues: Background and Perspectives, Juneau: Denali Press, 1999, pp. 205 -  219.
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draining into Hudson Bay (Rupert’s Land), continued to be the largest private land 
owner in North America.
As noted earlier, the fur trade dictated that indigenous peoples be treated as 
“partners,” and the competition between the Hudson’s Bay Company and the 
Northwest Company meant that Indians had some choice between whom they would 
trade and bargain with. However, the use of alcohol to lubricate transactions was 
obviously an unabashed form of exploitation, which had severe consequences for the 
aboriginal populations engaged in the fur trade.95 Peter C. Newman characterizes the 
relationship harshly:
Canadians have traditionally prided themselves on 
the fact that after the turn of the century there were 
relatively few armed confrontations between white 
and red men .... But this ... does not justify the smug 
assumption that white men north of the 49th parallel 
treated the native population with compassion and respect.
On the contrary, the unrestrained use of liquor in the 
Canadian fur trade ranks as one of history’s more 
malevolent crimes against humanity.96
99
95 Janet M. Billson, 1988, pp. 300-302; Sarah Carter, 1999, pp. 92-93; Douglas MacKay, The 
Honourable Company: A History o f  the Hudson’s Bay Company, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 
Company, 1966, pp. 221-228; Peter C. Newman, 1998, pp. 358-366.
96 Peter C. Newman, 1998, p. 358.
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The Indians in British North America were important allies of the British 
army during the War of 1812-13, but their power in eastern Canada dwindled as the
Q7white population grew and overwhelmed them. Fleras and Elliott state that: 
Reciprocity and accommodation were replaced by a system 
of internal colonialism and conquest-oriented acculturation, 
reflecting the need for (a) political control of Native populations,
(b) protection of British and French interests, and (c) removal 
of competition for scarce resources. Political events dictated this 
relational shift. After the 1812 War with United States, British 
colonizers no longer required aboriginal peoples as allies ....
Their value rapidly diminished, with the result that aboriginal
tribes became stigmatized as obstacles to the progressive
• 08 settlement of Canadian society.
The British government came under pressure to change Indian policy to 
encourage Indians to change their way of life, and, “A policy of assimilation evolved 
as part of this project to subdue and subordinate aboriginal peoples.”99Sarah Carter 
commented that:
From 1828, the British Indian Department sought to foster 
the creation of self-supporting, as well as self-governing 
Aboriginal agricultural communities in British North
97 Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report o f  the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples, Vol. 1, Looking Forward, Looking Back, Ottawa: Minister o f Supply and Services Canada, 
1996, p. 141; Sarah Carter, 1999, p. 113.
98 Augie Fleras and Jean Elliott, 1992, pp. 40-41.
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America. In that year the Indian superintendent of Upper 
Canada proposed a new function for the department: it 
would take the lead in ‘civilizing’ the Indians by encour­
aging them to settle on reserves, and take up agriculture 
as a livelihood.100
The Gradual Civilization Act (1857) and the Enfranchisement Act (1869) 
promoted individual property ownership as the mechanism for achieving voting rights 
and cutting ties with tribes -  and becoming “civilized.” Aboriginal self-government 
was discouraged, and government officials were given broad powers over band 
government.101
In western Canada, the aboriginal peoples continued to be a force that the 
government and Hudson’s Bay Company had to be concerned about, especially after 
1860, when American policies and wars with Indians resulted in some American 
tribes moving into the Canadian West. The North West Mounted Police was 
mobilized in 1873 to bring order to the region.
The creation of Canada in 1867 marks the commencement of internal 
colonialism in that country, and in 1870 eastern Canadian colonial policies were 
extended into the North-West Territories. Sarah Carter noted that:
When Manitoba and the North-West Territories joined 
Confederation in 1870, the vast majority of the residents 
were Aboriginal people, and largely unknown to them,
99 Augie Fleras and Jean Elliott, 1992, p. 41.
101
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their lives from then on were to be greatly influenced by 
policies and legislation developed for nearly 100 years in 
Eastern Canada, and inherited from British imperial practices.
The British North America A c t... had given the Canadian 
federal government jurisdiction over Indians and Indian 
reserves. In Western Canada, by 1870 there had been over two 
centuries of European contact, but no formal challenges to 
Aboriginal land ownership, except within the territory covered 
by the Selkirk Treaty.102
Aboriginal peoples were not consulted on the important changes taking place 
in British North America. Laws were passed, agreements made, and Confederation 
achieved without their knowledge or consent.
According to Carter, the first Indian Act, passed in 1876, was built upon the 
foundations of the colonial laws:
Through the British North America Act, and the 
legislation aimed at Aboriginal people combined in the 
comprehensive Indian Act of 1876, the federal govern­
ment took extensive control of the Aboriginal nations, 
their land, and their finances. Traditional forms of 
government were replaced by government/Indian agent -  
controlled models of government. There was no Aboriginal
100Sarah Carter, 1999, p. 113.
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participation in the formulation and ratification of this leg­
islation; there were protests and objections raised, but these 
were ignored.103
In 1871 the government of Canada began negotiating treaties with tribes in the 
newly acquired territories. The opportunity to negotiate was generally welcomed by 
the indigenous peoples in the region, whose way of life was rapidly eroding as the 
buffalo herds declined. They were able to negotiate provisions beneficial to their 
interests, but they were not told about the Indian Act, and the impact it would have on 
their lives and their relationship with federal authorities.104
Sarah Carter argues that 1885 marked a turning point in aboriginal-white 
relations in western Canada. The Riel Rebellion by Metis and Cree Indians was 
suppressed with military force, and there was, “a significant shift in Euro-Canadian 
attitudes towards aboriginal people after 1885. If there was a shred of tolerance before 
... it was shattered in 1885, as thereafter Aboriginal people were viewed as a threat to 
the property and safety of the white settlers.”105 Government policy towards Indians 
changed, so that, “The major goals of government policy ... were to wage war upon 
what was called the ‘tribal’ system and to rigidly supervise and monitor movements 
and activities of reserve people.”106 Federal regulations were approved to suppress 
traditional and religious practices, and a pass system was introduced to regulate when
101 Sarah Carter, 1999, pp. 115-116.
102 Sarah Carter, 1999, p. 111.
103 Sarah Carter, 1999, p. 115.
104 Sarah Carter, 1999, pp. 118-122.
105 Sarah Carter, 1999, p. 161.
106 Sarah Carter, 1999, p. 162.
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and where reserve Indians could travel. This illegal system of travel restrictions 
lasted, in some locations, until the 1940s.107
The federal government entered into treaties with various tribes across the 
West until 1921, but did not treat with the Inuit or with Indians in British Columbia, 
the Yukon Territory, or most of the tribes living north of the sixtieth parallel. In 
British Columbia, the colonial (and later, the provincial), government opposed 
recognition of Indian rights to any significant parcels of land. In the North, the federal 
government saw no advantage to entering into treaty negotiations with Indians or 
Inuit.
Federal Indian policy came under criticism after World War II, and this 
criticism forced federal officials to revisit the Indian Act. In 1951 the Act was revised
to eliminate some of the more offensive and discriminatory provisions, but the
108“assimilationist thrust” remained unchanged. Indians remained largely 
disempowered in Canadian society and most were not even entitled to vote until 
I960.109
In 1969 the federal government released its White Paper on Indian Policy, 
which proposed the repeal of the Indian Act and the Indian Affairs Program of the 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND). In effect, special 
programs for First Nations would be eliminated, and they would be treated the same
104
107 Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Vol. 1, 1996, pp. 180-186.
108 Kenneth Coates, 1991, p. 209; Augie Fleras and Jean Elliott, 1992, pp. 42-43.
109 Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Vol. 1,1996, p. 249.
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as all other citizens.110 Reaction to the proposal was similar to aboriginal peoples’ 
reaction to the termination policy in the United States: protests were held and there 
was a march on the capital city.
At the same time as the federal government was preparing its White Paper, 
Indians across the country were calling on the government to recognize their land 
claims, and launching court challenges to have their rights recognized. The Cree of 
Northern Quebec launched a court action against the Government of Quebec in 1972 
after that government had announced its intentions to build massive hydroelectric 
infrastructure in the James Bay region without the consent of the Cree. The courts 
granted the Cree a temporary injunction, and although it was overturned, it added 
impetus to negotiations that resulted in the James Bay and Northern Quebec 
Agreement in 1975.111
On January 31, 1973, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision 
on the Nishga Tribal Council’s land claim (the Calder decision). Although the Nishga 
lost their case, the court recognized that aboriginal title continued to exist, and the 
federal government announced a new policy recognizing land claims on August 8,
1973.112
A number of initiatives were launched in the 1970s and 1980s that had 
important impacts and implications for aboriginal peoples in Canada. The federal
110 Menno Boldt, Surviving as Indians: The Challenge o f  Self-Government, Toronto: University o f  
Toronto Press, 1993, pp. 297-300; Augie Fleras and Jean Elliott, 1992, p. 43.
111 Floyd W. McCormick, Inherent Aboriginal Rights in Theory and Practice: The Council fo r  Yukon 
Indians Umbrella Final Agreement, Edmonton: University o f Alberta unpublished dissertation, 1997,
pp. 110-112.
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government issued a new land claims policy, entitled In All Fairness, in 1981,113 and 
constitutional negotiations and lobbying resulted in aboriginal and treaty rights being 
recognized in the Constitution of Canada that same year. Efforts by aboriginal people 
to have their right to self-government recognized met with some success, especially 
after the issuance of the Penner Report, in 1983, with the federal government 
agreeing to negotiate self-government arrangements with individual first nations.114
However, aboriginal aspirations to have the right of self-government 
entrenched in the constitution were not successful. A series of constitutional 
conferences to resolve the issue ended in 1987 without agreement.115 Proposals to 
address aboriginal self-government were not included in the Meech Lake Accord of 
proposed constitutional revisions, and aboriginal Canadians were appalled that their 
interests were completely ignored by the process leading to the accord.116 
Consequently, when the accord required ratification by the Manitoba legislature, an
112 Steven Smyth, The Yukon’s Constitutional Foundations, Vol. 1, The Yukon Chronology: 1897-1999, 
Whitehorse: Clairedge Press, 1999, p. 29.
113 Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, National and Regional Interests in the North: Third 
National Workshop on People, Resources, and the Environment North o f  60, Ottawa: Canadian Arctic 
Resources Committee, 1984, pp. 57-70.
114 The Report o f the Special Committee on Indian Self-Government, chaired by Member o f  
Parliament Keith Penner, recommended that “... the right o f  Indian peoples to self-government be 
explicitly stated and entrenched in the Constitution o f Canada.” Report o f  the Special Committee,
1983, p. 141. The Committee did not support amending the Indian Act as a route to self-government.
115 Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, Aboriginal Self-Government and Constitutional Reform: 
Setbacks, Opportunities, and Arctic Experiences, Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee,
1988.
116 The Prime Minister and provincial Premiers met at Meech Lake, Quebec shortly after the last 
constitutional conference on aboriginal issues ended in failure in 1987. Northern and aboriginal leaders 
were not invited to the Meech Lake meeting. The meeting ended with an agreement that met Premier 
Bourassa’s demands for resolution o f Quebec’s constitutional issues. Northern and aboriginal leaders 
argued against ratification o f the Accord unless it was amended to address their concerns. For 
aboriginal people, this meant addressing their desire to have self-government protected in the 
constitution.
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aboriginal member blocked the process and frustrated the attempts of the federal
117government to achieve constitutional reform.
Measures to address aboriginal self-government were included in the 
proposed Charlottetown Accord of constitutional amendments in August 1992, but 
the demise of the proposal later that year in a national referendum meant that the 
status quo remained. The Chretien government agreed in its 1995 policy statement 
that aboriginal self-government agreements would be treated as if they were 
constitutionally entrenched, although this did not provide the legal certainty First
1 1 o
Nations sought.
In Canada, conflict between First Nations and federal and provincial 
governments continued to flourish in the 1990s. The standoff between Indians and 
Quebec police, then the Canadian military, at Oka, Quebec in 1990 garnered 
international attention. The dispute over a few acres of land escalated dramatically 
after a Quebec provincial police officer was shot in the incident. The conflict resulted 
in the launching of the largest and most expensive royal commission in Canadian 
history in 1991: the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. The commission 
completed its report in 1996, and made hundreds of recommendations addressing 
aboriginal issues in Canada, including recommendations to entrench aboriginal self­
government in the Constitution of Canada.119 But Canada’s indigenous peoples have
107
117 Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Vol. 1, p. 212.
118 Bernard W. Funston and Eugene Meehan, Canada’s Constitutional Law in a Nutshell, Toronto: 
Thomson Canada Ltd., 1998, p. 157.
119 Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Vol. 1, 1996, pp. 141-255.
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been disappointed with the federal government’s follow up on the recommendations, 
and the commission has commented that:
This ... review highlights how entrenched the economic 
disparities between Aboriginal people and Canadians gen­
erally are and how they increased during the 1980s. It is 
quite possible that during the 1990s these disparities have 
continued to widen... .The rapid rise in federal social assist­
ance expenditures from 1991-92 to 1995-96 ... suggests 
that conditions may have worsened in First Nation com­
munities. ... After adjusting for population and price changes, 
we calculate that the economic gap between Aboriginal people 
and an equivalent number of Canadians will reach $5.8 billion 
in 1996, compared with $4.4 billion six years earlier.120
In January 1998, the federal government responded to the Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples report by releasing Gathering Strength -  Canada’s Aboriginal 
Action Plan, “a long term, broad-based policy approach designed to increase the
1 91quality of life of Aboriginal people and to promote self-sufficiency.” The four key 
objectives of the policy are stated as follows:
• Renewing the Partnerships speaks to bringing about 
meaningful and lasting change in our relationships with
120 Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Vol. 5, 1996, pp. 31-32.
121 Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs, Gathering Strength-A n Aboriginal Action Plan, 
http://www.abic-inac.gc.ca/gs/index e.html. May 23, 2003, p .l.
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Aboriginal people;
• Strengthening Aboriginal Governance is about sup­
porting Aboriginal people in their efforts to create 
effective and accountable governments, affirming treaty 
relationships, and negotiating fair solutions to Aboriginal 
land claims;
• Developing a New Fiscal Relationship means arriving 
at financial arrangements with Aboriginal governments and 
organizations which are stable, predictable, and accountable 
and will help foster self-reliance; and
• Supporting Strong Communities, Peoples and Economies 
focusses on improving health and public safety, investing in 
people, and strengthening Aboriginal economic development.122
Headlines in national media since 1998 have reflected the fact that many First 
Nations continue to feel aggrieved by their economic and social status, and continue 
to confront governments to assert their rights to land, resources and governance. 
Canadian federal policies have not succeeded in resolving the grievances o f Canada’s 
aboriginal peoples, and, despite the resources they have dedicated to aboriginal issues 
(over $7 billion annually), a large number of Canadian aboriginal people continue to
i yy
live in poverty and suffer a disproportionate share of social problems. In January,
1998 Indian and Northern Affairs Minister Jane Stewart made a public apology to
122 Indian and Northern Affairs, 2003, p. 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
First Nation people who suffered abuse in residential schools, and announced the 
establishment of a $350 million healing fund to assist them.124 However, legal actions 
were launched against the federal government and churches that ran residential 
schools across Canada, including the North. In 2002, the federal government 
established a dispute resolution process to divert some of the claims for compensation 
out of the court process. And in February, 2003, the $12 billion class action suit 
representing victims of residential schools dropped its claim against the churches and 
focused its lawsuit solely on the federal government.125 
Indian Policy in the Yukon Territory: 1840 - 1941
The expansion of the fur trade into the area now known as the Yukon 
Territory did not occur until the 1840s, when LaPierre House and Fort Youcon were 
established. Here competition with the Russian American Company occurred,126 and 
aboriginal trade patterns were altered. In the northern Yukon, the Indians impeded 
fur-trader exploration into the Yukon River basin in order to protect their trading 
monopolies. Further south, Hudson’s Bay Company employee Robert Campbell 
opened a trading post at Fort Selkirk and competed with the coastal Chilkat Indians 
for furs. He had to abandon the post after it was sacked by the Chilkats in 1852.
The purchase of Alaska in 1867, and the expansion of American fur traders up 
the Yukon River, improved Indian traders’ negotiating power. If they did not like the
123 National Post, February 24, 2003.
124 Steven Smyth, The Yukon’s Constitutional Foundations: Vol. 1, The Yukon Chronology, (1897­
1999), Whitehorse: Clairedge Press, 1999, p. 270.
125 CHON-FM radio news report, February 26, 2003.
126 Allen A. Wright, 1976, pp. 49, 56.
127 Kenneth Coates, 1991, p. 22.
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prices one company offered, they could take their furs elsewhere.128
Prospecting and small scale mining in the Yukon prior to the gold rush 
provided Natives with economic opportunities as well, but the gold rush of 1897-98 
brought tens of thousands of would be miners to the Yukon and cheap labor was 
readily available. Racist views resulted in white people being hired in preference to
1 7Q
Natives, and Natives were relegated to the economic periphery.
Some Yukon Natives, and some non-Natives acting on behalf of the Indians, 
attempted to engage the federal government in treaty negotiations after the turn of the 
century. Chief Jim Boss obtained the assistance of a lawyer, T.W. Jackson, to petition 
the Minister of Interior for treaty negotiations in 1902, but the Minister rejected the 
overture. Further attempts in subsequent years were also rejected.130
According to Kenneth Coates, the forty years following the gold rush 
witnessed “the institutionalization of rigid exclusion of Natives from the dominant 
society.... The separateness of the races originated in the dualistic character of the
I T 1regional economy and was supported by strong racist attitudes.” The federal 
government displayed little interest in providing programs or assistance to Natives in 
the North, and Coates asserts that: “In both the Yukon and Northwest Territories, 
responsibility for native health and education was left in the hands of the Catholic and 
Anglican missionaries, supported by small federal grants.” Canadian historian
128 Kenneth Coates, 1991, p. 30.
129 Kenneth Coates, 1991, p. 52.
130 Steven Smyth, 1999, p. 6; Kenneth Coates, 1991, p. 163.
131 Kenneth Coates, 1991, p. 86.
132 Shelagh D. Grant, Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North: 1936-1950, 
Vancouver: The University o f  British Columbia Press, 1988, p. 33.
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Shelagh Grant concurred with Coates, noting that, “Their [Canadian Native] living 
standards compared poorly with those of the Natives of Alaska, Siberia and 
Greenland. In 1939, the Russian Eskimos were piloting planes; the Alaskans operated 
businesses; and the Greenlanders were electing their own councils. In Canada, the 
northern Indians and Inuit had no say in the economy, religious practices, education, 
law, or politics.”133
Indian Policy in the Yukon Territory: 1941 - 1973
As in Alaska, World War II resulted in significant changes to the lives of 
Yukon’s aboriginal peoples. The construction of the Alaska Highway, Canol pipeline, 
airports and weather stations drastically increased contact between aboriginal and 
non-aboriginal people, especially American servicemen and construction workers. 
Communities once insulated from the “Outside” suddenly became way stations on the 
Alaska Highway. Communicable diseases spread rapidly through these communities, 
and health services were not adequate to the task.134 Canadian historian Shelagh 
Grant notes that:
In this respect, the arrival of the United States Army 
was a blessing. As had occurred in the Yukon, American 
medical officers stationed in the Northwest Territories 
volunteered their services to both native and white in­
habitants, but much to the consternation of the northern 
administration, they frequently notified Canadian authorities
133 Shelagh D. Grant, 1988, p. 40.
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of the highly unsatisfactory conditions. Yet, despite aware­
ness of inadequate health services, there was little attempt
1to remedy the situation.
Political scientist Gurston Dacks noted that the process of Indian urbanization 
began with the construction of the highway, as “Many native people moved to 
crossroads on the Highway in the hope of gaining employment.... Others moved 
because they were ejected by [the federal] government from the lands they had 
traditionally occupied. This ejection remains a major source of Indian bitterness in the
136Yukon.” Social programs for Yukon Indians improved after World War II as 
national social programs were developed. But the national policies of assimilation 
remained, and the lot of many Indians actually deteriorated. Kenneth Coates observed 
that the Indian crime rate in the Yukon was low prior to 1950, with little violent 
crime, but many liquor related offences.137 After 1949, aboriginal crime rates 
escalated, so that by 1987 some 60 percent of inmates of the Whitehorse Correctional 
Centre were Indians,
although they represented only eighteen percent of the total Yukon population.138
Indian usage of land in the Yukon was severely disrupted as government and 
private activity expanded. New laws pertaining to big game guiding and trap line 
registration were invoked, and oil and gas leases, mining claims, and private land
134 Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal peoples, Vol. 1, 1996, pp. 439-440.
135 Shelagh D. Grant, 1988, p. 89.
136 Gurston Dacks, 1981, p. 35.
137 Kenneth Coates, 1991, pp. 179-180.
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holdings increased significantly, at the expense of traditional usage by Indians. And 
the Indian bands were poorly equipped to oppose or protest the land use changes.
Federal officials began “rationalizing” Indian administration in the Yukon in 
the post war period -  moving and combining bands for administrative efficiency.139 
According to Coates, “Some newly created bands had developed little of the internal 
cohesion required for an organized response.”140 The consequences of this 
administrative rationalization manifested itself in the 1990s, when the aboriginal 
people of the Lake Laberge area demanded that they be considered a separate First 
Nation from the Kwanlin Dun First Nation in land claim negotiations, and in the 
internal conflicts which broke out within the Kwanlin Dun First Nation.
Kenneth Coates asserts that Yukon Indian demands to have their land rights 
recognized were stymied because Ottawa did not want to upset the Government of 
British Columbia:
Ottawa was reluctant to accept demands for a Yukon treaty.
The explanation for this reluctance, which stood in contrast 
to the government’s willingness to sign treaties across the 
prairie west and middle north, ironically rested with the sen­
sitive question of aboriginal land rights in British Columbia.
138 Heino Lilies, “Some Problems in the Administration o f Justice in Remote and Isolated 
Communities,” speech notes for presentation at the C.I.A.J. Conference, Kananaskis, Alberta, October 
11-12, 1989, p. 4.
139 “Several bands were, in fact, amalgamations o f different cultural groups: Champagne and Aishihik 
were joined in the early 1970s, Upper Liard-Lower Post was a merger of five bands created in 1961, 
Kluane represented a grouping o f the Indians from Snag, Burwash, and Kloo Lake that started in 1961, 
and the Whitehorse Indians were joined with those from Lake LaBerge in the mid-1950s.” Kenneth 
Coates, 1991, p. 234.
140 Kenneth Coates, 1991, p. 234.
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The B.C. government had since 1870 steadfastly refused to 
consider Native requests for treaty rights. When Treaty No. 8 
was negotiated in 1899, it was made clear to the commissioners 
that no discussions were to be held with Indians to the west of 
the Rocky mountains ... for fear that such discussions would 
prejudice the BC situation. The Yukon Indians’ land rights had, 
according to government advisers in the 1960s, been sacrificed 
on the alter of federal-provincial politics.141
In 1969 Yukon Indian hopes for recognition of their land rights appeared 
doomed with the issuance of the White Paper on Indian Policy. But vociferous 
protests from indigenous peoples and their organizations convinced the federal 
government to drop its plans to eliminate all special rights for Indians, and a new 
policy had to be found.
Indian Policy in the Yukon Territory, 1973 -  2003: Settling Native Land Claims
The federal government recognized that it needed a new policy on land claims 
after the aboriginal people rejected the 1969 White Paper, which proposed the 
elimination of the Indian Act and all special rights for aboriginal people, and the 
Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision on Calder, on January 31, 1973. 
The Yukon’s Indians were the first to take advantage of the federal government’s 
change in policy to accept land claim proposals. Within weeks of the Calder decision, 
which recognized that aboriginal title still existed in Canada, Yukon Native
141 Kenneth Coates, 1991, p. 236.
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Brotherhood (YNB) leader Elijah Smith had arranged a meeting with Prime Minister 
Pierre Elliot Trudeau and the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, Jean Chretien 
to present their statement of claim: Together Today fo r  Our Children Tomorrow. 
Trudeau accepted the claim even though the government’s official policy statement 
was not released until August of 1973.
The acceptance of the land claim proposal provoked a strong reaction from 
non-Indians in the Yukon. Many whites feared that their land would be expropriated, 
and they had little understanding of the legal issues underlying the claim. Their 
mistrust of the negotiation process was amplified by the secrecy of the negotiations, 
and their hopes for economic development were frustrated by land disposition freezes 
that were imposed to facilitate the negotiations.142
When negotiations commenced, the Yukon’s Commissioner was a part of the 
federal negotiating team. Negotiations were, in effect, a bilateral negotiation between 
the Yukon Native Brotherhood and the federal government. As claims progressed, 
Yukon government participation changed to reflect a larger and more independent 
role, and eventually negotiations evolved into a tripartite process by 1979. Aboriginal 
leaders opposed a greater role for the Yukon government, but their wishes did not 
prevail.143 At that time, the issues of territorial constitutional development, land 
claims, and economic development were all issues vying for the Minister of Indian 
and Northern Affairs’ attention. In a letter to Commissioner Christensen, Minister 
Hugh Faulkner wrote:
142 Gurston Dacks, 1981.
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I should emphasize that the three matters which I have 
in mind -  constitutional development, Indian land claims, 
and economic development (including pipelines) -  all have 
a high degree of priority, and none of them can be pursued 
... at the expense of one or more of the others... .The com­
plexity of the linkages between these priorities is illustrated 
by the current constitutional situation in the territory. The 
elected Territorial Council has been pressing for further 
transfers of authority .. ..Yukon Indians, who have a direct 
relationship with the Federal Government.. .have at the same 
time been pressing for greater authority.. .The requirement to 
reconcile the spirit and objectives of the Yukon and Indian Acts, 
as they relate to Government in the Yukon, poses a complex 
political problem for the Federal Government, and more par­
ticularly for me as the Minister responsible.144
Negotiations from 1978 -  1984 were often acrimonious and interrupted by 
walk outs by either Yukon government negotiators or Indian negotiators.145 The 
Yukon government also opposed the terms of the Committee for Original Peoples 
Entitlement (COPE) Agreement in Principle, which covered the north slope of the 
territory, that was reached by federal and Inuit negotiators in 1978 without Yukon
143 Steven Smyth, “Constitutional Development in the Yukon Territory: Perspectives on the ‘Epp 
Letter '"Arctic, Vol.52, No. 1, Calgary: The Arctic Institute o f North America, 1999, p. 73.
144 Minister Hugh Faulkner to Commissioner lone Christensen, January 25, 1979.
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government participation.146 Yukon negotiators succeeded in having some of the 
terms of that agreement altered, and subsequently signed it in 1984.147
The urgency of addressing land claims in the Yukon was increased during the 
Berger Inquiry into the Mackenzie Valley pipeline proposal, when it became apparent 
that an Alaska Highway pipeline route would be a viable option to the Mackenzie 
Valley route. The federal government quickly launched the Lysyk Inquiry to study 
that option, and then announced its support for the highway route even though Yukon
148Indians opposed the construction of the pipeline before their claims were settled. 
Indian negotiators alienated non-Indian Yukon residents and Yukon government 
officials by calling on the federal government to freeze land dispositions, delay 
pipeline construction, and delay territorial constitutional change until land claims 
were settled. Prime Minister Trudeau also expressed frustration over the Indians’ 
position on the pipeline when he met with them in August, 1977.149
145 Jonathan L. Pierce, Indian land Claims in the Yukon, 1968-1984: Indian Rights as Human Rights, 
Ottawa: Carleton University, unpublished thesis, 1988.
146 Jonathan L. Pierce, 1988, p. 108. Note: agreements in principle are agreements drafted and 
approved by negotiators but have not been ratified by governments and First Nations.
147 Steven Smyth, 1999, pp. 36-116. On March 23, 1984, federal, Yukon and COPE negotiators 
reached a 16 point agreement that resolved outstanding issues that the Yukon Government had with the 
COPE Agreement-in-Principle. The main provisions o f the 16 clause agreement state that: the 
provisions o f  the Inuvialuit Final Agreement were not intended to serve as precedents binding in any 
other negotiations; the parties would continue negotiations on the Porcupine Caribou Management 
Agreement; the arbitration provisions o f the Agreement would be amended to increase Yukon 
representation on arbitration panels as Yukon’s constitutional jurisdiction increased; Yukon 
Government representation on Land Use Planning and Environmental Screening and Review processes 
would increase as the Yukon’s constitutional jurisdiction increased; the agreement would have no 
impact on the process o f devolution. Yukon Legislative Assembly, Sessional Paper No. 6, March 26, 
1984.
148 Jonathan L. Pierce, 1988, pp. 90-98.
149 Steven Smyth, 1999; Legendseekers Anthropological Research, Yukon First Nation Land Claims 
Chronological Listing o f  Events from 1973-1993, unpublished, 1997; Gurston Dacks, 1981.
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The positions of the federal and First Nation negotiators were quite far apart 
until 1981, when a Liberal federal government was elected and the federal negotiating 
mandate was altered by the Minister of Indian Affairs. A number of agreements in 
principle were signed by the parties, and gradually the components of a proposed 
comprehensive agreement came together in 1984. The main elements of the proposed 
agreement were: 8,000 square miles of land with surface title and subsurface rights; 
cash compensation of $380 million; establishment of several corporate structures to 
manage the funding; guaranteed representation on a wildlife management board; 
exclusive rights to hunt on settlement lands; fifty percent of the annual harvest of 
moose and caribou; and a “one-government” system, where Indians were guaranteed 
representation on territorial boards and committees, but bands would have limited 
jurisdiction.150 The majority of First Nations in the Yukon voted to approve the 
proposed claim settlement that spring and summer, however, the National Indian 
Brotherhood (NIB) opposed the agreement because it proposed to extinguish 
aboriginal rights. In August the Council for Yukon Indians (CYI -  successor 
organization to the Yukon Indian Brotherhood) general assembly voted to renegotiate 
six major elements of the proposed agreement, including provisions to grant self­
government, and thus rejected it.151
New negotiation mandates were developed after the federal election in 1984 
(which elected a Progressive Conservative Party government), and the territorial 
election in 1985 which elected a New Democratic Party (NDP) government. The
150 Jonathan L. Pierce, 1988, pp. 142-147.
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Yukon NDP government included two prominent aboriginal leaders as cabinet 
ministers, and another was appointed speaker of the Yukon Legislative Assembly.
The Minister of Renewable Resources, David Porter, was also a former negotiator for 
CYI. Settling land claims became the top priority of the new government.
New negotiators were appointed who brought new perspectives to the process, 
and late in 1985 Government Leader Tony Penikett and Council for Yukon Indians 
Chair, Mike Smith, signed a memorandum of understanding to recommence 
negotiations. The federal government issued a new land claims policy in December 
1986 which no longer required the extinguishment of aboriginal rights as a 
precondition for settling Native land claims, which addressed a major concern of the 
First Nation claimants.152
On the initiative of the Yukon’s chief negotiator, Barry Stuart, the negotiation 
process became more collaborative and less confrontational. Utilizing the approach of 
principled negotiation, which focused on each party’s interests, rather than their 
positions, the negotiators began to make progress. The process also became more 
community oriented: negotiations were conducted in Yukon communities rather than 
in Toronto, Vancouver and Ottawa. Thirdly, the process became more “open.” While 
still conducted largely in secrecy, the process permitted more parties to participate,
120
151 Jonathan L. Pierce, 1988; Steven Smyth, 1999, pp. 114-118.
152 The aboriginal rights in question were, and remain, largely undefined. The purpose o f the land 
claims process was to replace those undefined rights with clear rights to land and resources as set out 
in the agreement. See Floyd McCormick, 1997, pp. 73-83; Bernard Funston and Eugene Meehan, 
1998, pp. 145-56.
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directly or indirectly, in the process. Finally, timelines were introduced to impose 
discipline on the process.153
The negotiation process was complex. The Yukon Legislative Assembly’s 
Special Committee report on land claims noted that:
It involves a number of key elements. There is a main table 
for the negotiations of the major elements of all land claims 
and self-government agreements, and the main table involves 
representatives of the three key parties: CYI and First Nations, 
the territorial government and the federal government. The 
negotiators at the main table are supported by legal and technical 
staff.... From time to time, when there are difficult technical 
issues for negotiation at the main table and issues that are beyond 
the technical expertise of the negotiators, working groups are 
established that report to the main table. Working groups tend to 
be three-party working groups that are sent off to work through 
options for the resolution o f ... issues. These options will be 
brought back to the main table and discussed and negotiated by 
the main table negotiators.154
153 Floyd McCormick, 1997, pp. 53-56; Graham E. Gomme, Interest Group/Government 
Intermediation in the Yukon Indian Land Claim, Victoria: University o f Victoria, unpublished thesis, 
1990.
154 Yukon Legislative Assembly, Report o f  the Special Committee on Land Claims and Self­
Government, No. 1, Whitehorse: Yukon Legislative Assembly, 1993, p. 2.
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The main table was also supported by an implementation planning working 
group, made up of representatives of each of the parties. It was responsible for 
translating the finalized agreements into work plans to implement the agreements.155
The new process paved the way for the signing of an agreement-in-principle 
on November 8, 1988.156 However, controversies over federal policies and actions 
continued to impede progress toward a final agreement. The federal government 
continued to oppose entrenchment of self-government in the constitution (until 1992, 
when federal proposals to include it were rejected in the referendum on the 
Charlottetown Accord); the CYI boycotted negotiations during the “Oka crisis” in 
Quebec in 1990; and the Yukon government threatened non-cooperation after the 
federal government signed a land claim agreement with the Tetlit Gwitch’in in the 
Northwest Territories that granted the First Nation rights to 1500 square kilometers of 
land in the Yukon.
The achievement of an agreement on self-government in November 1991 was 
the final hurdle in reaching an agreement, and the Umbrella Final Agreement, along 
with four Yukon First Nation Final and Self-Government Agreements were signed in 
a public ceremony in Whitehorse on May 29, 1993. The agreements were ratified by 
the respective First Nations by voting. Legislation to ratify the agreements was 
approved by the Yukon legislature and given assent on March 13, 1993, and federal 
legislation to ratify the agreements was tabled in the House of Commons on May 31, 
1994. The legislation was only opposed by the federal Reform Party and the Kaska
155 Yukon Legislative Assembly, 1993, No. 1, p. 2.
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First Nations of the Yukon, who sought amendments. The government, using its 
majority, ensured that no amendments were allowed, and the legislation was given 
Royal Assent on July 7, 1994.157
The Umbrella Final Agreement granted the Yukon’s 6,000 First Nations 
members 16,000 square miles of land (approximately 8.6 percent of the land base of 
the Yukon): 10,000 (5.4 percent of the Yukon) of which is “Category A,” providing 
surface and subsurface rights, and 6,000 (3.2 percent) is “Category B,” granting 
surface rights only. The location of the land selected by each First Nation is the 
subject of “band by band” negotiations. The First Nations share $242 million (in 1989 
dollars), and a training trust fund of $500,000 was established. First Nations with 
settled agreements also share in resource revenues according to a formula set out in 
the agreement. Thirdly, First Nations are guaranteed representation on a variety of 
resource management boards established under the agreement, to which the Yukon 
and federal governments can also appoint members.
Self-government agreements are also negotiated with each First Nation. These 
agreements give First Nations a wide array of legislation-making powers that apply 
on their settlement lands, including land management, hunting, fishing, trapping, 
habitat protection, signage, licensing, zoning, traffic control, environmental 
protection, and firearms. They will also be able to pass laws and administer programs 
to their citizens that live off of settlement lands, and can negotiate with the Yukon
156 Steven Smyth, 1999, pp. 134, 146, 160.
157 Steven Smyth, 1999, pp. 235-236.
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and federal governments to deliver programs that have historically been delivered by
|  C O
those governments.
The Umbrella Final Agreement and each First Nation final agreement address 
one of the fundamental elements of internal colonialism that has characterized 
government-aboriginal relations in Canada: the historic absence of consultation.
Under the agreements, governments have a legal obligation to consult First Nations 
on a wide range of issues. The Umbrella Final Agreement and each First Nation final 
agreement states:
“Consult” or “Consultation” means to provide:
(a) to the party to be consulted, notice of a matter to be 
decided in sufficient form and detail to allow that 
party to prepare its views on the matter;
(b) a reasonable period of time in which the party to be 
consulted may prepare its views on the matter, and an 
opportunity to present such views to the party obliged 
to consult; and
(c) full and fair consideration by the party obliged to 
consult of any views presented.159
This provision is a major step in rectifying the problems inherent in colonial 
relationships, but old habits die hard. A recent review of land claim implementation
158 Steven Smyth, 1999, pp. 121-126.
159 Canada, Umbrella Final Agreement between The Government o f  Canada, The Council fo r  Yukon 
Indians and the Government o f  the Yukon, Ottawa: Minister o f Supply and Services Canada, 1993, p.
2 .
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issues found that lack of consultation continued to be one of the major complaints of 
First Nations with final agreements.160
The Umbrella Final Agreement required the enactment, by the federal 
government, in consultation with the Yukon government and First Nations, of a 
single development assessment process that would apply on federal, Yukon, and First 
Nation lands, so that there would not be a patchwork approach to environmental 
assessment processes in the Yukon.
A third innovative element was the dispute resolution process written into the 
Umbrella Final Agreement and the individual First Nation final agreements, which 
enables parties to a claim-related dispute to seek mediated solutions rather than going 
to court. While these provisions have yet to be utilized, they remain an inexpensive 
alternative to costly court battles that have plagued other First Nations in North 
America.
A fourth major innovation of the Yukon land claim settlements was the 
resolution of taxation issues relative to Yukon First Nations. Historically, non­
aboriginal people would point to taxation benefits that Yukon First Nation people 
received as a discriminatory practice that was race-based and unfair. With the 
settlement of a land claim, First Nation citizens became subject to the payment of 
income taxes, and, in addition, First Nation governments were empowered to levy 
taxes on their citizens. A major issue that generated inter-racial resentment was 
eliminated.
160 Canada, Five-Year Review o f  the Umbrella Final Agreement Implementation Plan and Yukon First 
Nation Final Agreement Plans fo r  the First Four Yukon First Nations: February 14, 1995 -  February 
13, 2000, Ottawa: Minister o f  Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2000.
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A major point of contention between Yukon aboriginal people and non­
aboriginal people that historically proved problematic for race relations was the issue 
of subsistence harvest rights. Historically, Yukon Indians could harvest virtually any 
form of wildlife at any time of the year for subsistence purposes under federal law, 
while non-Indians were restricted to a variety of seasons, bag limits, and other 
restrictions. As land claims are settled, First Nation citizens are entitled to hunt on 
their own lands or the lands of another First Nation which grants them hunting rights. 
However, they will be subject to whatever laws the First Nation governments pass 
that govern hunting on First Nation lands. Indians can also hunt on Crown lands, but 
are then subject to the laws of general application. These arrangements appear to 
satisfy most Indians and non-Indians throughout the Yukon.
While the benefits of the land claims settlements are significant, the Yukon
has pioneered other innovations that have fostered better inter-racial relations, such as
circle sentencing. Territorial Court Judge Barry Stuart initiated circle sentencing in
the Yukon in the early 1980s, but the first recorded judgment involving circle
sentencing was R. versus Moses, in 1991.161 Circle sentencing involves interested
members of a community, as well as representatives of the Crown and defense, in the
sentencing process. Everyone in the court sits in a circle, and each has equal
opportunity to speak to sentence. Those attending may speak directly to the accused
as well. The court attempts to identify a support group for the person sentenced, and
to assist that person in meeting any court ordered obligations that form part of the
161 Barry D. Stuart, pers. comm., 2004. See also: R.v. Moses, in Canadian Criminal Cases, (Third 
Series), Vol. 71. Aurora: Canada Law Book, Inc., 1992, pp. 347-385.
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sentence.
The process was found to be a useful alternative to the normal sentencing 
procedures, where only Crown and defense counsel address the court, and the 
process was soon adopted and formalized as a community justice initiative by the 
Kwanlin Dun First Nation in Whitehorse. This approach also gained favor with 
members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police serving in the Yukon, and with 
successive territorial governments, and is being tried in many other communities 
across Canada. Judges in other parts of Canada began utilizing the approach as a 
better way to deal with some sentencing issues before them, especially where Native 
people were being sentenced.
Since 1993, negotiations have focused on settling the remaining ten First 
Nation final and self-government agreements. As additional claims agreements are 
achieved in the Yukon, they are not debated in parliament. Each agreement is ratified 
by a vote of First Nation members, by the Yukon cabinet, and by the federal cabinet. 
Once all parties have ratified the agreements, they are given legal effect by Orders-in- 
Council, thus precluding parliamentary debate of the terms of the agreements. 
Conclusion
Colorado University law professor Charles Wilkinson has suggested that:
A central policy issue in Indian affairs [in the United 
States] has always been whether Indian tribes should 
remain separate or whether they should be assimilated 
into the larger society. Policies such as allotment and
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termination, for example, were assimilationist. Indians, 
on the other hand, press for acceptance, as the philo­
sophical centerpiece of federal Indian policy, of the 
principle that Indian tribes are permanent institutions
• i foin national policy.
This review of Indian policy in Canada and the United States confirms that, 
while policy instruments varied, federal Indian policy in Canada was preoccupied 
with the same issue of assimilation versus separation. Furthermore, federal policy 
toward Indians living in the northern regions of both countries differed from its 
approach to southern Indians in that neither country viewed treaty making as 
necessary until late in the twentieth century.
In both Canada and the United States, indigenous peoples have a special legal 
relationship with the federal government that is often referred to as a “fiduciary” or 
“trust” relationship, although these concepts do not adequately define the full extent 
of that relationship.163 In Canada, aboriginal rights were subject to alteration, even 
elimination, due to the doctrine of “supremacy of parliament,” until they were 
recognized and protected in the Constitution Act in 1982, while in the United States 
aboriginal rights are still subject to congressional “plenary” powers.164 In both 
Canada and the United States there is no clear definition of aboriginal rights.165 Each 
tribe negotiated its own treaty terms with federal agents, but some tribes were not
162 Charles F. Wilkinson, 1987, p. 75.
163 David S. Case, 1984, p. 5; Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996, Vol. 1, p. 223.
164 Bernard Funston and Eugene Meehan, 1998, p. 148; David S. Case, 1984, p. 4.
165 Bernard Funston and Eugene Meehan, 1998, pp. 145-46; Charles F. Wilkinson, 1987, pp. 7-12.
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given an opportunity to negotiate treaties; some treaties were abrogated; and federal 
laws were changed to grant or remove rights. As a consequence, the courts were left 
with a difficult job of interpreting the laws and, in many cases, deciding what 
aboriginal rights were on a case by case basis.
In Canada, the executive arm of government has been the primary agency 
responsible for negotiating and administering treaties, aboriginal policies and the 
Indian Act. The courts have interpreted and applied the law as cases arose, but the 
Indian Act has generally withstood legal challenges. Parliament serves primarily to 
ratify the laws that are placed before it.
Vine Deloria and David Wilkins contrast the Canadian situation with that of 
the United States, where:
the role of each of the branches of government with respect 
to Indians has changed dramatically. The legislative branch 
has become the dominant actor in the lives of Indians, and the 
judicial branch is nearly as important in its role in interpreting 
the laws of Congress that deal with Indians. The role of the 
president and the executive branch have changed most fun­
damentally. With the expansion of the federal government, the 
bureaucracy itself exercises significant veto power over the 
president’s program and affects congressional lawmaking as 
well. By stalling the implementation of laws, writing the rules 
and regulations under which programs operate, and manipulating
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budget items, the bureaucracy appears to have become a fourth 
independent branch of government.166
In both countries, specialized bureaucratic agencies, the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, and the Department of Indian Affairs, were established to administer the 
indigenous populations, and aboriginal people could not participate in political affairs 
unless they were deemed to be “civilized.” National policies towards aboriginal 
peoples fluctuated significantly over time, reflecting contradictory perspectives about 
how they should be treated. In Canada, Indians were the subject of systemic racial 
discrimination under the Indian Act'.
The distinctive place accorded Indian people by the 
Indian Act was not a privileged one. It was marked by 
singular disparities in legal rights, with Indian people sub­
ject to penalties and prohibitions that would have been ruled 
illegal and unconstitutional if they had been applied to any­
one else in Canada.167
Both countries have attempted to terminate their special relationships with 
indigenous peoples and to eliminate special programs and racially defined rights, 
provoking strong reactions and policy reversals on this issue.
The indigenous peoples of the Yukon and Alaska were treated as internal 
colonies of Canada and the United States during most of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. However, they were not treated in exactly the same way as southern
166 Vine Deloria and David Wilkins, 1999, p. 33.
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Indians during this time. The federal governments of Canada and the U.S. decided not 
to treat with the aboriginal peoples of the North until court decisions determined that 
they had unextinguished title to lands not under treaty.
In Alaska, the decision to settle land claims was driven by non-aboriginal 
interests -  to enable the state to acquire its allotment under the Statehood Act, and to 
facilitate the construction of an oil pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez. Initial offers 
to settle the claims sought to minimize both the land quantum and compensation 
limits, and only intense lobbying by the Alaska Federation of Natives was effective in 
increasing those amounts.
In the interim, Alaska’s indigenous peoples were subjected to discriminatory 
national policies that they were generally not consulted on, and which had profound 
impacts on their lives. National parks were established, hunting regulations were 
changed, and other measures affecting aboriginal people were taken without 
considering the impacts on them. When aboriginal people voiced their concerns, they 
were frequently ignored.
While aboriginal skills and services as packers and hunters were at times 
highly valued, they were sidelined when cheap, non-aboriginal labor was available 
(for example, during the gold rush), or when technology was imported. Aboriginal 
people received poorer educational opportunities than non-aboriginal people and were 
relegated to the margins of industrial society in the North. Aboriginal people in both 
Alaska and the Yukon had standards of living well below the average for non-
167 Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Vol. 1, 1996, p. 257.
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aboriginal people, and after increased contact during and after World War II, social 
problems also increased. Their subsistence lifestyle continued, albeit under increasing 
pressures. ANCSA eliminated Native subsistence harvest rights, but these rights were 
renewed under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, and conflicts 
between federal and state legislation have resulted in separate fish and wildlife 
management regimes being applied on federal and state lands in Alaska. This 
situation has soured aboriginal and non-aboriginal relations in Alaska, and numerous 
efforts to find a constitutional solution to the problem have been fruitless to the 
present.
In contrast, land claim settlements in northern Canada have resolved the 
subsistence harvest debate. Indians in the Yukon have the ability to control hunting 
on their own lands, and participate actively on Renewable Resource Councils and the 
Fish and Wildlife Management Board created under the Umbrella Final Agreement.
The theory of internal colonialism predicts that, as social contact increases 
between races, a cultural division of labor is created in which one ethnic group 
dominates the other, and “As a consequence ... there is a crystallization of the 
unequal distribution of resources and power between the two groups. The 
superordinate group, or core, seeks to stabilize and monopolize its advantages 
through policies aiming at the institutionalization of the existing stratification 
system.”168 The history of relationships between non-aboriginal peoples and 
aboriginal peoples in North America appears to confirm this theory, at least until
168 Michael Hechter, 1975, p. 9.
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modem land claims were negotiated. The national policies of Canada and the United 
States, following the decline of aboriginal military power in the South, and the 
decline of the fur trade in the North, resulted in the economic marginalization of 
aboriginal peoples. These policies were extended into Alaska and the Yukon in the 
nineteenth century, with the notable exception that few reserves were created and no 
treaties were formalized.
The policies of internal colonialism towards aboriginal people in Canada and 
the United States began to erode after World War II as public opinion shifted, human 
rights laws were passed, and court decisions struck down discriminatory laws. 
Nevertheless, federal policies of assimilation continued in both countries, and 
aboriginal peoples continued to be economically and socially disadvantaged relative 
to non-aboriginal people. National governments did not feel the need to conclude 
treaties with Natives in Alaska and the Yukon until convinced by the courts that 
aboriginal people had rights to the land and economic pressures made settling land 
claims a priority. These economic pressures added leverage to the Natives’ 
negotiating position, enabling them to finalize agreements that boosted their social 
and economic status in northern society. For northern aboriginal people, land claim 
settlements have been their most powerful weapon in breaking down the cultural 
division of labor created by policies of internal colonialism. However, they have not 
been a panacea for the social and economic ills of northern indigenous peoples. While 
the socio-economic status of some aboriginal people in Alaska and the Yukon has 
improved significantly since the 1970s, many in these jurisdictions still face
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significant social and economic problems, and their standard of living is not yet equal 
to the non-aboriginal people in these societies. Furthermore, racism continues to be a 
social issue that demands the attention of governments. For example, in 2001 an 
incident involving non-aboriginal youths targeting aboriginal people for a paint- 
balling attack resulted in the Governor of Alaska launching a major campaign to 
combat racism in the state.169
Finally, it should be recalled that, while statehood was an initiative of the 
people of Alaska, and the impetus to resolve land claims came from the indigenous 
people of Alaska, both statehood and land claims could only be resolved by federal 
processes, and required federal legislation and federal leadership. Lobbying by 
Alaskans was important to shaping the final policy outputs, but legislators from many 
other states were also influential in shaping the legislation, as were federal public 
servants, and lobbies based in the lower 48.
In the Yukon, land claims were launched in 1973, and impetus to settle the 
claims was added during the Mackenzie Valley and Alaska Highway natural gas 
pipeline proposals. The processes for achieving land claim settlements differed 
significantly between Alaska/ U.S. and the Yukon/Canada. In Alaska/U.S., the 
process focused on specific legislative initiatives that were debated in legislative 
committees and in Congress. The process was largely open and transparent, with a 
few in camera meetings. In the Yukon/Canada, the process was largely conducted by 
secretive negotiations amongst three parties until an agreement was achieved. Once
169 Whitehorse Star, April 20, 2001, p. 12.
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an agreement was reached by the negotiators, ratification of the agreement by 
Parliament was quick and accomplished without amendments. The federal 
government, possessing a majority in the House of Commons, was able to get the bill 
through Parliament without acceding to Opposition requests for changes. “Outside” 
forces consisted primarily of southern-based officials in the federal departments o f 
justice, and energy, mines and resources, and other agencies that commented on draft 
agreements, although some organizations, such as national Indian organizations, also 
influenced the process.170 Court decisions, such as Sparrow,111 caused portions o f the 
Final Agreement to be renegotiated to reflect new case law as it evolved. 
Nevertheless, as in Alaska, the key to resolving the land claim issue rested with the 
federal government, and a shift in federal policies was necessary to address the 
outstanding claims of Yukon Indians.
Aboriginal people in the Yukon and Canada are still suffering the effects o f 
“mission school syndrome,” as a consequence of federal policies o f assimilation. 
While churches were the vehicle for carrying out the policy, the claimants of 
compensation have recently recognized that responsibility rests with the federal 
government. Mission schools were designed to be a cheap and effective mechanism 
for assimilating aboriginal people into the mainstream culture. But the racist premise 
of the program, combined with lack of funding and inadequate monitoring and
170 Floyd McCormick, 1997, pp. 153, 172-174.
171 In R. v. Sparrow, (1990) the Supreme Court o f Canada reaffirmed that the federal government had a 
fiduciary obligation to aboriginal people in Canada. However, the aboriginal and treaty rights o f  
aboriginal Canadians, protected by the Section 35 o f  the Constitution Act, could be interfered with i f  
the legislation satisfied the test set out in the Sparrow  decision. Bernard Funston and Eugene Meehan, 
1998,pp. 151-154.
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safeguards, resulted in a bitter legacy. Far from integrating aboriginal people into the 
mainstream of society, many “graduates” of the program became marginalized 
members of society, and now demand compensation for their pain. On the other hand, 
there are the success stories of mission schools -  young men and women who went 
on to become outstanding leaders in their communities or nationally. But these are the 
leaders who rejected the federal White Paper on Indian Policy, rejected the “one 
government” system in the Yukon, and asserted their rights to land and resources in 
order to maintain their culture, language and traditions, rather than be assimilated.
Federal policies in Canada and the United States fostered conflict between 
aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples in both countries. They purported to protect 
Indians from exploitation, but failed to do so. Indians were subjected to systemic 
discrimination that deprived them of their individual rights and eroded their tribal 
governments and their land base.
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Chapter 4 
Northern Economies
Introduction
The weakness o f northern economies has been an issue raised in arguments 
against constitutional advancement of northern jurisdictions for decades, and various 
theoretical arguments have been advanced to justify varying federal approaches to 
northern development. After reviewing some of those theoretical debates and 
examining the characteristics of northern economies, this chapter reviews the 
history of federal economic development policies in the Yukon and Alaska in an 
effort to determine whether those policies fostered or hindered autonomous economic 
development and constitutional development. The chapter concludes with a section 
on overcoming dependency, and argues that federal policies can be successfully used 
to encourage regional economic development.
Historian Claus-M. Naske has noted that the arguments against Alaska’s 
admission to statehood focused heavily on Alaska’s economic viability. Opponents of 
statehood argued that Alaska’s resources were not developed enough to attract private 
industry, (which could generate revenues to replace federal expenditures). They 
commented that Alaska’s sparse population did nor justify representation in 
Congress, and could not support the expenses of state government. The also argued 
that the post-war defense construction boom would end, depriving the territory of a 
major source of revenue. And finally, opponents argued that statehood would result in
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significant increases in governmental costs, which would lead to higher taxes and 
thus discourage private investment.1
Similar arguments have been made about the constitutional advancement o f 
Canada’s territories by economist Jack Stabler, and former Northwest Territories 
Commissioner Gordon Robertson, although Gurston Dacks has commented that:
The terms of this whole debate are misplaced because the 
basic assumption -  that fiscal strength is necessary for 
provincehood -  is incorrect. For example, the Atlantic 
provinces regularly receive large proportions of their total 
revenue from federal-govemment grants.... Thus, there is 
no necessary reason why finances should stand in the way of 
granting provincial status.”3 
As noted earlier, Alaska, Yukon, (and other northern jurisdictions) were 
“colonies” -  districts or territories - for most of their histories, dependent on national 
government policies, programs, and funding to support their economic development. 
Since constitutional change in large measure depended on whether decision-makers 
viewed these jurisdictions as economically ready for constitutional advancement, it is 
clear that federal economic policies in the North have enhanced or hindered the 
prospects for constitutional change.
1 Claus-M. Naske, An Interpretive History o f  Alaskan Statehood, Anchorage: Alaska Northwest 
publishing Co., 1973, p. 152.
2 Jack C. Stabler, “Fiscal Viability and Constitutional Development in Canada’s Northern Territories,” 
P olar Record, Vol. 23, No. 146,1987, pp. 551-567; Gordon Robertson, Northern Provinces: A 
Mistaken Goal, Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1985.
3 Gurston Dacks, A Choice o f  Futures: Politics in the Canadian North, Toronto: Methuen, 1981, p. 
116.
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The philosophical debate over how the North should be developed re-emerged 
during the Mackenzie Valley pipeline hearings conducted by Thomas Berger in the 
1970s. History professor Robert Page documented University of Alberta Sociologist 
Charles Hobart’s argument before the Berger Inquiry that, “the traditional native 
culture had been largely destroyed by the collapse of the fiir market, the white 
curriculum in the schools, television, the highways into the North, and so on. The 
native peoples had been ‘socialized’ away from the former lifestyle toward the wage- 
labour economy.” Hobart predicted, “a powerful backlash against the system” by 
young Natives if  their expectations for wealth and opportunity were denied because 
of lack of development in the North.4
Robert Page also documented economist Mel Watkins’ perspective that 
challenged Hobart’s analysis. Page described Watkins’ argument as follows: 
Governments and multinational companies had combined 
to promote the export of raw staples from the region to service 
the American industrial empire. Unlike Hobart, [Watkins] tried 
to trace where the profits or economic rents from northern 
development went -  the evidence was clear that it was outside 
the North.
Native people ... were divorced from meaningful 
participation in this colonial economy.... The North was a
4 Robert Page, Northern Development: The Canadian Dilemma, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 
limited, 1986, pp. 222-223.
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typical resource hinterland exporting raw resources while 
importing capital and manufactured goods.
Watkins argued that this outward draining of economic 
surplus locked the North into a ‘staples trap.’ It had neither the 
capital nor the political power to control its own destiny.5 
Dependency theory predicts that peripheral regions will under develop or face 
restricted development due to their relationship with the center, or core region. The 
center controls the pace and nature of economic development in the periphery, and 
discourages development that competes with center-based businesses. The center 
exploits the resource base of the periphery and discourages autonomous development 
by creating unequal trade relationships.6 While dependency theory predicts under 
development, it should be noted that other theorists have suggested that national 
governments possess a level of autonomy from capitalist elites and that national 
policies can either support center-based exploitation of the periphery, or support 
autonomous development in the peripheral region.7
Michael Hechter has asserted that there are two basic reasons for the evolution 
of regional economic inequality in a nation: geographic factors and cultural factors. 
Geographic factors include such attributes as distribution of natural resources,
5 Robert Page, 1986, p. 226.
6 Michael Pretes, “Underdevelopment in Two Norths: The Brazilian Amazon and the Canadian 
Arctic,” Arctic, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1988, pp. 109-116; Thomas D. Hall, (ed.) A World-Systems Reader: 
New Perspectives on Gender, Urbanism, Cultures, Indigenous Peoples, and Ecology, New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000, pp. 4-8; Immanuel Wallerstein, Unthinking Social 
Science: The Limits o f  Nineteenth Century Paradigms, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991; Andre Gunder 
Frank, “The Development o f  Underdevelopment,” Monthly Review, September, 1966.
7 Robert Jessop, “Recent Theories o f  the Capitalist State,” Cambridge Journal o f  Economics, Vol. 1, 
No. 4, 1977, pp. 353-374; Peter Evans, 1995; Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, 
London: NLB and Sheed and Ward, 1973.
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climate, etc. Cultural factors include kinship systems, inheritance customs, and other 
factors which affect the way resources are managed and distributed.8 As noted earlier 
in this dissertation, regional inequality can result from the exploitation of the 
periphery and the creation of a dependency relationship. Once established, Hechter 
notes that:
These areas are seen to be already suffused with extensive 
market connections to the dynamic region.... The economic 
inequality of the stagnant regions will tend to be exacerbated 
by the play of market forces in the absence of intervention by 
the central government. Hence, since increased economic 
efficiency between regions can only serve to impoverish the 
stagnant regions, some form of political action is required to 
bring about regional parity.
When the periphery is not only economically dis­
advantaged but culturally distinct as well, the likelihood 
of increasing regional equality appears to be even more 
remote. This often occurs in the internal colonial situation.9
Characteristics of Northern Economies
The similarity of northern economies to the economies of the developing 
world was examined in chapter 2. A more detailed analysis o f the characteristics of
8 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536­
1966, Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1975, pp. 130-132.
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northern economies follows, and will be useful for understanding what might be done 
to foster economic development, and consequently, constitutional development, in the 
Yukon.
Gurston Dacks wrote that, “Northern economics are colonial economics, as 
reflected in the North’s dual economy. The two northern economies overlap and 
many individuals participate in both .. ..”10
Dacks described northern (Canadian) industrial economies as having the 
following characteristics: a staple base, a “colonial link,” heavily influenced by 
multinational corporations, high costs, “boom and bust” phenomena, lacking internal 
linkages, structurally unbalanced, and dominated by government. Since this 
description was from his observations conducted in the late 1970s, it is important to 
ask whether these characteristics continue to exist in the Yukon today, and whether 
they adequately describe the economy of Alaska. However, an explanation of Dacks, 
descriptors would be a useful first step.
According to Dacks, the northern economy is based on the export of staples to 
the metropolis. Staple goods are materials that are relatively unprocessed, such as raw 
logs and unrefined minerals, and, “They are so important that their impact extends far 
beyond the realm of economics: social and political patterns tend to be profoundly 
influenced by the nature o f the staple and by the relationships among all those ... who 
are involved in any way with the staple.”11 Dacks went on to note that, “The most 
important relationship created by a staple economy is the colonial link between the
9 Michael Hechter, 1975, p. 133.
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frontier hinterland and the staple-consuming metropolis. The essence of this 
relationship is that factors outside the colonial economy determine the economic 
viability of the staple.”12
Some of the major players in the colonial relationship are multinational 
corporations, which are based in the metropolis and can use their skills and resources 
to influence policies related to staple exploitation. Thus, “Their expertise enables 
them to act as initiators o f the policy process and to force government into the role of 
reacting rather than leading.”13 Multinationals are typically headquartered in the 
metropolis, rather than the periphery, and are owned and controlled by shareholders 
living outside the North. Consequently, profits are exported and (in the Yukon until 
recently), royalties were paid to the national government rather than the territorial 
government. Furthermore, it was normal practice to import labor, goods and services 
from outside the North to operate and service projects in the North, unless there were 
northern sources of supply that were competitive.
The fourth characteristic is the high cost of living and of doing business in the 
North. Dacks noted that Whitehorse prices were 30 percent higher than Edmonton, 
and Dawson prices were 50 percent higher.14 Federally mandated programs, such as 
the Northern Canada Power Commission, established by federal legislation, 
contributed to the high cost o f energy in the North due to its charter requirement to
10 Gurston Dacks, 1981, p. 12.
11 Gurston Dacks, 1981, pp. 13-14.
12 Gurston Dacks, 1981, p. 14. See also Government o f  Yukon, Yukon Development Strategy: A Public 
Discussion Paper, 1986, p. 34.
13 Gurston Dacks, 1981, p. 15.
14 Gurston Dacks, 1981, p. 15.
143
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
not operate at a loss.15 Other contributing factors include long distances from 
suppliers, small northern populations, limited transportation infrastructure, and the 
dominance of monopolies.16
Northern economies also experience the “boom and bust” phenomena 
associated with a staple based economy. Northern economies “boom” when their 
resources are in high demand and prices rise to the point where exploitation is 
profitable, then crash when demand tapers off or other sources o f supply come on 
stream. The discovery of gold in the Klondike and at Nome, the discovery of oil at 
Prudhoe Bay in 1968, the OPEC oil embargo, and other resource discoveries and 
global resource scarcity crises, all contributed to elevated levels of economic activity 
in northern North America at various times. There have also been economic “busts” 
when resource prices declined, as in Alaska from 1986 to 1988, after the price o f oil 
collapsed in 1985.17 The “boom” times are typified by a rush of people into the North 
to exploit job opportunities related to resource extraction. The subsequent “bust” 
period often results in population declines.
The factors noted above contribute to the problem of weak sectoral linkages in 
northern economies. The Yukon Government’s 1986 Yukon Development Strategy 
noted that:
15 Gurston Dacks, 1981, p. 15; Kenneth J. Rea, The Political Economy o f  the Canadian North: An 
Interpretation o f  the Course o f  Development in the Northern Territories o f  Canada to the Early 1960s, 
Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1968, p. 280.
16 Kenneth J. Rea, 1968.
17 Terrence Cole and Elmer E. Rasmuson, Banking on Alaska: The Story o f  the National Bank o f  
Alaska, Vol. 1, Anchorage: National Bank o f Alaska, 2000, p. 432; Government o f  Yukon, 1986, pp. 
28-32; Stephen Haycox, Frigid Embrace: Politics, Economics and Environment in Alaska, Corvallis: 
Oregon State University Press, 2002, p. 128; George Rogers, “The Alaska Economy and Economic
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There has been a strong dependence by consumers 
and by each of the sectors of the economy on imported 
goods and services. This has arisen partly because in­
stability itself has made it difficult to build stable 
commercial enterprises serving Yukon needs, but also 
because of such factors as high production costs, including 
the cost of energy, limited access to capital, and the small 
scale of internal... markets. The overall result has been 
th a t... little of what is consumed in the Yukon is produced 
in the Yukon, meaning that internal Yukon needs have not 
contributed to the maximum in generating business and job
1Ropportunities.
The structure of northern economies is also revealing. Dacks states that, 
“Relatively developed economic systems display some balance, in that they possess 
substantial primary, secondary, and service sectors. The North does not match this 
pattern: it has large primary and service sectors, but only a very small manufacturing 
sector.”19 What manufacturing exists may be the result o f poor transportation 
systems, which makes locally manufactured products cost competitive with imported
145
Issues: An Historical Overview,” in Clive S. Thomas, (ed.), Alaska Public Policy Issues: Background 
and Perspectives, Juneau: The Denali Press, 1999, p. 19; Michael Pretes, 1988.
18 Government o f Yukon, 1986, p. 32.
19 Gurston Dacks, 1981, p. 18.
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products. Paradoxically, as transportation infrastructure to the North improves, the 
viability of northern manufacturing declines.
The final characteristic that Dacks elaborates upon is the role of government 
in northern economies. Government plays an important role through its policy and 
regulatory processes, including fiscal policy, which can impede or encourage 
economic development. It can also play an important role through its spending 
practices, which are driven by factors such as strategic considerations 4nd defense 
policy, threats to national sovereignty or security, and its national mandates relating 
to the environment, land and water management, aboriginal peoples, and northern 
development.21
Studies of the Yukon economy since Dacks’ analysis was completed have 
confirmed that the structure of the Yukon economy has remained largely 
unchanged.22 In 2003, a report on the Yukon economy prepared by the Yukon 
government, entitled the Yukon Business Case, stated that, “Historically the three 
mainstays of the economy have been mining, tourism and government. However, 
recent global economic developments have not been kind to the territory.”23 The 
report also noted that, “From 1997 to 2002, the Yukon economy was negatively 
impacted by declines in major resource-based economic activities,”24 and, “Mineral
20 Gurston Dacks, 1981, p. 18.
21 Gurston Dacks, 1981, pp. 19-20; Kenneth J. Rea, 1968.
22 Government o f  Canada, A Northern Political and Economic Framework, Ottawa: Minster o f  Supply 
and Services Canada, 1988; Government o f  Yukon, 1986; Government o f  Yukon, Yukon Business 
Case, Putting the Pieces Together: A Presentation to Federal Finance, 2003; Michael S. Whittington, 
(Coordinator), The North, Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1985.
23 Government o f  Yukon, 2003, p. 15.
24 Government o f  Yukon, 2003, p. 15.
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production in Yukon declined by 65 per cent over the 1997 to 2002 period to around 
$79 million.” Furthermore, “The major decline in production is explained in part by 
the drop in price for some of Yukon’s historical key mineral commodities between 
1997 and 2002. Zinc prices declined by 36.1 per cent, lead by 26.8 per cent and 
copper by 20.4 per cent.” The Yukon Business Case also noted the ongoing 
importance of the tourism sector and the increasing importance of the public sector, 
which, “has grown in economic importance in Yukon, both in relation to other sectors 
and in absolute terms.”27
The relationship between federal funding, the staple base o f the economy, and 
education and social structure in the North was illustrated in the Yukon 
government’s 2003 Business Case, which stated:
National program funding per capita is not reflective of 
true costs and service requirements expected of the Yukon 
Government. The cyclical nature of Yukon’s resource 
based economy, changing world metal prices, and declining 
resource demands, coupled with extreme distances to 
market, have resulted in steady loss of jobs. Consequently, 
people have left the Yukon in search of employment. This situation 
coupled with an increasing and less mobile First Nation pop­
ulation, a group that has special needs in the classroom and 
has traditionally been underrepresented in the workforce,
25 Government o f Yukon, 2003, p. 16.
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continues to grow and introduce new requirements for 
training and education. Given an inadequately funded ex­
penditure base, the rising costs to delivering educational 
services in increasingly aging infrastructure poses enormous 
challenges.28
Alaska economist George W. Rogers has studied the economic history of 
Alaska and has summarized the characteristics of Alaska’s economy in a strikingly 
similar way to Dacks’ description of the northern Canadian economy. Figure 4 
provides a concise comparison of descriptors. Rogers describes Alaska’s economy as 
possessing the following six characteristics: government has been a major player as a 
land and resource owner, contractor, employer, developer, investor, subsidizer, and 
contractor; Alaska is primarily an export economy; it is dependent on one, two, or at 
most, three main economic activities; it experiences major economic fluctuations and 
instability; it is a federation of regional and local economies dominated by “Outside” 
economic ties; and, finally, its economic evolution has experienced booms and 
busts.29
Federal Economic Policy in Alaska: Colony to Statehood
Many Alaska historians, from Jeannette Paddock-Nichols to former governor 
Ernest Gruening, have argued that Alaska was largely neglected or ignored by the 
federal government, and that “Outside” economic interests had undue influence over
26 Government o f  Yukon, 2003, p. 16.
27 Government o f  Yukon, 2003, p. 18.
28 Government o f  Yukon, 2003, p. 24.
29 George Rogers, 1999, p. 19.
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Staple base Export economy
Colonial linkDominated by multinational corporations Strong “Outside” economic ties
High costs
Boom & bust economy Boom & bust economy
Lacking internal linkages A “federation” of regional economies
Structurally unbalanced
Dominated by government Government a major player in development
Major fluctuations & instability in economic activity
Figure 4
Characteristics of Northern Economies: A Comparison of Analyses
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the Alaska economy. Ernest Gruening also recognized that Alaska’s weak economy 
was an impediment to statehood, and consequently he became a strong advocate of
-J A
economic development initiatives for the territory. Their assessment was supported 
by a number of studies and analyses that have been conducted on Alaska. For 
example, George W. Rogers has noted that many national politicians did not view 
Alaska as an economic asset when it was purchased.31 While those closest to the 
purchase negotiations recognized Alaska’s potential, many other politicians and 
reporters of the day referred to the purchase as “Seward’s Folly,” and little interest 
was demonstrated for investing federal money in Alaska until the Klondike gold rush. 
According to Claus-M Naske and Herman Slotnick, the gold rush: 
focused attention on Alaska as nothing else had....
Congress, for the first time since the purchase of Alaska, 
went on to deal more seriously with Alaskan problems. It 
appropriated money for the U.S. Geological Survey to 
begin work on the survey and exploration of Alaska, and 
it extended the coal-mining laws of the United States to the 
district. The U.S. Army built posts at Eagle, Nome and 
Haines, and at Tanana .... The Department of Agriculture
30 Terrence Cole, “The History o f a History: The Making o f Jeannette Paddock Nichols’ Alaska,” 
Pacific Northwest Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 4, 1986, pp. 130-138; Ernest Gruening, The State o f  Alaska, 
N ew  York: Random House, 1954; Ernest Gruening, Many Battles: The Autobiography o f  Ernest 
Gruening, New York: Liveright, 1973; Claus-M. Naske, “Some Attention, Little Action: Vacillating 
Federal Efforts to Provide Territorial Alaska with an Economic Base,” Western Historical Quarterly, 
1995, pp. 40-41.
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received money to examine the potential of farming in 
Alaska.32
The glow of the gold rushes sustained the momentum of federal 
interest in Alaska into the early 1900’s with amendments to the Organic Act and the 
decision to build the Alaska railroad in 1914.33 The decision to build the railway 
represented an attempt to change federal policy towards Alaska. Progressives blamed 
the federal government for impeding Alaska’s development by implementing a maze 
of regulations and land withdrawals, and they believed that Congress needed to 
implement an effective coal land-leasing law and build a federal railroad in order to 
effect development.34
While the railway was of great benefit to Alaskans, its real purpose was to 
access coal reserves for the navy, and to develop Alaska and its resources for the use 
and benefit of the people of the United States, rather than for the people of the 
territory.35 And, aside from the access to coal, federal interest in Alaska as a militarily 
significant region waned during an isolationist era until World War II.36
While the construction of the railroad provided an economic stimulus to 
Alaska, it was unable to make a profit from its operations, and other federal policies 
clearly worked to the territory’s disadvantage. According to Claus-M. Naske and
31 George W. Rogers, 1999, p. 21.
32 Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, pp. 85-86. .
33 Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, pp. 64, 86,96-97; W. H. Wilson, “The Alaska 
Railroad and Coal: Development o f a Federal Policy, 1914-1939,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly, Vol. 
73, No. 2, 1982, pp. 66-77.
34 W.H. Wilson, 1982, p. 66.
35 W.H. Wilson, 1982, p. 67; Claus-M. Naske, 1995, p. 40.
36 Claus-M. Naske, 1995, pp. 40-41.
151
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Herman Slotnick, the passage of the Merchant Marine Act, also known as the Jones 
Act, in 1920:
made it mandatory that all ships engaged in commerce 
between American ports be American-owned and built in 
the United States. The Act gave shippers the option of 
using either American- or Canadian-owned vessels to 
carry goods from a port in the United States to its 
destination somewhere in the Atlantic or the Pacific- 
with the exception of Alaska. Merchandise coming into 
or exported from Alaska had to be carried on American 
ships. American vessels had to be used even if  shippers 
to Alaska could obtain better prices from Canadians.37
The constitutionality of the act was challenged in court but it was ruled valid 
because Alaska was a territory and not a state.
The federal government also took an active interest in exploiting the fur seal 
stocks on the Pribilof Islands by indenturing Aleut laborers. Alaska did not benefit 
from the seal harvest, and the discriminatory treatment of the Aleuts did not come to 
light until World War II, when they were confined in dilapidated canneries near 
Juneau.39
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37 Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, p. 97.
38 Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, p. 97.
39 Dorothy Jones, 1980; Orlando W. Miller, The Frontier in Alaska and the Matanuska Colony, New  
Haven: Yale University Press, 1975, p. 16.
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The population of Alaska fell from approximately 64,000 in 1910, to 55,000 
in 1920, rising to only 59,000 by 1930.40 Historian Orlando Miller commented that 
Alaska’s economy in the 1930s was colonial and extractive, based on the export of 
fish, gold and furs. The annual value of exports averaged from one and a half to two 
times the value of imports, and:
By the mid-1930s, Alaska had changed outwardly 
only a little since the early days o f the salmon fisheries 
and gold rushes.. ..the old belief that the territory 
would inevitably follow the pattern of growth of past 
frontiers had been weakened ... Increasingly the hope 
for development was centered on federal policies.41
However, Richard Cooley’s study of federal management of Alaska’s salmon 
stocks confirmed that federal officials pandered to canning industry interests that 
were based in Seattle and California. As a consequence of federal mismanagement, 
Alaska’s valuable salmon resource declined year after year until the state took over 
control of the resource in 1961.42 More recently, Alaska fishermen have gone to court 
alleging that “ Seattle based processors and Japanese importers conspired to fix
153
40 Orlando W. Miller, 1975, p. 17.
41 Orlando W. Miller, 1975, p. 33.
42 Richard A. Cooley, Decline o f  the Alaska Salmon: A Case Study in Resource Conservation Policy, 
Ann Arbor: University o f  Michigan unpublished thesis, 1961. However, recent scientific discovery o f  
the Pacific Decadal Oscillation, a “long-lived El Nino-like pattern o f Pacific climate variability,” may 
also explain the decline o f  salmon harvests during the era Cooley studied. See
http ://tao. atmos. Washington, edu/odo.
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prices” in the early 1990s, fueling Alaskans’ views that “Outside” interests continue 
to influence the management of this resource.43
Some historians have suggested that Nichols and Gruening over emphasized 
the neglect theory, and have suggested that Alaska was no more neglected than other 
western states.44 The history of Alaska since 1939 suggests that Alaska’s strategic 
importance and wealth o f resources provided impetus for a renewed federal interest in 
the state. Alaska was the only part o f the country that was occupied by foreign troops 
during World War II, and it became a front line of the war for a brief period.45 During 
the Cold War, Alaska’s strategic location adjacent to Russia also gave federal and 
defense officials cause to pay attention to the state. Federal funding for defense 
infrastructure in Alaska transformed the state, attracted a large number of new 
residents, and renewed the drive for statehood 46 However, while military funding 
was creating an artificial economic boom in Alaska during the war years, other 
federal government policies were undermining the state’s gold mining industry. The 
declaration of gold mining as a nonessential industry when the price o f gold fell, 
contributed to the virtual elimination of the territorial government’s main source of
1 1  ■ • 47 irevenue: gold mining taxes.
43 Juneau Empire online, March 10,2003. The defendants were cleared of the charges on May 23, 
2003. {Fairbanks D aily News-Miner, Aug.I, 2003).
44 Terrence Cole, 1986, p. 138; Claus-M. Naske, “Alaska and the Federal-Aid Highway Acts,” Pacific 
Northwest Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 4, 1989, p. 138.
45 Brian Garfield, The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians, Toronto: 
Bantam Books, 1982.
46 Terrence Cole and Elmer E. Rasmuson, 2000; Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 75.
47 Terrence Cole, “Golden Years: The Decline o f  Gold Mining in Alaska,” Pacific Northwest 
Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 2, 1989, pp. 62-71; Terrence Cole and Elmer E. Rasmuson, 2000, pp. 209-212; 
Clark C. Spence, The Northern Gold Fleet: Twentieth-Century Gold Dredging in Alaska, Chicago: 
University o f  Illinois Press, 1996.
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Canada-U.S. cooperation during World War II provided the two nations with 
a unique opportunity to cooperate on northern economic development planning for 
the post-war years. The North Pacific Planning Project, initiated in 1943, compiled an 
extensive amount o f valuable information about the region and published two reports 
and several sub-studies. However, according to Claus-M. Naske, Congress eliminated 
the project that same year, and, “As far as can be determined, Congress did not follow
AO
the recommendations of the planners.”
Alaskans’ lobbying efforts for federal attention to the state’s economic needs 
made a breakthrough when President Truman sent a special message to Congress on 
May 21, 1948. The President called on Congress to grant the territory statehood, to 
provide funding to develop the territory’s transportation system, and improvements to 
hospitals and housing. He also asked Congress to settle Alaska Native land claims, 
amend the discriminatory provisions o f the Merchant Marine Act, and amend 
legislation to allow the sale of public lands in Alaska.49
Congress responded by gradually authorizing more funding for infrastructure 
projects in the state and amending the land laws to allow the sale of public lands. 
Military spending in the state also increased until 1963. But the Merchant Marine Act 
remained unchanged, Native claims were not settled, and, “Congress ... did not enact 
any of the Department of the Interior’s grandiose development schemes.”50
The economic activity, improved infrastructure, and population increase 
generated by World War II added impetus to the aspirations of Alaskans who sought
48 Claus-M. Naske, 1995, p. 49.
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statehood, and in 1943 a statehood bill was introduced into Congress on Delegate 
Anthony Dimond’s behalf. The bill was opposed by Secretary of the Interior, Harold 
Ickes, “ because of the Territory’s seasonal economy and unstable population.”51 
The most ardent opponents of statehood were the non-resident commercial 
interests, such as the fishing and canning companies and shipping interests,52 as well 
as a few resident businessmen who opposed increased taxation. Claus-M. Naske 
argues that, “The general aim of this combined interest lobby was a negative one, 
designed to defeat all measures which would increase governmental costs and to kill 
any moves which would allow Alaska more control over its natural resources.”53 
President Truman’s statements in support of statehood in 1946 and 1948 
demonstrated that the administration was supportive of the movement. However, this 
was insufficient to convince Congress, and the statehood bills advanced in the 1940s 
were stymied.
Efforts to achieve statehood were renewed in 1950, and more economic 
arguments against statehood were raised. For example, Senator Hugh Butler (R- 
Neb.), argued that, “The Territory could not afford statehood because its two major 
industries, gold mining and salmon fishing, were declining. This left only the gigantic
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49 Claus-M. Naske, 1995, pp. 61-62.
50 Claus-M. Naske, 1995, p. 64.
51 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 61.
52 Peter A. Coates, The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Controversy: Technology, Conservation, and the 
Frontier, Fairbanks: University o f  Alaska Press, 1993, p. 85.
53 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 87.
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defense expenditures which one day would have to come to an end and upon which a 
stable society could not be built.”54
Two events in 1957 bolstered the statehood movement: the discovery of 
commercial amounts of oil at the Swanson River field by Richfield Oil Corporation,55 
and a declaration by the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee that Alaska 
met the requirements for admission to statehood, including sufficient population and 
enough resources to support a state government and its share o f the cost of the federal 
government.56
Nevertheless, as Alaska approached statehood in 1959, it faced significant 
economic challenges. A large land allotment and transitional grants addressed some 
of these challenges over a period of five years, and were, “designed to put Alaska on 
an equal footing with the other states.”57 But it did not have a diversified, self- 
sustaining economy, except perhaps the subsistence economy of rural Alaska.
As noted in Chapter 3, the aboriginal peoples o f Alaska faced increasing 
competition for access to the fish and wildlife of the territory as the non-aboriginal 
population increased. Non-aboriginal people were initially interested in the lur seals 
of the Pribilof Islands, but soon began exploiting the rich fisheries resources as well. 
Indigenous people were eventually forced off many traditional salmon spawning 
streams by commercial canneries headquartered in Seattle and San Francisco. The 
people of Alaska, both aboriginal and non-aboriginal, opposed the use of fish traps by
54 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 103.
55 Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, p. 247.
56 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 159.
57 Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, p. 163.
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the canning and fishing companies, and one of the first acts of the State of Alaska was 
to prohibit their use. But aboriginal and non-aboriginal people differed over 
preferential harvest rights for Alaska’s aboriginal people, and the Alaska Constitution 
prohibited preferential hunting rights for any group. Alaska aboriginal land claims 
remained unresolved when statehood was granted, despite the warnings of Winton C. 
Arnold that unresolved land claims would create problems for the fledgling state.58 
Federal Economic Policy in Alaska: Statehood to 2004
The new state government in Alaska was faced with enormous challenges in 
1959: it was expected to provide modem services and infrastructure to a small and 
diverse population spread over an enormous geographic area. Yet it had limited 
sources of taxation, a debilitated salmon resource in need of rehabilitation, a small oil 
and gas sector, two pulp mills, some mining activity, and a small but growing tourist 
industry.59 It was still heavily dependent on federal expenditures, particularly military 
spending, as an important generator of economic activity. It was not until 1968, and 
the discovery of substantial oil resources at Prudhoe Bay, that the economic fortunes 
of Alaska improved substantially.
This section of the chapter discusses the ongoing significant role of the federal 
government in the economic development of Alaska, as well as the significant role 
that other “Outside” organizations and corporate interests play in the Alaska 
economy. It demonstrates that Alaska, unlike more developed states in the lower 48, 
continues to be dependent on federal expenditures and high oil prices for its economic
58 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, pp. 78, 99.
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prosperity. Furthermore, “Outside” interests such as environmental lobbies have 
helped shaped the Alaska economy by successfully lobbying the federal government 
to designate large areas of the state as protected areas where development cannot take 
place. Federal policies and laws continue to have major impacts on Alaska’s 
development, and Alaskans continue to struggle to change federal policies to make 
them “friendlier” to Alaskan interests.
The subsistence economy of Alaska, including the management o f fish and 
game, was completely under federal jurisdiction until 1960, when responsibility for 
fish and game management was turned over to the state government.60 Federal 
resource management policies and laws historically provided some measure of 
recognition and protection of aboriginal harvest rights in Alaska. Over time, many of 
these rights were expanded to include non-aboriginal subsistence harvest rights in 
rural areas, while aboriginal harvest rights were variously curtailed or expanded by 
shifting federal policies.61
A major policy change appeared to be implemented when Congress approved 
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) in 1971, as section 4(b) o f the Act 
extinguished all aboriginal hunting and fishing rights in the state. However, the 
conference committee that approved the final draft of the legislation also stated that it 
expected both the state and federal governments to protect the subsistence needs of
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59 Terrence Cole and Elmer E. Rasmuson, 2000, p. 320; Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 169.
60 Henry P. Huntington, Wildlife Management and Subsistence Hunting in Alaska, Seattle: University 
o f Washington Press, 1992, p. 25; Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, p. 284.
61 Theodore R. Catton, Inhabited Wilderness: Indians, Eskimos and National Parks in Alaska, 
Albuquerque: University o f  New Mexico Press, 1997; Henry P. Huntington, 1992.
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Alaska’s Natives. Furthermore, section 17 (d) (2) “directed the secretary [of the 
Interior] to withdraw up to 80 million acres [of Alaska public lands] for possible 
inclusion in the National Parks, Forests, Wildlife Refuges or Wild and Scenic Rivers
(\Xsystems.” According to David Case, the federal actions to protect lands as required 
by 17(2) (d), and the Alaska government’s responses, “set the stage for the next two 
years of political debate over the fate o f much of the public land in Alaska. During 
the course o f this debate, Alaska Natives and other Alaska subsistence advocates 
were able to trade their support for ANILCA’s environmentally oriented land 
classifications for environmentalist support of ANILCA’s Title VIII subsistence 
provisions.”64 Thomas Thornton noted that when the Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act (ANILCA), was passed in 1980:
Congress initially sought to implement a Native preference.
The final Senate version of the bill included such a provision, 
but the state of Alaska vigorously objected, and a compromise 
rural preference was eventually adopted along with the priority 
for subsistence use. Many Natives balked at the compromise, 
noting the unique qualities o f Native subsistence and Congress’ 
prior commitment to specifically protect it. Politically over­
powered, however, they had no choice but to go along with it .. ,65
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62 David S. Case, 1984, p. 295.
63 David S. Case, 1984, p. 298.
64 David S. Case, 1984, p. 299.
65 Thomas F. Thornton, “Subsistence: The Politics o f  a Cultural Dilemma,” in Clive S. Thomas, (ed.), 
Alaska Public Policy Issues: Background and Perspectives, Juneau: The Denali Press, 1999, p. 207.
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ANILCA also provided for state management of subsistence harvest rights to 
avoid the need for a dual management system of federal laws on federal lands and 
state laws on state lands. The state government attempted to comply with ANILCA, 
and had enacted subsistence legislation in 1978, which gave priority to subsistence 
uses of fish and wildlife, but did not provide a preference to any particular group.
This met the requirements of the state constitution, but not the requirements of 
ANILCA, which required a rural preference. Various efforts by the state government 
to bring its laws into compliance with ANILCA were stymied by interest groups until 
1986, when the law was amended.66
The subsistence issue resurfaced when the constitutionality o f the state law 
was challenged, and in 1989 the Supreme Court of Alaska ruled in McDowell v 
Collinsworth that the state’s rural preference provisions violated the state 
constitution. Another 1989 decision, Bobby v Alaska, handed down by the federal 
court, ruled that the Board of Game had to adjust its regulations to allow for 
customary and traditional practices.
The inability of the Alaska government to implement legislation that was in 
compliance with ANILCA and its constitution resulted in the federal government 
reassuming regulatory authority over wildlife on all federal lands in Alaska on July 1, 
1 9 9 0  68 ^  1 9 9 9 ? the federal government reassumed control over subsistence fishing
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66 Thomas F. Thornton, 1999, p. 208.
67 David S. Case, 1984, pp. 1020-1021; Thomas F. Thornton, 1999, p. 208. Daniel Nelson, Northern 
Landscapes: The Struggle fo r  Wilderness Alaska, Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 2004.
68 Henry P. Huntington, 1992, p. 61.
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on federal lands as a result of the Katie John decision,69 and Governor Knowles’ 
decision not to appeal the Katie John decision. The state benefited economically from 
these federal government takeovers because the federal government also assumed the 
administrative costs, and some have argued that the dual management system has in 
fact worked well because, “ the federal government has moved more forcefully than 
the state ever did to implement Title VIII of ANILCA. This has meant not only a 
strong subsistence priority and also a rural preference, but also efforts to make 
management more local, communal, and congruent with the realities of rural
70subsistence economies and lifestyles.” However, many Alaskans are dissatisfied 
with the dual management system, and Thomas Thornton has noted that the dual 
management system undermines some of the goals of statehood: “While wresting fish 
and game management from the federal government was one of the driving forces 
behind Alaska’s statehood movement, the state now appears ready to forfeit that 
responsibility to a Department of the Interior that does not want it.”71
Alaskans and federal officials have also differed over the question of 
reserving lands in the national interest. Historian Peter Coates has noted that, “During 
the first decade of the century, federal conservation policies had fuelled demands in 
Alaska for more home rule. There was also a close relationship between the gathering 
strength of the statehood movement in the postwar era and deepening frustration with
69 R. T. Peel, “Katie John v United States: Balancing Alaska Sate Sovereignty with a Native 
Grandmother’s Right to Fish,” B. Y. U. Journal o f  Public Law, Vol. 15, p. 264.
70 Thomas F. Thornton, 1999, p. 217; See also: Thomas A. Morehouse and M. Holleman, “When 
Values Conflict: Accommodating Alaska Native Subsistence,” Occasional Paper No. 22, Anchorage: 
Institute o f Social and Economic Research, University o f Alaska Anchorage, 1994.
71 Thomas F. Thornton, 1999, p. 210.
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federal unwillingness to promote economic progress at a pace agreeable to
79 7">development-minded Alaskans.. . Alaska “boosters” generally sought to 
maintain lands in the public domain for use and exploitation, while federal officials 
and “Outside” conservation interests sought to identify and protect parts of Alaska for 
conservation purposes. ANILCA rejuvenated the debate because it identified and 
protected more lands from development, including the Alaska National Wildlife 
Refuge, some parts of which are known as the “1002 lands.” Alaskan boosters have 
worked tirelessly to have these lands reopened to oil and gas exploration, while 
national and international conservation organizations have worked just as vigorously 
to keep the area off limits to development.
Alaskans became increasingly dependent on oil revenues after the discovery 
of oil at Prudhoe Bay in 1968. The discovery led directly to proposals to build a 
pipeline to export the oil, and the oil companies quickly established the Trans-Alaska 
Pipeline System to organize its pipeline application.74
The federal government was supportive of the pipeline initiative, but its 
regulatory process, including the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) in 1969, and court cases launched by “Outside” environmental groups,
n r  t  t t
slowed the pipeline land use approval process. In addition, Native villages launched
72 Peter A. Coates, 1993, pp. 81-82.
73 Coates uses the term, “in a catholic sense to describe someone (not necessarily resident in Alaska) 
imbued with the entrepreneurial spirit which believes that Alaska’s natural resources have great 
material value and advocates their rapid and thorough development without government interference 
(preferably with government assistance).” Peter A. Coates, 1993, p. 21.
74 Peter A. Coates, 1993, p. 176.
75 H. R. Myers, “Federal Decisionmaking and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline,” Ecology Law Quarterly,
Vol. 4, 1975, pp. 915-961.
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lawsuits to block land dispositions on the proposed pipeline route in order to expedite 
settlement of their land claims.
The settlement of Alaska Native claims in 1971 provided a significant boost to 
the Alaska economy. The settlement placed close to $1 billion into the hands of 12 
(later 13) Native settlement corporations (Native regional corporations) that invested 
heavily in Alaska, and allowed the pipeline project to proceed. In 2001, 12 Native 
regional corporations and 30 village corporations had revenues o f $2.9 billion, paid 
out $52.1 million in dividends to share holders, and $434 million in payroll to their 
employees in Alaska.76
Once the land claim issue was settled with the passage of ANCSA, the state 
experienced the classic economic “boom” resulting from the construction o f the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline. In 1974, the value of construction contracts awarded in Alaska 
increased 883 percent over 1973. Construction related employment increased by 27
77percent that year, then 100 percent in 1975, and 40 percent in 1976. However, 
according to Cole and Rasmuson, after the pipeline was completed in 1977, the 
Alaska economy declined sharply, so that in 1978-1979 bankruptcies in Alaska 
increased by 71 percent, and employment in the construction sector fell by 19
78percent.
State government spending soon reversed the economic down turn that 
resulted from the completion of the pipeline. Bolstered by huge oil revenues, the state
76 Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, Oct. 16, 2003.
77 Terrence Cole and Elmer E. Rasmuson, 2000, p. 408.
78 Terrence Cole and Elmer E. Rasmuson, 2000, p. 415.
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70government embarked on an expenditure spree unprecedented in American history.
In addition, it eliminated the state income tax and established the Alaska Permanent
o r j
Fund, which issued annual dividend checks to every Alaskan. Alaska became, (and 
remains), one of the wealthiest states in the United States.
Despite the state’s new found wealth, Alaskans harbored a number o f 
grievances about federal policies in the state, and Alaska’s economic issues were one 
of the driving forces behind the creation of the Alaska Statehood Commission in 
1980, which was mandated to study and report on Alaska’s relationship with the 
United States. This was a remarkable commission, because it was the first time in the 
twentieth century that any state had seriously examined its relationship with the 
federal government. Many of the commission’s recommendations were designed to 
reduce federal influence in Alaska, and to enhance the state’s ability to develop 
economically. For example, the commission recommended that the federal Export 
Administration Act be amended to enable the export of Alaska’s oil to Japan, and that
Q 1
the Jones Act, discussed earlier, be amended and repealed.
Whatever policies the government might have changed as a result o f the 
Statehood Commission’s report would not have saved the state from the impacts o f 
low oil prices and federal banking deregulation that occurred in 1986, which resulted 
in the closure or collapse of almost half the financial institutions in the state.
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79 Terrence Cole and Elmer E. Rasmuson, 2000, pp. 413-416.
80 Gerald McBeath and Thomas Morehouse, Alaska Politics and Government, Lincoln: University o f  
Nebraska Press, 1994, p. 53.
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According to historian Terrence Cole and former banking executive Elmer 
Rasmuson:
The roots of the 1980s real estate boom and bust can be 
traced not only to the state’s growing dependence on the 
price of a barrel of oil, and the massive subsidies passed 
on to Alaskan citizens, but also to the inherent structural 
and regulatory problems of U.S. financial institutions at the 
time. In fact if any one single factor besides the state spend­
ing of oil dollars is to blame for both the height of the 
speculative fever and the depths of the depression that follow­
ed, it would be the actions of many banks and savings and 
loans, which funneled -  too often recklessly -  billions of
89dollars into the Alaskan economy.
The attitudes o f Alaska’s bankers were shaped by the federal government’s 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation which had reduced public awareness o f the 
potential for bank failures, and banks and savings and loans companies made 
excessive real estate loans in Alaska. Then, “The shock of the oil price collapse in 
1985 burst the bubble of the Alaska real estate boom in 1985-1986, starting a three- 
year-long cycle of bankruptcies, defaults, business closures, wage cuts and bank 
failures.”84
82 Terrence Cole and Elmer E. Rasmuson, 2000, p. 425.
83 Terrence Cole and Elmer E. Rasmuson, 2000, p. 426.
84 Terrence Cole and Elmer E. Rasmuson, 2000, p. 432.
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Alaska’s economic recovery in the 1990s was fueled by the return of higher 
oil prices and the expansion of the courier industry in Anchorage that takes advantage 
of Alaska’s strategic location on the great circle routes. But Alaska’s economy post- 
2000 faces some of the same challenges that it faced in the 1970s: dependence on
o r
federal expenditures, oil and mineral prices, and tourism. Fortunately for the state, 
Alaska has a powerful Congressional delegation which has been very successful at 
leveraging federal dollars for state programs and projects, and the federal government 
decided to continue heavy military expenditures in Alaska rather than closing more
or
bases and withdrawing troops. Furthermore, in recent years the Permanent Fund has
87been generating as much (or more) revenues as oil taxes and royalties. However, 
Alaskans are increasingly becoming concerned about the possibility that North Slope 
oil production will eventually dry up, leaving the state with a huge fiscal gap between 
what it has been spending in the past four decades and what it can earn from oil 
revenues. According to the Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, these concerns were 
reinforced in November 2004, when Moody’s Investors Services upgraded the 
outlook for Alaska’s credit rating from “negative” to “stable” due to recent high oil 
prices and state efforts to restrict spending, “But they also warned that the rating 
could again be imperiled if  the state doesn’t come up with a fiscal plan that weans
o o
Alaska off oil money and balances income and spending in the long term.” Added to
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85 Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, November 26, 2003.
86 Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, November 25, 2003.
87 Dr. Gerald McBeath, pers. comm., 2005.
88 Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, Nov. 24, 2004.
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this picture are concerns over declining salmon returns and the possibility that 
continuing terrorist threats could seriously damage the tourism industry in the state. 
Federal Economic Policy in the Yukon
Canadian historian Morris Zaslow has argued that in Alaska and the Yukon: 
“two diametrically opposed principles for the government of a pioneer environment 
confronted one another. The American philosophy, exemplified by the mining camps, 
was libertarian and laissez-faire, based on the principle o f squatter sovereignty; the
OQ
Canadian approach was authoritarian and colonial.” However, Zaslow overstated his 
case. Both Canadian and American federal governments were slow to recognize the 
potential o f their peripheries, and neither country invested heavily in their exploration 
and development until the gold rush. During the gold rush, Canada reacted to the 
large number o f Americans entering the country with some alarm and responded as 
most countries would -  by increasing its capacity to maintain control. The American 
government knew that a Canadian threat to occupy Alaska was non-existent, so it was 
not compelled to respond in like fashion when the focus of the gold rush shifted from 
Dawson to Nome or Fairbanks. After the Gold Rush, the Canadian federal 
government withdrew from active support of the northern economy and left economic 
development almost totally to the private sector, while the U.S. federal government 
actually invested in Alaska through projects such as the construction of the Alaska 
railroad and building the Matanuska Colony.
89 Morris Zaslow, “The Yukon: Northern Development in a Canadian-American Context,” in Kenneth 
Coates and William Morrison (eds.), Interpreting Canada’s North'. Selected Readings, Toronto: Copp 
Clark Pitman Ltd., 1989, p. 138.
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Kenneth Coates has argued that Canada’s approach to its periphery was 
different from the American approach:
Although popular myth and historical convention suggest that 
the Canadian government exercised far more control over its 
frontier than the American authorities exercised over Alaska, 
the truth is otherwise. The U.S. government was active, building 
railways, regulating resources, and rushing to the defense of its 
periphery. Canada saw expense, not opportunity, on its north­
western frontier, and it did its best to limit its financial and 
political obligations there.90
Canadian economist Kenneth J. Rea studied the economic history of the 
Canadian North and the impact of federal policies on its development. He 
characterized the federal government’s approach to northern Canada to the 1950s 
laissez-faire’.
Certainly it was not felt that the federal government should 
initiate measures aimed at developing the resources in the 
Territory directly. This was, of course, quite consistent with 
the laissez-faire principles of the government of the day.
However much the government might have violated these prin­
ciples in order to promote and accelerate economic development 
in the other parts o f Canada during the first half o f this century,
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it adhered quite scrupulously to them when the question of 
developing the resources under its direct control in the Yukon ...
91arose.
The consequences of this policy had profound impacts on the way the North 
failed to develop. According to Rea, the North was left to private enterprise to 
exploit:
Entrepreneurs attempting to develop the land resources of 
the Territories had, in the absence of effective government 
participation in the development process, no alternative but 
to undertake, on their own initiative, the provision of a great 
deal of capital infra-structure which would elsewhere have 
been treated as social capital -  in the sense that it would have
92been provided publicly.
Following World War I, the federal government withdrew a large amount o f 
financial support from the Yukon government, cutting its budget and reducing its 
authority. Large corporations, many of them foreign-owned, came to dominate all 
facets of the Yukon economy. Corporations like Treadwell Yukon, the White Pass 
and Yukon Route Railway, and A.N.C. Treadgold’s Yukon Consolidated Gold
90 Kenneth Coates, “Controlling the Periphery: The territorial Administration o f the Yukon and Alaska, 
1867-1959,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 4, 1987, pp. 150-51.
91 Kenneth J. Rea, 1968, p. 58.
92 Kenneth J. Rea, 1968, pp. 199-200.
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Corporation, became the major decision-makers in the Yukon economy, supplanting 
even federal authorities.93 As a result, the Yukon economy stagnated from 1918 until 
World War II.
The federal government’s policies toward northern Canada can be contrasted 
with its policies of expansion and development in the South. Prime Minister John A. 
Macdonald promoted his National Policy in the election of 1878, and after his 
election, the National Policy, “became the basis for Canada’s economic development 
for the next 50 years.”94 The National Policy was focused on western expansion and 
development, and had three interrelated objectives: constructing a Canadian railway 
system, promoting immigration, settlement and agricultural development on the 
prairies, and building and protecting the Canadian economy through the imposition of
• • 95protective tariffs.
In addition to promoting economic development, Canada secured and 
expanded the federation by enticing other British North American colonies to join 
Canada by offering incentives. According to political scientists Richard Van Loon 
and Michael Whittington, “As other provinces came into the federation, they also 
were given generous debt allowances. Even the provinces of Alberta and 
Saskatchewan, which had been federal territories before their coming of age and so
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Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1988, p. 213.
94 Robert J. Jackson and Doreen Jackson, Politics in Canada: Culture, Institutions, Behaviour, and  
Public Policy, Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, Inc., 2001, p. 55.
95 Robert J. Jackson and Doreen Jackson, 2001, pp. 55-56.
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obviously had no debt, received an annual payment based on the difference between 
their debt allowance and their non-existent debt....” 96
In addition to these subsidies, a number of special federal grants have been 
given to various provinces from time to time in order to meet their special needs. For 
example, both New Brunswick and Newfoundland received big subsidies after 
joining the federation. And when Alberta and Saskatchewan became provinces in 
1905, the federal government retained the rights to their natural resources but gave 
them large grants as compensation.97
In contrast to the above historical precedents, the Canadian federal 
government has never proposed any type of financial incentive to a northern territory 
to seek provincial status. Rather, it has sponsored constitutional changes that have 
made it more difficult for territories to attain provincial status. These changes will be 
examined in detail in the next chapter.
As noted earlier in this dissertation, federal military expenditures transformed 
Alaska during World War II, and were an important factor in sustaining the Alaskan 
economy in the post-war era. The Yukon’s experience was quite different. With the 
shift to an emphasis on an international role of peace-keeping, the Canadian 
government gradually demobilized the Canadian armed forces after World War II, 
and its military presence in the Yukon lasted only until 1964. (Only a small 
detachment remained after the military’s withdrawal). According to K. J. Rea, “ like 
the Alaska Highway and the Canol Project, the DEW line and various other smaller
96 Richard J. Van Loon and Michael S. Whittington, The Canadian Political System: Environment,
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military ventures in the north had a relatively small effect on the long-term economic
QO
development o f the area.” However, the federal government did provide some 
assistance to Canadian gold miners when it approved the Emergency Gold Mining 
Assistance Act in 1947, which provided funding to gold mining operations to assist 
with the increased costs o f production."
The Indian subsistence economy was important to the federal government 
because it obviated the need for welfare spending. Federal policy to leave the 
aboriginal population to fend for itself, with only the assistance of Roman Catholic 
priests and Anglican ministers, relieved federal officials of the costs of providing 
social assistance, medical services, and anything but rudimentary educational 
opportunities for northern indigenous peoples. Federal officials ensured that 
aboriginal people could hunt, fish and trap on unoccupied Crown lands and on special 
game preserves without restrictions until the 1950s, when trap line registration was 
introduced by the Yukon government. However, Indians were precluded from 
participating in the more lucrative big game outfitting business opportunities.100 And, 
by the 1960s, the Indian dominated trapping industry was in serious decline.101
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97 Richard Van Loon and Michael Whittington, 1987, p. 279.
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99 Kenneth J. Rea, 1968, p. 131.
100 Kenneth Coates, 1991, p. 56.
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The dire social circumstances of northern Natives was an important incentive 
prompting federal officials to begin intervening in the northern economy in the post 
World War II era.102
The relationship between political capacity and economic development was 
also significant. Private enterprise was reluctant to invest in capital facilities that did 
not provide immediate benefits in terms of profits. So they did not invest in schools, 
hospitals, and other services to the communities where they were located. According 
to Kenneth J. Rea, these are the activities normally associated with governments, and, 
“one aspect of the development process in the territorial north ... was the absence of 
such publicly sponsored undertakings during most of the area's economic history. The 
reasons for this... were not only to be found in the lack of demand .. .but also in the 
policies and, indeed, in the very structure o f government in the north.”103 For Rea, 
the colonial nature of northern governments also contributed to the lack of economic 
development:
The system of territorial government devised for the 
northern part o f Canada not only minimized the influence 
of local interests upon policy at that level, but the financial 
arrangements made it virtually impossible for the territorial 
government to implement measures arising out of such 
influence whenever it did make itself felt. This weakness of 
the territorial government arose largely... from the constit-
102 Kenneth J. Rea, 1968, p. 315.
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utional provisions which removed control over natural resources 
from the jurisdiction of the territorial administration. This not 
only served to transfer the responsibility and the initiative for 
the development of such resources ... to the federal government, 
but it also eliminated the only major source of revenue which 
might have been available to the territorial government for 
financing the investments it might have undertaken in resource- 
developing capital.104
The federal Government refused to support the idea of a rail link between 
British Columbia, the Yukon and Alaska, despite the North Pacific Planning 
Commission’s support for such a link, and American authorization to negotiate an 
agreement with Canada to construct one in 1949.105 However, federal support for 
frontier road construction gathered momentum in the 1950s, and in 1957, Prime 
Minister Diefenbaker’s government adopted a policy that supported the building of 
roads into northern areas which had economic potential. 106 Under the new policy, the 
federal government agreed to pay the full costs of constructing “development” roads 
in the Yukon, while maintenance costs were to be split: the federal government 
paying 85 percent of the costs, and the Yukon Government paying 15 percent.107 The
103 Kenneth J. Rea, 1968, pp. 314-315.
104 Kenneth J. Rea, 1968, p. 315.
105 Kenneth J. Rea, 1968, p. 234.
106 Kenneth J. Rea, 1968, p. 242.
107 Kenneth J. Rea, 1968, p. 243.
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policy was further enhanced in 1962, when the federal government increased its 
subsidy to mining companies for building roads to mine sites.108
The increased economic activity and military presence in the Yukon caused 
the population to grow substantially from 1941 to 1961, rising from about 5,000 
people to almost 15,000.109 The Yukon’s elected assembly, the Territorial Council, 
began agitating for increased responsibility and greater attention to the territory’s 
economy. This increasing interest in the economic and constitutional future of the 
Yukon prompted the federal and Yukon governments to sponsor a major study of the 
Yukon economy in 1967. The 14 volume study was completed by D. Wm. Carr and 
Associates in November, 1968, and included 29 specific recommendations for 
additional work. These recommendations included a renewed call to build a rail link 
from the Yukon to southern Canadian railways, completing a forest inventory, and 
conducting a feasibility study for a lead-zinc smelter in the Yukon.110 However, most 
of the recommendations were never acted upon.
108 Kenneth J. Rea, 1968, p. 246.
109 Kenneth J. Rea, 1968, pp. 324,431.
110 Recommendations included:
- building a standard gauge railway from the centres o f  originating traffic in the Yukon to connect 
with Canada’s mainline railways by 1978;
- provision o f a Canadian tidewater port as near as possible to the Yukon by the time the standard 
gauge railway is ready to use;
- provision o f adequate electric power capacity and developing comprehensive generating facilities 
and effective transmission grid by 1975;
- extension o f programs for the development roads and airfields to develop a grid for each o f them 
covering the territory by 1975;
- completion o f a geological survey and mapping o f  the Territory within 12 years;
- complete a feasibility study for a lead-zinc-silver smelter for the territory within 5 years;
- feasibility studies for iron ore mining and coal-fired thermal electric plants;
- expansion o f the forest industries by 20 times by 1985;
- complete an inventory o f Yukon forests;
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Federal acceptance o f aboriginal land claim negotiations marked a significant 
turning point in federal policy that had significant implications for the Yukon. The 
question of who owned the land and resources of the Yukon, combined with a freeze 
on federal land dispositions and new environmental legislation, dampened the 
investment climate in the territory. The federal government also rejected the Yukon 
Indians’ demand for a Yukon University as outlined in their statement of claim. 
While the small size of the Yukon’s population (less than 30,000 in 1973) likely 
contributed to the decision, two independent studies launched by the Science Council 
of Canada and the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, later 
supported the initiative.111 As a consequence of the federal decision, northern Canada 
is the only region in the circumpolar North that lacks a university that can build the 
human capacity to meet local needs and address the educational requirements of 
many of its residents. Many Yukon residents are forced to migrate out o f the territory 
to obtain their academic credentials as the Yukon has only one small college, and 
many students never return.
- establishment o f  a specialized development authority to carry forward the work o f  the study and to 
carry out overall planning and co-ordination for economic development o f  the Yukon and the 
northwest region. (Carr and Associates, 1968, pp, 12-16).
The vast majority o f the recommendations were never implemented, although work on forest 
inventories, geological surveys, and other studies Eire ongoing. The federal government continued to be 
reluctant to discuss a railway through the Yukon, and U.S. initiatives to obtain Canadian participation 
in studies have largely been ignored. However, by 2005, the federal government appeared to be 
considering the proposal following a visit from Alaska Governor Murkowski and Premier Fentie.
111 Council for Yukon Indians, Together Today fo r  Our Children Tomorrow: A Statement o f  
Grievances and an Approach to Settlement by the Yukon Indian People, Brampton: Charters 
Publishing Company Limited, 1973. p. 21; Science Council o f Canada, Northward Looking: A 
Strategy and a Science Policy fo r  Northern Development, Ottawa: Minister o f  Supply and Services 
Canada, 1977, pp. 57-58; Thomas H.B. Symons, The Symons Report, Toronto: The Book and 
Periodical Development Council, 1978, p. 101.
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Federal interest in the North was also rekindled in the 1970s when the federal
government was faced with a proposal to build a natural gas pipeline down the
Mackenzie Valley. The government appointed Mr. Justice Thomas Berger to chair the
inquiry in 1974, and a broad array of environmental and Native organizations soon
spoke out against the pipeline project. After many months of hearings it became clear
that Justice Thomas Berger would not support early construction of the line. Before
Berger’s report was issued in 1977, an alternate route down the Alaska Highway was
proposed and quickly supported by all the parties except the Council for Yukon 
11 0 •Indians. The Canadian and U.S. governments quickly approved the project but its 
economic viability waned as the energy crisis in North America receded, and the
i n
project was never completed. The Yukon was not to benefit from pipeline 
development as Alaska had. Indeed, the Yukon lost “tax benefits of at least $1 billion 
over the twenty-five year life of the pipeline .. ..”114
But energy issues remained high on the federal government’s agenda into the 
1980s with the adoption of the National Energy Policy (NEP) in October 1980. The 
NEP was designed to support oil and gas exploration in the North and offshore 
frontiers, increase Canadian ownership and control o f the oil and gas industry, and 
divert economic rents from the corporations and producing provinces to the federal 
government.115
112 Kenneth M. Lysyk, Edith E. Bohmer, and Willard L. Phelps, Alaska Highway Pipeline Inquiry, 
Ottawa: Minister o f  Supply and Services Canada, 1977.
113 Robert Page, 1986.
114 Robert Page, 1986, p. 283.
115 Robert Page, 1986, p. 301.
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The elements of the policy were incorporated into the Canada Oil and Gas 
Act, in 1981, which was opposed by both aboriginal and non-aboriginal northerners 
because it identified northern land and resources as national resources, ignored the 
concept of aboriginal title, and benefited southern Canadians at the expense of 
northern Canadians.116
A Progressive Conservative government was elected in the national election 
of September, 1984. The Yukon’s Member o f Parliament, Erik Nielsen, soon became 
deputy Prime Minister, and the national government adopted a new policy on 
northern development in 1987 when it approved, A Northern Political and Economic 
Framework, the first major policy statement on the North since 1972. The essential 
components of the framework were to: transfer all remaining provincial-type 
programs to the territorial governments; settle land claims as soon as possible; ensure 
a full debate on the division of the Northwest Territories; develop stable, sound and 
diversified territorial economies (with a special emphasis on renewable resource 
development and tourism); improving the business climate for investors through a 
Northern Mineral Policy and a Northern Oil and Gas Accord; and, review the role of 
the federal government in the North as it relates to foreign policy and Canadian Arctic
• 117sovereignty.
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117 Government o f Canada, A Northern Political and Economic Framework, Ottawa: Minister o f  
Supply and Services Canada, 1988, p. 5.
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The Framework noted that, “Three concerns underscored the need to reassess 
northern economic policy: demographic pressures; declining major resource activity 
and the northern economy’s dependence on government expenditures.”118
The policy proposed to address the North’s economic problems by devolving 
resource management responsibilities to the territorial governments (subject to 
continued support by First Nations), finalizing land claim negotiations, and 
diversifying northern economies. However, it also noted that territorial government 
growth and federal spending would not continue at the same pace as in the past 
decades.119
The federal policy complemented the Yukon government’s Yukon Economic 
Strategy, completed by the Yukon Department of Economic Development in 1988. 
The Yukon Economic Strategy was the culmination of several years o f public 
consultations, workshops and studies, known as the Yukon 2000 process, conducted to 
gain consensus on how the Yukon’s economy should evolve.120 The strategy outlined 
numerous initiatives the Yukon government would undertake to strengthen and 
diversify the economy in order to achieve the identified goals of: maintaining the 
option of residents to stay in the Yukon; gaining greater control over the economy;
191enhancing the quality of life; and, ensuring equality of opportunity.
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increased from $131 million to $1,933 million, including transfers to the territorial governments and, 
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In the Yukon, the federal policy framework was implemented through the 
completion of a number of program transfers (such as freshwater fisheries, Northern 
Canada Power Commission, health and hospital transfers, and airports), to the Yukon 
Government; the signing and implementation of the 1991 Canada-Yukon Economic 
Development Agreement, and the negotiation of the Yukon Indian land claims 
Agreement in Principle (1988), and the Umbrella Final Agreement (1990).
The 1991 Canada-Yukon Economic Development Agreement (ED Pi) followed 
an earlier 1984-89 Economic Development Agreement, which together made available 
some $64.2 million for economic research, planning, training, and demonstration 
projects in the major sectors of the economy: tourism, renewable resources, forestry, 
mining, and small business. Three million dollars of this funding was also earmarked
1 9?for efforts to reopen the Curraugh Resources mine at Faro.
In October, 1993 a Liberal federal government was elected. The new 
government did not adopt an explicit northern policy, and the Economic Development 
Agreement lapsed in 1996, and was not renewed, despite a federal-Yukon evaluation 
report that recommended the agreement be renewed in a modified form.123 Since 
1996, the North has been the only region in Canada that has not had regional 
economic development funding available to it. However, the Liberal government 
continued the process of negotiating program transfers to the Yukon government, 
including responsibility for onshore oil and gas (1998), and culminated in the transfer
122 J.C. McDavid and Associates, 1991-96 Canada-Yukon Economic Development Agreement: Final 
Evaluation Report, Whitehorse: Canada-Yukon Economic Development Agreement, 1996, p. 199. 
Note, the mine at Faro was reopened for several years, but then closed down once again.
123 J.C. McDavid and Associates, 1996, pp. 256-261.
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o f all Northern Affairs programs to the Yukon government on April 1, 2003.124 The 
Liberal government also continued negotiating land claims and, along with the Yukon 
government, signed final agreements with most Yukon First Nations between 1994 
and 2004.
The settlement of a number of land claims in the Yukon has had positive 
results for the Yukon’s aboriginal population. Federal land claim money has bolstered 
the social and economic development o f most Yukon First nation communities, so 
that in October, 2004, the Department o f Indian and Northern Affairs was able to 
report that eight of Yukon’s fourteen First Nation communities ranked amongst the 
top 89 aboriginal communities in Canada on the First Nations Community Well­
Being Index.125
The pipeline debates of the 1970s were rekindled in 2000 when proposals to 
construct Mackenzie Valley and Alaska Highway pipelines were resurrected. But the 
old arguments against the pipeline proposals were no longer evident. First Nations in 
the N.W.T. and the Yukon with land claim settlements were much more amenable to 
the pipeline proposals, and opportunities to partner with the pipeline companies were 
actively sought. In 2003, the Yukon government provided financial support to Yukon 
First Nations to form an Aboriginal Pipeline Group to study the impacts o f an Alaska
1 OftHighway pipeline and formulate their position on the pipeline. The Yukon
124 Government o f  Canada, Yukon Northern Affairs Program Devolution Transfer Agreement, Ottawa: 
Minister o f  Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2001.
125 Erin O’Sullivan and Mindy McHardy, The Community Well-Being (CWB) Index: D isparity in Well­
Being Between First Nations and Other Canadian Communities Over Time,, Ottawa: Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada, 2004.
126 Yukon News, Oct. 1, 2003, p. 5.
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government also concluded an agreement with Kaska Minerals Corporation in 2003 
to enable the corporation to lease Crown lands and arrange for mineral exploration 
work to be conducted on those lands.127
The Yukon government has, since the 1980s, fostered links with its northern 
neighbors in an attempt to strengthen political and economic initiatives, including
• • • • 198joining the Northern Forum in 1991, and renewing intergovernmental relations 
accords with its neighbors. For example, a new accord was signed by Alaska 
Governor Murkowski and Yukon Premier Fentie on December 1, 2003, to foster 
cooperation on initiatives such as an inter-jurisdictional railway, an Alaska Highway 
gas pipeline, and extension of fibre optic cable from Alaska through the Yukon.129
Increased cooperation amongst northern Canadian jurisdictions has had 
proven benefits, such as when the three northern premiers walked out o f a first 
ministers’ conference in February 2003 to protest the small amount of health funding 
they were allocated by the federal government. Federal officials soon after increased 
the level of health funding to the territorial governments to $60 million.130 The 
Yukon’s ties with Alaska have been advantageous. For example, Yukon students 
attending the University o f Alaska benefit by being treated as residents for tuition 
purposes. Other areas o f cooperation include joint tourism marketing, agreements on 
highway maintenance, reciprocal fishing licensing, and the U.S. government’s
127 Yukon News, Nov. 17, 2003, p. 5.
128 Government o f  Canada, Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges o f  
Cooperation into the Twenty-First Century, Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 
1997, pp. 42, 170.
129 Government o f  Yukon, News Release, December 1, 2003.
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ongoing investments in highway maintenance in the Yukon as part of the Shakwak 
Project. Canada and the U.S. entered into an agreement in 1977 to upgrade portions 
of the Haines Highway and the Alaska Highway (the Shakwak Project). The 
agreement has been extended for many years, and the Yukon government took over 
the reconstruction work in 1992 when highway maintenance was devolved to it from 
the government of Canada.131
Ironically, Canada pays the most attention to the North when its sovereignty 
in the North is challenged. This was evident during World War II, when Canada had 
to react to the influx of American troops; in 1969, when it had to respond to the 
Manhattan’s transit of the Northwest Passage; and in 1985, when The USS Polar Sea 
made its way through the Passage. Following the latter incident, the Canadian federal 
government actually announced in its 1987 policy paper on defense that it would 
invest in a small fleet of nuclear submarines to provide more effective monitoring of
the Northwest Passage. As each threat passed, Canada lost interest in the northern
1 \)sovereignty issue, and never purchased a nuclear submarine.
However, late in 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin announced his concern 
over the possibility that global warming could reduce the ice pack in the Arctic 
Ocean, potentially opening new opportunities for foreign vessels to utilize the 
Northwest Passage, and perhaps challenge Canadian sovereignty once again. His 
government has proposed a federal-territorial planning exercise to develop a northern
130 Governments o f  Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut, News Release, February 16, 2003, 
February 20, 2003 and April 16, 2003.
131 www.hpw.gov.vk.caytrans/highwavs/shakwak.html. Nov. 10. 2004.
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strategy, and he even mused about the possibility of creating northern provinces.133 
This planning process may provide new opportunities for the territories to seek the 
resources they require to place their economies on a more solid footing.
Overcoming Economic Dependency
Underlying the demands for constitutional change in northern jurisdictions has 
been the desire to gain greater control of local economies and to reduce dependency 
on national governments. National governments continue to be significant forces in 
northern economic development in Alaska, Greenland and the Yukon. Large transfer 
payments underpin their economies, and federal largesse in Alaska is also a function 
of the large military presence in the state, unmet needs of capital and social 
infrastructure as compared with the lower 48 states, protection of federal lands, and 
the significant influence wielded by Alaska’s congressional delegation.
Alaska remains the wealthiest and most independent subnational jurisdiction 
in the circumpolar North, with statehood guaranteed in the constitution and benefiting 
from its bountiful stock o f natural resources, and especially its wealth o f oil. Yet the 
narrow base of Alaska’s economy, combined with ongoing projections of declining 
oil reserves, disturbs many Alaska economists.
As noted throughout this chapter, the policies of national governments have 
played a significant role in northern development and underdevelopment. National 
governments must also be engaged to provide the leadership and support to break
132 D. Huddleston, “Canadian Defence Polices and Activities in the Arctic,” The Arctic: Choices fo r  
Peace and Security, Edmonton: The True North Strong and Free Inquiry Society, 1989, pp. 179, 183.
133 John Ibbitson, Globe and Mail, November 23, 2004.
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northern jurisdictions’ dependency on government transfers and on mineral, oil and 
other staple prices. Can this be done?
Sociologist Peter Evans, in Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial 
Transformation, demonstrates how Korea, Brazil and India were able to foster 
powerful information technology industries within their countries. He utilized the 
concept of the “developmental state,” which possesses “embedded autonomy,” to 
demonstrate how the state can effectively intervene in a developing economy to foster 
economic development. According to Evans:
The internal organization of developmental states comes ... closer 
to approximating a Weberian bureaucracy. Highly selective merit­
ocratic recruitment and long-term career rewards create commitment 
and a sense of corporate coherence. Corporate coherence gives these 
apparatuses a certain kind of ‘autonomy.’ They are not, however, 
insulated from society as Weber suggested they should be. To the 
contrary, they are embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds 
the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for the 
continual negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and policies. Either 
side of the combination by itself would not work.... Only when 
embededness and autonomy are joined together can a state be called 
developmental.134
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Using a “comparative institutional approach,” Evans analyzed how the actions 
and policies of the governments of Korea, Brazil and India were able to successfully 
foster the development of information technology industries within their countries at 
a time when conventional economic wisdom suggested that multi-national 
corporations, based in core countries, would dominate this industry and dictate where 
and how it would evolve.135 This was the case, in spite of the fact that, in Evans’ own 
assessment, India and Brazil were not fully developmental states, but were, 
“intermediate cases, exhibiting partial and imperfect approximations of embedded 
autonomy. Their structures did not categorically preclude effective involvement, but 
they did not predict it either.”136
Brazil, India and Korea utilized a combination of roles he refers to as 
“custodian,” “demiurge” “midwife” and “husbandry,” to build “greenhouses, sets o f 
rules that would protect seedling computer firms from the cold winds of international
117competition.” Custodial policies are essentially protectionist regulations, while the 
“demiurge” state “becomes involved in directly productive activities, not only in 
ways that complement private investment but also in ways that replace or compete 
with private producers.”138 “Midwifery” and “husbandry” policies involve programs 
to assist the emergence of new entrepreneurial groups, inducing existing 
entrepreneurs to take on new challenges, and other forms of assistance to assist local 
corporations to expand and develop.
135 Peter Evans, 1995, pp. 15, 18-20.
136 Peter Evans, 1995, p. 13.
137 Peter Evans, 1995, p. 111.
138 Peter Evans, 1995, p. 79.
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The “greenhouse” conditions created by Brazil, India and Korea differed 
significantly because of the different political, economic and social circumstances of 
each nation, but each country successfully fostered the growth of its information 
technology sectors in the 1980s.
According to Evans, the advent of a “'new internationalization’ based on the 
fusion of local and transnational capital,” in the 1990s provided new challenges to the 
emerging information technology industries in Brazil, India and Korea. However, 
Evans notes that the greenhouse policies of the 1980s proved useful for meeting these 
new challenges:
The new internationalization was not simply the negation of 
nationalist development strategies. In many ways it built on 
the foundation laid by those strategies. Local firms had to exist 
before they could make alliances. They had to develop their own 
organizations, marketing skills, and installed base in order to 
have something to offer potential transnational allies. Without 
midwifery there would not have been local groups with which 
to ally.
Greenhouse policies also gave TNCs an incentive to look 
for allies. Greenhouse rules in all three countries, explicitly in Brazil 
and India, implicitly in Korea, made certain kinds o f foreign entry
188
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contingent on finding local partners. These policies were local
1 TQcapital’s the [sic] biggest single bargaining asset.
Given the central role that national governments must play in fostering 
northern economic development, northern governments must successfully cajole 
national governments to action. Getting national governments to, first, articulate a 
policy of northern development, and second, to actively pursue polices of midwifery 
and husbandry, will be easier where those northern governments have the support of 
First Nation governments and aboriginal peoples. To the extent that national 
governments can effectively implement such policies, northern based businesses, 
entrepreneurs, aboriginal corporations, and governments will need to have the 
capacity to negotiate and implement mutually beneficial arrangements with multi­
national corporations.
Territorial lobbying in Canada appears to have had some impact on federal 
policy makers recently. On October 5, 2004, the Government o f Canada presented its 
Speech from the Throne, and made specific reference to the need for a comprehensive 
plan for northern development:
A region of particular challenge and opportunity is 
Canada’s North -  a vast area of cultural and ecological 
significance. The Government will develop, in cooperation 
with its territorial partners, Aboriginal people and other 
northern residents, the first-ever comprehensive strategy
139 Peter Evans, 1995, p. 184.
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for the North. This northern strategy will foster sustainable 
economic and human development; protect the northern 
environment and Canada’s sovereignty and security; and 
promote cooperation with the international circumpolar 
community.140
Conclusion
Dependency theory predicts that peripheral regions will fail to develop 
because their economies are structured by “Outside” forces whose interests are 
opposed to, or at least, not focused on, those of the regions they dominate. However, 
according to some theorists, national governments possess a degree of autonomy that 
enables them to either assist “Outside” forces in exploiting peripheral economies, or 
support the evolution of autonomous local governments and regional economic 
development. Consequently, national policies can play a crucial role in either the 
exploitation or the development of their peripheries.
The economic history of the American and Canadian North provides 
significant evidence that federal policies for many years provided support for 
“Outside” corporations to exploit the resources of Alaska and the Yukon. In Canada, 
federal authorities largely abandoned the North to private corporations, preferring to 
let private interests develop infrastructure. In Alaska, federal interest was greater, 
fostering some growth through research and infrastructure development such as the
140 Government o f  Canada, Speech from the Throne, October 5, 2004, pp. 5-6.
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Alaska Railway. But federal policies (or, possibly, the Pacific Decadal Oscillation), 
also contributed to the near collapse of the salmon fishery through exploitation by 
“Outside” interests over the protests of Alaskans.
K.J. Rea’s comments about the effects of federal policies and the structure of 
territorial government in the Canadian North are equally applicable to territorial 
Alaska: “the system of government not only minimized the influence o f local interests 
and upon policy at that level, but the financial arrangements made it virtually 
impossible for the territorial government to implement measures arising out of such 
influence whenever it did make itself felt. This weakness ... arose largely ... from the 
constitutional provisions which removed control over natural resources from the 
jurisdiction o f the territorial administration.”141 This situation, “eliminated the only 
major source of revenue which might have been available to the territorial 
government for financing the investments it might have undertaken in resource- 
developing capital.”142 In other words, the lack of constitutional capacity to 
implement resource policies precluded economic development in the absence of 
effective federal policies.
Today, both the Alaska and Yukon economies remain somewhat dependent on 
Outside forces: federal expenditures and transfer payments and oil and other 
commodity prices. Non-resident corporations still have a hand in determining the 
pace of change in these northern jurisdictions.
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From the 1860s until World War II, it can be argued that neither country 
invested heavily in its northern territories. The U.S. government invested more in 
Alaska than the Canadian government did in the Yukon: the U.S. government built 
the Alaska Railway, launched the Matanuska Valley agricultural project, and invested 
more in people, roads and research. But these efforts did not transform Alaska. World 
War II transformed Alaska. Federal expenditures provided road, airline, and modem 
communication linkages to the lower 48, eliminating Alaska’s sense of remoteness. 
Federal expenditures improved infrastructure and brought a population boom to the 
state that supported renewed efforts in support of statehood.
During World War II, the North became a strategic resource to national 
governments because of its location, and the American government spent large 
amounts o f money developing military infrastructure there. American war spending 
also benefited the Yukon to a large extent, much to the Canadian government’s 
chagrin. The American presence in the Canadian North pointed out how neglected the 
region was. It was American money that built the Alaska and Haines Highways, the 
Canol Road and pipeline, upgraded airports, improved phone service to the South, 
and improved the White Pass and Yukon Route Railway. In contrast, Canada’s 
military involvement in the Yukon was largely relegated to maintaining a highway it 
did not want. However, concerns over perceived threats to Canadian sovereignty over 
the Northwest Passage by American interests (the voyages of the Manhattan and the 
Polar Sea), also fostered responses. But the federal government’s interest waned as 
each threat passed, and it never invested in the fleet of nuclear submarines capable o f
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monitoring traffic through the Northwest Passage, as announced in the 1987 defense 
policy paper. 143Consequently, military bases and activities played a major role in 
Alaska’s economic development, but only a small, transitory role in the Yukon’s 
development.
Economic booms also proved advantageous for constitutional change.
Citizens were more willing to advocate for constitutional change when the economy 
was booming, and federal authorities appeared more willing to accede to demands for 
such change during boom times. However, where federal interests conflicted with 
territorial interests, the territorial interests were ignored. This was evident when the 
gold mining economy in Alaska collapsed during and after World War II due to 
federal policies and a collapse in the price of gold.
The periods of greatest economic development in the North were the result of 
either sustained federal expenditure, or resource exploitation booms, such as the gold 
rush in the late 1890s and the oil rush in the 1970s. The two phenomena are 
connected. The value of remote regions becomes apparent to national governments 
when large amounts of valuable resources are found there and world market prices 
are high. The strategic value of the resource is important as well. The importance of 
oil increased significantly as a “national” resource in 1973 during the OPEC oil 
embargo and the more recent Middle East wars, resulting in renewed efforts to 
develop pipelines.
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These facts indicate that prosperous northern economies can be built where 
federal interest in northern development is sustained. In Alaska, this federal interest 
was sustained by the strategic location of the state, which grew in importance as 
Alaska’s strategic resources grew. In Canada, federal interest in the North was 
sporadic rather than sustained.
Canada had a plan for developing its western territory: the National Policy.
The policy promoted western development through the development of infrastructure, 
such as the Canadian Pacific Railway, and incentives for settlement, such as 
promoting immigration and giving away free land. Order was maintained through the 
creation of the Northwest Mounted Police. In contrast, neither the United States nor 
Canada had a comprehensive plan to encourage northern development, even after 
World War II.
The federal perspective on northern economic development is driven by the 
need to exploit northern resources for the national interest, whereas local and regional 
governments want economic development to benefit local businesses and 
communities. As an example, Prime Minister Trudeau’s National Energy Policy 
fostered exploration and development of energy resources in the North, but the 
benefits o f the program were designed to benefit southern Canadians at the expense 
o f northerners -  so northern Canadians opposed the National Energy Policy.
The debates over the admission of Alaska to statehood focused heavily on 
economic issues and on whether Alaska would be able to pay the expenses of state 
government. However, at the end of the debate there were no requirements for the
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advocates o f statehood to demonstrate that statehood was “feasible.” No economic 
formula was prescribed, and no economic criteria had to be met. In the end, the 
granting o f statehood was a political act.
However, Alaska, supported by large infusions of federal funding during and 
after World War II, was able to attract and support a population that demanded 
constitutional change. The Yukon did not receive a level of federal support that 
enabled it to do the same. In contrast to Alaska, the Yukon’s 30,000 people have no 
university, no functioning railway, no access to regional economic development 
funding, and no significant military presence. Furthermore, there is no federal policy 
or plan to address northern economic development, although one was recently 
promised.
In the absence of a federal policy on northern development, territorial 
governments are forming alliances to support their claims for increased federal 
spending, and for the re-establishment of northern regional economic development 
funding. They are also increasingly allying with First Nation governments to improve 
economic development opportunities and attract businesses to the North. But the 
Yukon is still too reliant on resource extractive industries and multinational 
corporations for wealth generation. In Canada’s northern territories, resource 
development alone has not proven sufficient to build a northern economy to the level 
where it can sustain a large population needed to provide the tax base to support 
modem government. It seems evident that federal spending to support a university, 
research and development projects, military bases, and similar programs, could
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provide some stability to northern economies to balance the boom and bust 
phenomena associated with resource extractive industries.
In conclusion, it would appear that some combination of federal investment 
and resource extraction will be required to ensure economic development in the 
Yukon, to the point where provincial status could be contemplated. As the economy 
grows, it will become less dependent on federal transfer payments and less of a 
burden on taxpayers in other regions. Larger numbers of workers and their families 
will be attracted to the region, enhancing its political importance and its chances of 
constitutional development.
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The Constitutional Evolution of Alaska and the Yukon 
Introduction
Hechter’s model of internal colonialism focuses on the cultural division of 
labor: the subordination of one ethnic group by another, and the relegation of the 
subordinate group to low status occupations. As Europeans moved into the northern 
regions of North America their efforts were devoted to exploiting the fur resources 
and exploring for gold deposits. Indigenous peoples were valued for their wealth o f 
knowledge of local geography, hunting skills, and endurance, and were employed as 
packers, hunters and guides. Their value to the explorers and prospectors declined as 
the region was settled and a resource extraction economy was established. Horses, 
trains, tramlines and riverboats displaced Indian packers, and the mapping of the 
region eventually eliminated the need for guides.
Over time, the independent entrepreneurs, such as the prospectors, and agents 
of the centre -  the explorers, missionaries, soldiers, and fur traders -  settled in the 
periphery. Becoming settlers, their needs changed and they began to advocate for 
policies that fostered local development and local government. Their interests then 
clashed with those of the centre, whose primary interest remained exploitation of the 
periphery. A dynamic set of relationships thus emerged as the interests of the 
aboriginal population, the settlers, and the representatives of centre-based elites 
sought to influence the policies of national governments that impacted on the 
periphery. The national government, in turn, had a range of interests o f its own -
Chapter 5
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fostering national development, protecting sovereignty, winning elections, and so on. 
Its responses to issues relating to the periphery depended on many factors.
Canadian historian Morris Zaslow described the demographics of the 
territorial North in the 1960s as follows:
Observers point out that there is not one territorial public but 
several, and that the political awareness and interest of each 
varies. There are the native inhabitants ... constituting over 20 
per cent of the population of the Yukon ... a group that 
can be generally described as having extremely limited 
formal education (although this is being rapidly overcome), 
very parochial perspectives and interests, minimal experience 
of political institutions, and frequently a profound suspicion 
of the white man and all his works. The result is to inhibit the 
natives from playing the role in territorial government that 
their numbers warrant.1
The second group Zaslow described was the civil servants and government 
employees, many o f whom were transient, “who are discouraged from participating in 
territorial affairs by virtue of their positions.” Consequently, “a large part of the adult 
population of the north is inert or immobilized as regards any campaign for 
constitutional reform.”
1 Morris Zaslow, “Recent Constitutional Develoment in Canada’s Northern Territories,” Canadian 
Public Administration, 10, 1967, p. 177.
2 Morris Zaslow, 1967, p. 177.
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The third group included the white professionals and entrepreneurs, mine 
workers, clerks, laborers, and agents of large corporations. Zaslow noted that,
“Among this group also are found entrepreneurs who have come north to live, rear 
families, and make a place where a permanent, modem white community can take 
root.”3 It is this group that was the most politically active because they objected to the 
governmental restrictions and the loss of benefits to “Outside” interests.
Alaska’s demographics, although shaped by the resource based nature o f the 
economy, were different from the general pattern described by Zaslow. The 
population was larger and more complex. There was a large military presence in 
Alaska during and after World War II, a powerful fishing industry lobby, an 
influential aboriginal organization based in Southeast Alaska, and Alaska’s aboriginal 
population was more populous and diverse than the Yukon’s.
In both the Yukon and Alaska, the harsh environment and landscape also 
shaped the northern communities, both aboriginal and non-aboriginal. In the words of 
US park official Melody Webb:
The environment o f the Yukon [River basin] demanded 
greatly modified behavior patterns, radically new 
perceptions, and skills and abilities without precedent 
in America’s frontier experience. As individuals adjusted 
and adapted, some innovative social and economic
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institutions evolved as well.”4 
These innovative institutions included such things as miners’ meetings and 
miners’ law, annual migrations to the “Outside,” and inter-cultural common law 
marriage. Northerners also developed unique terms to describe themselves and others 
(newcomers), as “sourdoughs” and “cheechakos,” respectively.
Chapters 3 and 4 reviewed the impact of federal policies on the evolution of 
aboriginal rights and the economies of Alaska and the Yukon. This chapter will 
examine the evolution of public government5 in the two jurisdictions, focusing on the 
efforts of residents to acquire a measure of greater control over their constitutions and 
institutions o f governance, the policies and responses o f national governments, and 
the interactions among Natives, settlers and non-resident interests.
The Drive for Statehood in Alaska
Alaska managed without local government in its early years under American 
military administration, as federal officials provided minimal services and there was 
no elected assembly to represent the needs of the population. Indigenous peoples 
governed themselves with little interference as long as they did not threaten the 
economic interests o f the non-indigenous people that sought to exploit the resource 
base of the colony.
Claus-M. Naske has commented that most of the early settlers who came to 
Alaska had some understanding of how frontiers in the lower 48 had evolved, and 
many of them believed that Alaska would follow a similar course to statehood.
4 Melody Webb, Yukon: The Last Frontier, Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993, p. 8.
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However, Naske states that, “Alaska ... did not follow the usual Territory-to-State 
pattern. It was not until 1884 th a t ... the First Organic Act granted Alaskans even the 
basic elements of self-government.”6
Thus, like the early years in the neighboring Yukon Territory, “the Federal 
Government exercised its full powers to assure a tight, imperial control, and thereby 
created a truly noncontiguous administrative empire, much like those empires created 
by various European nations in that era .... Despite such imperial control, however, 
the Federal Government showed little real interest in Alaska.... The nation’s priorities 
simply did not include Alaska.”7
The Organic Act of 1884 provided a minimal form of civil government at 
minimum cost to the federal government, and no commitments of further 
development. Claus-M. Naske and Herman Slotnick commented that:
Aside from agreeing that Alaska’s government should be 
simple and inexpensive, they [Congress] had no clear concept 
of the form it should take. The result was a compromise, a 
hodgepodge of conflicting ideas and principles.... Alaska was 
designated a “district.” The term “territory” was deliberately 
omitted ... because it implied certain constitutional forms and
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5 Public government refers to publicly elected governments, as opposed to First Nations or Native 
government, which are elected only by band or First Nation citizens.
6 Claus-M. Naske, An Interpretive History o f  Alaskan Statehood, Anchorage: Alaska Northwest 
Publishing Co., 1973, pp. 2-3. • ■
7 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 3.
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guarantees. The Organic A c t... expressly forbade a legislature.8 
Governance in Alaska improved slightly with the appointment of a governor, 
a judge, and a few other federal officials, but without a legislature settlers had no 
avenue for enacting the laws and policies they felt they needed. Miners in remote 
areas formulated and enforced their own laws in the absence of any local authorities, 
and thus pressure for change continued.
This situation changed with the Klondike and subsequent gold rushes, which 
drew attention to Alaska and its resources. President McKinley supported legislative 
changes to address Alaska’s needs, and numerous changes to the Organic Act were 
implemented between 1898 and 1906, including a provision to select a non-voting 
member to the House of Representatives.9 Other changes included the imposition of 
business taxes and licenses, legalization of alcohol, increasing the number o f judicial 
districts to three, enabling the incorporation of towns, relocating the capital from 
Sitka to Juneau, and changing Alaska’s designation from “district” to “territory.”10 
However, the federal government effectively ran the territory. As recently as 
1941, Claus-M. Naske comments that one report stated:
In many respects, Alaska is a Federal province: The 
Governor is a Federal appointee, the law enforcement 
and judicial system is administered by the United States 
Department of Justice, part of the local taxes are imposed
8 Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, Alaska: A History o f  the 49th State, Norman: The 
University o f  Oklahoma Press, 1987, pp. 72-73.
9 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, pp. 5-6.
10 Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, pp. 86,92.
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by Act of Congress and collected by Federal officers, the 
fisheries and wildlife are under the jurisdiction of Federal 
and quasi-Federal agencies, about 98% of the land is in 
Federal ownership, the national defense program now 
changing the economic life of the Territory ... is entirely 
in Federal control."
While settlers lobbied for change, non-resident corporate interests such as the
1 0mining, shipping and canning industries, sought to maintain the status quo.
Aboriginal Alaskans sided with other Alaska residents in opposing commercial fish 
traps and other non-resident interests that historically discriminated against aboriginal 
people and displaced them from their traditional salmon fishing streams.
The stage was thus set early in Alaska’s history: settlers lobbied the federal 
government for greater self-government, while non-resident interests opposed such 
moves and favored federal administration of lands and resources. The indigenous 
population generally supported measures to reduce non-resident control, but had a 
limited role because o f discriminatory practices that limited their voting rights and 
their socio-economic status.13 The federal government was the dominant force in 
Alaska and had the power to grant or withhold constitutional change, and, because of 
its special relationship with the aboriginal population (as outlined in Chapter 3), was 
the target of lobbying from all three factions in the territory.
11 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 6.
12 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 23.
13 Donald C. Mitchell, Sold American: The Story o f  Alaska Natives and Their Land, 1867-1959: The 
Army to Statehood, Hanover: University Press o f  New England, 1997.
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By the early 1900s Alaska’s political parties adopted positions advocating for 
constitutional change. The Democrats wanted full territorial status, while the 
Republicans argued for self-government but not necessarily territorial status.14 In 
1908, James Wickersham ran in the election for the position o f Alaska’s delegate to 
Congress on an “anti-Syndicate” l5and pro self-government platform, and won.16 
Wickersham’s campaign for legislative reform toward self-government captured 
public support, and inl912 the Second Organic Act was passed. The Second Organic 
Act provided for a bicameral legislature whose work was subject to veto by a 
federally appointed governor and by Congress. In addition, there were a variety of 
limitations placed on the legislature’s authority, while broad responsibilities were 
granted to the governor. Consequently, the legislators distrusted the governor and
1 7spent much of their time trying to undermine his control.
Furthermore, the federal government continued to own and control all of 
Alaska’s lands, and reserved for itself ongoing authority to legislate in the areas of 
game, fish and fur resources. According to Naske and Slotnick, “The Alaskan Lobby, 
as the representatives o f the mining and fishing interests were called, had succeeded 
in putting a clause in the Second Organic Act that expressly forbade the Alaska 
legislature ‘to alter, amend, modify and repeal measures relating to fish and game, or
14 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, pp. 23, 26.
15 “The Syndicate was a combination o f the J.P. Morgan and Guggenheim fortunes. In Alaska the 
principal mining venture o f this organization was the Kennecott-Bonanza copper mine.... Since the 
Syndicate apparently had inexhaustible capital and reportedly controlled steamship transportation and 
a major part o f  the salmon canning industry, many Alaskans feared that the wealthy combine would 
shortly dominate Alaska’s politics.” Naske, 1973, p. 26.
16 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 27.
17 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 6.
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to interfere with the primary disposal of the soil.’”18 While many Alaskans were 
disappointed with the limitations of the Second Organic Act, the act did clarify 
Alaska’s constitutional status, and declared that the United States’ constitution 
applied in the territory. According to Claus-M. Naske:
Historically, statehood was tied to the territorial classification, 
and, after the Insular Cases, specifically to the incorporated 
status. On a number of occasions the Court recognized 
Alaska’s incorporated status, and also decided that once an 
area had been incorporated it could not revert again 
to an unincorporated status. Furthermore, once 
Congress had incorporated a Territory, it subjected itself 
to certain limitations to legislate for that region, although 
these restrictions did not apply when it exercised authority 
to make laws for an unincorporated area. Most importantly, 
the act of incorporation was consistently looked upon as a 
commitment on the part of Congress ultimately to admit 
the incorporated Territory as a State.19
The campaign for statehood began in earnest in 1915, with the creation of the 
first statehood club and an advocacy newspaper, The Forty-Ninth Star, in Valdez. 
Shortly thereafter, in 1916, Wickersham had the first statehood bill for Alaska
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18 Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, pp. 94-95.
19 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, pp. 8-9.
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0C\introduced in Congress, although it did not go anywhere. The statehood idea 
received a brief boost from President Harding in 1923, who supported the concept in 
a speech, but he died shortly thereafter and his successor did not display similar 
enthusiasm for Alaska statehood.
As noted in the previous chapters, World War II fundamentally transformed 
Alaska, and its larger population and improved infrastructure boosted public 
confidence in their ability to be self-governing. The statehood movement was 
renewed when Delegate Anthony Dimond’s statehood bill was submitted to Congress 
in 1943. Dimond’s statehood bills were unsuccessful, but the statehood movement 
gained momentum in the post-war years with the election of Bob Bartlett, who 
replaced Anthony Dimond as Alaska’s delegate to Congress, and who campaigned on 
a statehood platform. In addition, Alaska’s governor, Ernest Gruening was a staunch 
advocate of the statehood cause. Bartlett’s and Gruening’s enthusiasm for the cause 
prompted numerous Alaskans to support statehood and a grass roots organization, the 
Alaska Statehood Association, was formed.
Support for statehood was also being generated in the federal bureaucracy in 
the post-war area. Naske and Slotnick note that, in 1945, “the executive departments 
most concerned with the Administration of Alaska had to take an official stand. 
Finally, on August 10, 1945, Secretary [of the Interior] Ickes issued a statement on 
behalf of his department stating that statehood was now a part o f the department’s
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policy for Alaska.” By 1946 President Truman had been won over to the statehood 
cause, and a state referendum that year indicated wide support for statehood amongst
99Alaskans.
The statehood bill introduced in 1947 (H.R. 206) received more serious 
consideration than earlier post-war bills, with numerous Alaskans flying to 
Washington to testify for and against the bill before the Subcommittee on Territorial 
and Insular Possessions of the Committee on Public Lands. The subcommittee and 
committee both reported the bill with unanimous support. Several members of the 
House Subcommittee on Territories and Insular Possessions subsequently traveled to 
Alaska later that year to hear more Alaskans’ views on the bill.23 However, the bill 
did not include a provision disclaiming all rights to lands held by aboriginal people. 
This prompted the Natives’ lawyer, James Curry, to advise that Natives would oppose 
the bill unless the omission was corrected.24 A revised bill, H.R. 5666, incorporating a 
disclaimer, passed committee examination and was reported by the House of 
Representatives in April 1948, but was subsequently tied up in the rules committee
9^and not debated.
President Truman gave a boost to the statehood cause on May 21,1948 when
9£
he devoted an entire message to Congress on the statehood issue. In 1949, Delegate 
Bartlett and his friends in Congress again launched a statehood bill, H.R. 331, and the
21 Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, p. 146.
22 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, pp. 70-73; Ernest Gruening, The Battle fo r  Alaska Statehood, College: 
University o f Alaska Press, 1967, p. 2.
23 Ernest Gruening, 1967, pp. 14-17.
24 Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, pp. 359.
25 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, pp. 76-79.
207
91
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Alaska legislature took steps to promote statehood by passing a bill to establish an 
eleven-member Alaska Statehood Committee and appropriating $80,000 to support 
it.27 The committee was effective in mobilizing support for Alaska statehood at 
Senate hearings conducted on the statehood bills in 1950. In addition, Governor 
Gruening, on his own initiative, recruited the “committee of one-hundred” prominent
98Americans to support the statehood movement.
H.R. 331 was passed by the House of Representatives early in 1950 and 
referred to the Senate, which also conducted hearings on the measure. During the 
hearings, the chief fishery industry lobbyist, W.C. Arnold:
Urged the Senate to reject H.R. 311 because the Native 
land rights disclaimer section prohibited the state of 
Alaska from selecting land whose title was colored by 
Native claims and ‘require[d] the people of Alaska, as a 
condition of statehood, to acknowledge existence of 
unextinguished Indian title to the very homes in which they 
live and to accept the state lands subject to unextinguished 
Native rights.’29
Subsequent to these hearings, Senators redrafted the bill to remove the 
disclaimer, and included language, “ that suspended the secretary’s [of the Interior]
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26 Ernest Gruening, 1967, p. 43
27 Ernest Gruening, 1967, pp. 10-11.
28 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, pp. 90-95; Ernest Gruening, 1967, pp. 13-14.
29 Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, p. 362.
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authority to establish reservations until Congress approved the Alaska constitution.”30 
Both actions provoked aboriginal organizations and their allies to oppose the 
provisions, and some vowed to attempt to defeat the bill if  the offending provisions 
were not removed.
The objections to Alaska statehood became more complex as the possibility of 
statehood became more apparent. In addition to the Natives’ objections, congressmen 
began to focus on issues such as Alaska’s ability to generate sufficient revenues to 
support a state government, the small population base, the political consequences of 
statehood, noncontiguity, and racial issues.32 Claus Naske noted that House Speaker 
Joseph Martin of Massachusetts raised the concern that Alaska, as a state, would 
likely elect a Democratic delegation.33 This concern, and the concerns o f southern 
Democrats that Alaskan delegates might support civil rights reforms, resulted in a 
lengthy filibuster that stalled the bill, and it had to be reintroduced in 1951.34
While Bartlett’s 1951 bill, S. 50, was drafted so as to appease aboriginal 
concerns, Senator Butler attempted to reintroduce language to place limitations on the 
creation of new reservations in Alaska. However, the Committee on Interior and
'J c
Insular Affairs rejected the proposed amendment. The 1951 bill was also killed by 
the coalition of conservative Republicans and southern Democrats in 1952.36
30 Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, p. 364.
31 Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, pp. 362-366.
32 Ernest Gruening, 1967, pp. 101-102.
33 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, pp. 96, 102 -  103.
34 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 104; Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, p. 366.
35 Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, p. 367.
36 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 107; Walter R. Bomeman, Alaska: Saga o f  a Bold land, New York:
Harper Collins Publishers Inc., 2003, p. 399.
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In 1953 Senator Butler (R..-Neb.), became the Chair of the Interior and Insular 
Affairs Committee, and took the committee to Alaska to hear from the “little
'in ' t
people” of the territory. The response from average citizens appearing before the 
committee was overwhelmingly in favor of statehood, and Senator Butler
10
subsequently admitted that the prospects for statehood were improved.
As chair of the committee, Butler was in a strong position to craft the next 
statehood bill to his liking. A subcommittee was struck to draft the new bill, which 
authorized the state to select 100 million acres o f ‘“vacant, unappropriated and 
unreserved’” public land, other than small plots that were in the use of, or occupied
TOby, Natives. The bill was unopposed by Natives, largely because the aboriginal land 
rights lobby had disintegrated following the death of Felix Cohen and the resignation 
o f key aboriginal lobbyists.40 In any event, the bill died in 1954 after it was attached 
to the Hawaii statehood bill and the House Rules Committee refused to send the 
measure to the floor of the House.41
While the aboriginal land issue was temporarily “resolved,” the statehood 
movement became side tracked by proposals to partition the state and to promote 
commonwealth status rather than statehood, and President Eisenhower and his 
administration were not supportive of Alaska statehood 42
37 The term “little people” was used by Senator Hugh Butler, chairman o f the Senate Interior and 
Insular Affairs Committee, who, prior to the committee’s tour o f  Alaska, stated that he wanted to hear 
from Alaska’s “little people” on die statehood issue. Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 115.
38 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 117.
39 Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, p. 368.
40 Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, p. 369.
41 Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, p. 373.
42 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 126.
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Frustration with the slow movement of statehood initiatives through Congress 
in the early 1950s prompted statehood advocates to begin considering alternative 
means to promote their cause. The idea of holding a constitutional convention was 
developed by several organizations in the territory, and a bill to authorize a 
convention, House Bill No. 1, was approved in the territorial legislature in 1955, 
along with an appropriation of $300,000 to cover convention expenses.43 Convention 
delegate Victor Fischer explained that Alaska was influenced by Hawaii’s 
constitutional convention, held in 1950:
Because the issues of Alaska and Hawaii statehood were 
intertwined in Congress, it seemed logical for Alaska to 
also write a constitution and be on par with Hawaii. Also, 
proponents of Alaska statehood hoped the existence of the 
constitution for the proposed state would show Congress that 
Alaska was ... ready to become a state.”44 
The convention legislation authorized the election of fifty-five convention 
delegates to meet for a seventy-five day period at the University o f Alaska in College, 
Alaska. The elected delegates represented a broad spectrum of Alaskans, but, despite 
their large numbers, there was only one aboriginal Alaskan delegate.45 There was no 
significant pressure for Native involvement in the convention and most aboriginal
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43 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, pp. 136-37; Ernest Gruening, 1967, p. 71.
44 Victor Fischer, “Alaska’s Constitution,” in Gerald McBeath and Thomas Morehouse (eds.), Alaska 
State Government and Politics, 1987, p. 29.
45 The Native population o f Alaska at the time was approximately 33,000, about one quarter o f the 
population o f the territory. Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 152.
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leaders were unaware of its significance. Furthermore, most Natives were not yet 
mobilized politically in the territory.46
The convention approved the draft of a state constitution, and resolutions to: 
eliminate fish traps, ratify the constitution at a primary election in 1956, and adopt the 
Tennessee Plan.47 All of these measures were approved in the April, 1956 
referendum, and the Tennessee Plan delegates were elected in the general election in 
October.48
The convention delegates were unable to come to terms with the issue of 
aboriginal land rights, despite the pleas of delegate Marvin R. “Muktuk” Marston to 
include land grants for aboriginal people in the state constitution. Furthermore, the 
issue of subsistence harvest rights for aboriginal Alaskans was not addressed. As a 
consequence, an opportunity to build common ground between aboriginal and non­
aboriginal people for resolving aboriginal land rights and subsistence issues was 
lost.49 However, when the statehood bill was being drafted in 1957 by Bartlett under 
Henry “Scoop” Jackson’s supervision, the provisions that were objectionable to the 
aboriginal population were removed, and a disclaimer disavowing any state selections 
of Native claimed lands was added. Aboriginal opposition to the bill was thus 
precluded.50
46 Gerald McBeath, pers. comm., April 12, 2004.
47 Promoted by businessman George H. Lehleitner, the Tennessee Plan was to elect delegates to 
Congress without waiting for congressional action or approval. This approach was used by Tennessee 
in 1796 to pressure Congress to admit Tennessee as a state. Claus-M. Naske, 1973, pp. 140-141.
48 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 144.
49 Gerald E. Bowkett, Reaching fo r  a Star: The Final Campaign fo r  Alaska Statehood, Fairbanks: 
Epicenter Press, 1989, pp. 57-59; Victor Fischer, A laska’s Constitutional Convention, Fairbanks: 
University o f  Alaska Press, 1975, pp. 134-139.
50 Donald C. Mitchell, 1997, p. 374.
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Lacking significant aboriginal involvement, the Alaska constitution strongly 
reflected non-aboriginal reform values. According to Gerald McBeath and Thomas 
Morehouse, “Like its older sister states of the American W est... Alaska was strongly 
influenced by the western reaction against eastern centers of federal government and 
private corporate power. An important part of this western reaction was the insistence 
on local control, independence, and autonomy, especially where land, resources, and 
individual liberties were involved.”51
The constitutional convention, referendum, and election o f the Tennessee Plan 
delegation were covered by the national media and added impetus to the statehood 
movement. Furthermore, Secretary of the Interior McKay, who was an opponent of 
statehood, resigned to run for a Senate seat in 1956, and he was replaced by a 
statehood advocate, Fred Seaton. Seaton agreed to hire Alaskan Theodore (Ted) 
Stevens as a legislative counsel for the department, and to provide advice on Alaska 
issues. Stevens worked with the publisher of the Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, 
William Snedden, who was actively engaged in lobbying efforts for statehood. 
Snedden used his media contacts to promote statehood for Alaska. Consequently, 
when the Tennessee Plan delegates drove from Alaska to Washington in 1957 to 
publicize the statehood movement, they could count on a considerable amount of 
sympathetic press coverage. The delegates received a warm welcome in Tennessee
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The Denali Press, 1999, p. 238.
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and in Congress, although they were not officially recognized or offered seats in the 
either the House or Senate.52
The efforts of Stevens, Snedden, and Seaton to gamer support for statehood 
began paying dividends as opposition to statehood in the bureaucracy and Congress 
began to wane. Both Senate and House committees established to review statehood 
bills in 1957 reported the bills favorably, and House Speaker Sam Raybum reversed 
his earlier opposition to debating statehood bills on the floor of the House.53 Then, in 
1958, President Eisenhower spoke out in favor of statehood for Alaska in his budget 
address.
While these changes augured well for statehood proponents, the statehood 
bills still faced serious opposition from individual congressmen when brought 
forward for debate. House Rules Committee Chair, Howard Smith, opposed statehood 
for Alaska, but his ability to block progress on the bill was circumvented when the 
chair o f the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee had the legislation deemed as 
“privileged,” thus forcing a debate on the bill. After several amendments were 
adopted, the bill was approved in the House of Representatives by a vote o f 210 to 
166.54 The bill then proceeded to the Senate, where, after three days o f debate, it 
passed by a vote o f 64 to 20. President Eisenhower subsequently signed the statehood 
bill into law on January 3, 1959.55
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52Claus-M. Naske, 1973, pp. 156-157.
53 Claus-M. Naske, 1973, p. 159.
54Claus-M. Naske, 1973, pp. 162-164.
55 Ernest Gruening, 1967, pp. 104-106.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Summary
The struggle for statehood was a prolonged affair, taking about 43 years to 
accomplish. There was no consistent federal policy on the issue, with different 
presidents and interior secretaries taking stands that variously supported and opposed 
statehood. Indeed, Dwight D. Eisenhower, the president who signed the statehood bill 
into law, was not an ardent supporter of statehood.
Non-resident corporate interests were the most vocal opponents of statehood, 
as they feared a state government would pass laws and impose taxes which would be 
averse to their interests. Politicians in the southern United States also opposed 
statehood, fearing that the state would elect Democratic Party candidates to Congress 
and upset the political balance in that institution. Many of these “Outside” interests 
used the arguments that the territory was too under-populated and under developed to 
be able to support the programs necessary to run a state government.
Many residents of Alaska also did not support statehood for many years. 
Aboriginal Alaskans had limited political power but opposed several bills that did not 
recognize their interests in the land, and some resident corporations also opposed 
statehood for fear of increased taxation. However, the aboriginal interests were 
eventually addressed in the proposed legislation, and, after World War II, many more 
Alaskans became confident that statehood was an achievable and desirable goal.
Alaskans had time on their side. The rules for getting a statehood bill passed 
were the same as the rules for getting any other piece of legislation passed. In the 
absence of any federal policy opposing statehood, and without any complex
215
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constitutional rules to overcome, Alaskan persistence paid off. Statehood was 
achieved because the rules for attaining statehood were not, ultimately, based on 
wealth or population -  but on effective political lobbying and the overcoming of 
internal opposition to the measure.
The Yukon’s Struggle for Constitutional Certainty 
Amending the Yukon Act
The Yukon Territory was created as a result of the Klondike gold rush and the 
influx of American gold seekers that threatened Canada’s sovereignty in the region. 
Like Alaska, its earliest form of government was purely colonial -  the federal 
government appointed the commissioner and council and there was no provision for 
elected representatives. However, during the “boom” times of the Klondike gold rush, 
advocates for provincial status for the Yukon included Commissioner William 
Mclnnes. Mclnnes proposed provincial status in a speech to Dawson residents in 
1905.56 During the period 1899 -  1917, the Yukon Act was amended to establish an 
elected territorial council that had law-making powers, and the Yukon was allowed to 
elect a member to the parliament of Canada. However, by 1918 the Yukon’s 
economic fortunes and its population had declined substantially, and the federal 
government unilaterally amended the Yukon Act to reduce the size o f the territorial 
council to just three members, and then it drastically cut the Yukon government 
budget. Only vigorous protests from the Yukon citizenry prevented further action to 
replace the elected council with an appointed one. The twenty-four years from 1918
56 David R. Morrison, The Politics o f  the Yukon Territory: 1898-1909, Toronto: University o f  Toronto 
Press, 1968, p. 72
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to 1942 were years of economic doldrums, and the role of commissioner was 
continually downgraded as the territory’s population declined.57 Then, in 1937, the 
very existence of the Yukon Territory was threatened when the federal and British 
Columbia governments reached a deal to annex the territory to that province. Yukon 
residents protested against the deal, which was made without any consultation, but it 
was the issue of government funding for Catholic schools that caused the federal 
government to drop the initiative. According to historian Kenneth Coates:
The proposed annexation, announced with such fan­
fare and seemingly inevitable, failed over the question 
of continuing a territorial grant to St. Mary’s Catholic 
School, which at the time had only fifteen students.
Prime Minister Mackenzie King, remembering what a 
political hot potato the funding of separate schools had 
been on the prairies, skipped deftly away from the issue, 
and the project fell through. The Yukon had been saved, 
not because Ottawa cared about it, but through sectarian 
prejudice and political cowardice.58
World War II brought federal attention to the Yukon in a fashion not seen 
since 1898. American troops appeared in the Yukon, in numbers that rivaled the gold 
rush era, to construct a highway that the Canadian government did not want.
57 Kenneth Coates and William Morrison, 1988, pp. 184-217.
58 Kenneth Coates and William Morrison, 1988, p. 216. See also, Richard Stuart, “D uff Pattullo and 
the Yukon Schools Question o f 1937,” Canadian Historical Review, Vol. LXIV, No. 1, 1983, pp. 25­
44.
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According to historian Shelagh Grant, Canadian officials viewed the proposal to build 
the highway with a great deal of suspicion, and recommended that it proceed, “only 
on the proviso that the Americans would undertake the full responsibility for the cost, 
construction, and maintenance for the duration of the war and that the Canadian 
portion of the highway would be turned over to Canada at its end.”59 The Americans 
also constructed the Canol pipeline and an oil refinery in Whitehorse, built a road to 
Haines, Alaska, upgraded the White Pass and Yukon Railway, and improved other 
infrastructure around the territory.60 These measures opened the territory to improved 
transportation and tourism business opportunities in the post war years, reduced 
transportation and communication costs for Yukon residents, and increased the 
territorial population when the Canadian army established a garrison in Whitehorse to 
maintain the new highway. The growth in the population of Whitehorse came at the 
expense of Dawson City, and the capital of the territory was arbitrarily moved by the 
federal government from Dawson City to Whitehorse in 1953.61
The Yukon’s Territorial Council (its legislature) began demanding 
constitutional change in the 1950s, and by 1960 it had convinced the federal 
government to amend the Yukon Act to create an Advisory Committee on Finance. 
The Advisory Committee, consisting of three elected members o f Territorial Council, 
was to be consulted when the territorial budget was being prepared. Unfortunately, 
the commissioner of the day, Frederick Collins, had little faith in the committee, and
59 Shelagh D. Grant, Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950, 
Vancouver: The University o f  British Columbia Press, 1988, p. 75.
60 Kenneth Coates, 1992; Kenneth Coates and William Morrison, 1988, pp. 219-257; Terrence Cole 
and Elmer E. Rasmusson, 2000, pp. 200-203.
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in-fighting amongst councilors and confidentiality requirements reduced the efficacy 
of the committee.62
In 1966 and 1968, the Territorial Council approved resolutions in support of 
provincial status but the federal government was unresponsive. It did, however, agree 
with the advice of Commissioner James Smith to establish an Executive Committee 
consisting of three appointed members (the commissioner and two assistant 
commissioners) and two elected members of council, in 1970. The elected members 
were given portfolio responsibilities for two departments of the Yukon government, 
thus granting a limited degree of responsible government for the first time. The 
composition of the committee changed over the next nine years, as the appointed 
members were removed and the number of elected members was increased, so that by 
1978 the only appointed member was the commissioner, who continued serving as 
chair of the committee.63 During this period, the Territorial Council began calling 
itself the Yukon Legislative Assembly, and, in 1978, it formally adopted the name 
with the passage of the Legislative Assembly Act.64
All of the changes to the executive committee were made by ministerial 
directive under the terms of the Yukon Act, so that the act itself was not amended. 
However, the Yukon Legislative Assembly established the Standing Committee on 
Constitutional Development in 1977 to study and promote change to the territorial
61 Kenneth Coates and William Morrison, 1988, pp. 259-262.
62 John D. Hillson, Constitutional Development o f  the Yukon Territory, 1960-1970, University o f  
Saskatchewan, unpublished thesis, 1973, pp. 84-85, 90-95.
63 Steven Smyth, “Ministerial Directives and Constitutional Development in the Yukon Territory,” 
Polar Record, Vol. 26, No. 16, 1990, pp. 7-12.
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constitution. The second report of the committee, tabled in December, 1977 included 
a proposed new Yukon Act, which would have created a province of Yukon had it 
been adopted by the federal government.65
The 1978 territorial election was the first election in which political parties 
were able to run slates of candidates and have their affiliations identified on the 
ballots. The Yukon Territorial Progressive Conservative Party, a strong advocate o f 
constitutional change, formed a majority government, and was soon lobbying the 
Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs to amend the Yukon Act. The national 
Progressive Conservative government, elected the following year, was sympathetic to 
the Yukon government’s aspirations, and the new Minister of Indian and Northern 
Affairs, Jake Epp, issued a letter of instruction to Commissioner lone Christensen to 
remove herself from the Executive Committee. This removed the federally appointed 
commissioner from any role in the Yukon government’s decision-making process, 
and represented a significant change in the Yukon’s constitutional evolution. The 
federal government also announced its intention to amend the Yukon Act to confirm 
responsible government in law, and to hold a referendum on provincial status. 
However, the national government was defeated in 1980 before it had an opportunity 
to carry out these promises, and a federal Liberal government was re-elected under 
Prime Minister Trudeau.66 Prime Minister Trudeau and the Department of Indian and 
Northern Affairs were never sympathetic to Yukon’s demands for provincial status.
64 Steven Smyth, The Yukon’s Constitutional Foundations, Vol. 1, The Yukon Chronology (1897-1999), 
Whitehorse: Clairedge Press, 1999, p. 38.
65 Yukon Legislative Assembly, Second Report o f  the Standing Committee on Constitutional 
Development fo r  Yukon, Sessional Paper No. 77-2-33, 1977.
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Prime Minister Trudeau was once quoted as stating the Yukon would not achieve 
provincial status in his lifetime.67 Liberal Ministers of Indian and Northern Affairs 
were willing to discuss modest changes that did not require amendments to the Yukon
ASAct, such as changes to the way the Yukon government was financed, although the 
act was amended several times to accommodate federal priorities.69
A major factor complicating the Yukon government’s demands for 
constitutional development was the slow pace of land claims, and federal versus 
territorial perspectives on the relationship between land claims and constitutional 
development. Speaking to the Yukon Legislative Assembly on November 27, 1982, 
The Honorable John C. Munro, Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, stated that: 
We are now prepared ... to recognize in law, responsible 
government for Yukon once final agreement has been 
reached in the comprehensive land claims with the Council 
for Yukon Indians....
Provincial status, however, is not a realistic objective for 
Yukon at this time....
66 Steven Smyth, 1999, pp. 71-79.
67 The Whitehorse Star, August 5, 1977, p. 1. Prime Minister Trudeau’s reasons for opposing 
provincial status are unknown, however, it is likely that he may have taken this position in order to 
provoke the Yukon’s Member o f Parliament, Erik Nielsen, who was a strident critic o f  Trudeau’s 
policies and a staunch advocate o f provincial status. He may also have opposed provincial status 
because o f his sensitivities about Quebec’s possible opposition to provincial status. There is no 
mention o f the issue in his autobiography, Memoirs, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Inc., 1993.
68 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Speaking Notes fo r  the Honourable John C. Munro, M inister o f  
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, [to] Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development, March 24, 1981, p. 10.
69 Steven Smyth, 1999, pp. 140-141, 158.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The land claims negotiations ... will only be concluded 
when Yukon Indians feel their rights and capabilities are 
adequately protected in Yukon’s political structures and 
processes.
The challenge, as I see it, is to work toward achieving
7 nconsensus on what these guarantees should be.
The Yukon’s Government Leader, Chris Pearson, responded to Minister 
Munro by saying:
We must make it clear ... that we do not see that the enshrinement 
of responsible government in law is in any way connected to the 
settlement of Yukon Indian land claims. This has never been a
condition, nor is it proper for it to be.....
There appears to be another major misunderstanding revealed in 
the Minister’s address today. This misunderstanding concerns 
what is being negotiated in the Yukon Indian land claims forum.
The Minister speaks of protecting the rights of Yukon Indian 
people in Yukon’s political structure and process .... Such a
71process is unnecessary and ... redundant.
The Department o f Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), 
which was responsible for administering government in the northern territories, was 
also reluctant to promote change. Political scientist Michael Whittington studied the
70 Yukon Legislative Assembly, Sessional Paper No. 82-2-11, November 27,1982, p. 2.
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North for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects 
for Canada, and in 1985 wrote that, “The dominant, if  declining, bureaucratic force in 
the .. .Yukon is the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 
(DIAND), which functions not only as a colonial office in Ottawa, but in the past was 
responsible for the delivery of all services that would have been provided by a
79province in the South.” Furthermore, “it is still necessary to emphasize that the 
formal or legal relationship of the territorial governments to the federal government 
remains essentially colonial.”
Officials in DIAND were not advocates of northern provinces, pointing out 
that territorial governments would not qualify for equalization payments if  they 
became provinces. According to DIAND analyst D.G. Saigaonkar:
The FEP [federal equalization program] is intended 
to address provincial disparities in revenue raising 
capacity. The amount of compensation provided 
under the FEP is not determined by the expenditure 
which a ‘have-not’ province must incur for providing 
comparable services, but rather depends upon the revenue 
raising capacity of each province in comparison with the 
national benchmark developed for each tax base or 
source o f revenue. According to these benchmarks, 
both the territories have considerable tax capacity and
71 Yukon Legislative Assembly, November 27, 1982, p. 3.
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would, therefore, not qualify as ‘have-not’ areas for 
payments under the program. Even if  they collected 
revenues from all tax bases at the National Average Tax 
Rates (NATR), their revenues would still fall below the level 
of their expenditures. Consequently, a federal grant would 
still be required in order to fund their current level of 
expenditures.74
The confrontational nature of federal-territorial-First Nation relations changed 
somewhat after the election of a Yukon New Democratic Party government in 1985, 
which placed a high priority on settling land claims and supported entrenchment of 
aboriginal self-government in the national constitution. However, the relationship 
remained strained over the issue of whether Yukon Indians should have a veto over
n r
the territory becoming a province. At the same time, interest in provincial status for 
the Yukon waned after the economic recession of the early 1980s. A committee o f the 
Yukon Legislative Assembly established in 1990 to hear Yukoners’ thoughts on 
constitutional development heard only a few submissions advocating provincial 
status. The committee subsequently reported that:
‘ Most Yukon citizens who appeared before the Committee:
(a) are reluctant to express definitive opinions until the settle­
ment of native claims is finalized;
72 Michael Whittington, The North, Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 1985, p. 73.
73 Michael Whittington, 1985, p. 73.
74 D.G. Saigaonkar, Fiscal Capacities o f  the Yukon and Northwest Territories, 1987-88, Department 
o f Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1988, pp. 2-3.
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(b) have a general sense of unease about making choices... 
while so much uncertainty exists about constitutional issues 
on a national scale;
(c) desire more information ...
(d) do not believe that provincial status should be pursued at 
this time;
(e) do want provincial status to be available as an option ...
(f) feel that the Yukon should have a larger population and a 
more broadly-based economy before consideration is given to 
becoming a province.76
The committee then qualified those findings “by noting that a minority of 
those who appeared ... believe that provincial status should be actively pursued and 
do not think that the size of the Yukon’s population and the state of the economy 
should hinder the Yukon’s pursuit of that goal.”77
The Yukon government continued to pursue devolution initiatives, and 
succeeded in negotiating a number of transfers of federal responsibilities to Yukon 
government administration, as outlined in Chapter 4. The Council of Yukon First 
Nations (CYFN -  the successor organization to the Council for Yukon Indians) and 
individual First Nations at times protested that they were not consulted enough in the
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75 Steven Smyth, 1999, pp. 207-208.
76 Yukon Legislative Assembly, Select Committee on Constitutional Development, Report on the 
Green Paper on Constitutional Development, 1991, pp. 5-6.
77 Yukon Legislative Assembly, 1991, p. 6.
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devolution negotiations, but a consultation accord between the Yukon government, 
CYFN, and non-member First Nation negotiators was eventually signed in May 1997
79as a means for addressing this concern.
The Yukon government achieved considerable success in negotiating the 
devolution of federal programs to Yukon government control after 1996, when the 
federal Minister o f Indian and Northern Affairs issued a consultation paper entitled, 
Devolution o f  the Northern Affairs Program to the Yukon Government.80 Following 
up on its 1996 consultation, the federal government tabled a Formal Proposal on the 
devolution of federal programs to the Yukon government on January 31, 1997.81
After a year and a half of negotiations, the governments of Canada and 
Yukon, and representatives of Yukon First Nations signed the Yukon Devolution 
Protocol Accord, on September 23, 1998, “which provided a framework to both guide 
devolution negotiations and permit simultaneous negotiation of unresolved land 
claims.” This accord was a major breakthrough in gaining First Nation support for 
devolution negotiations since First Nations had always advocated the settlement o f 
land claims as a priority over federal transfers of authority to the Yukon government. 
To this end, the Protocol Accord stated that any transfer agreement shall outline, “the 
intent o f the Parties to conclude, as matters being of the highest priority, the
78 Steven Smyth, 1999, pp. 207, 208,218, 225.
79 Letter to DIAND Minister Irwin, Government Leader McDonald, Acting Grand Chief o f CYFN, 
Kwanlin Dun First Nation Chief Joe Jack, Kaska Tribal Council Chief Hammond Dick, and Liard First 
Nation Chief Ann Bayne, May 29, 1997.
80Mary C. Hurley, Legislative History o f  Bill C-39, Ottawa: Library o f Parliament, 2002, p. 5.
81 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Transferring Full Authority over Natural Resources to 
Yukoners: A Formal Proposal from the Government o f  Canada to Devolve Northern Affairs Program  
in the Yukon to the Yukon Government, Ottawa: Minister o f Public Works and Government Services 
Canada, 1997.
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negotiation of any outstanding Yukon First Nation Final Agreement or self­
government agreement and any Transboundary Agreement into the Yukon... .”83
After the successful negotiation of the transfer of onshore oil and gas 
administration to the Yukon government in early 1998, the Yukon government 
embarked upon an ambitious course to have the Yukon Act revamped and to gain 
control of all federal Crown land and resources in the territory.
In 1999, the Yukon government drafted its own version of a new Yukon Act, 
designed to give effect to devolution, modernize the language of the act, and formally 
recognize the Yukon’s system of responsible government. The Yukon government 
wanted to generate public support and consensus around the proposed act in order to 
present a unified front to federal negotiators, but consensus was elusive. The draft act 
was distributed for public comment, and a five person Special Commission on the 
Yukon Act formed to gather public comments. The Yukon government also 
sponsored two major public consultation initiatives to gain public comments: a public 
forum held at Yukon College on September 24 and 25, 1999, and a televised town 
hall meeting on October 21, 1999. The special commission released its report in 
November, and recommended that: more public consultation be conducted; the 
government should consider referencing municipal government in the preamble; the 
government should explain the rationale for extending the term of the Legislative 
Assembly by one year; and should give careful consideration to concerns raised about 
using terms such as “Lieutenant Governor.” The commissioners also recommended
82 Mary C. Hurley, 2002, p. 5.
227
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
that a clause be added to enable the legislature to propose amendments to the act; and, 
that it attempt to gain political consensus on how the issues of a Crown in Right o f 
Yukon and the northern boundary were to be addressed.84
Premier McDonald (New Democratic Party) and Liberal Opposition Leader 
Patricia Duncan flew to Ottawa in February 2000 to meet with federal politicians and 
lobby for speedy consideration of Yukon Act amendments, expected to be introduced 
in a few months. The process was interrupted during the 2000 territorial election, 
which brought a Yukon Liberal government to power on April 17, 2000.
Negotiations with federal officials commenced in May 2000, after the federal 
government sent Yukon officials and the CYFN their version of a proposed Yukon 
Act. Devolution and Yukon Act negotiations proceeded in tandem, with drafts of a 
transfer agreement and the Yukon Act being exchanged by officials after each 
negotiating session. CYFN officials were present at the negotiations, with 
opportunities to comment on the drafts as they evolved, and on October 5, 2001, the 
CYFN approved a resolution giving qualified support for the Devolution Transfer 
Agreement (DTA). However, the Kaska and Kwanlin Dun First Nations, which were 
not members of the CYFN, and the Carcross/Tagish First Nation, which changed its 
position on the issue, decided to publicly oppose the Devolution Transfer Agreement 
and the proposed new Yukon Act.
The Devolution Transfer Agreement was signed by Premier Duncan and 
DIAND Minister Nault in October 2001, and the draft Yukon Act was introduced in
83 Yukon Devolution Protocol Accord, Sept. 23, 1998, pp. 2-3.
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the House of Commons on October 3 1st as Bill C-39.85 Bill C-39 was referred to the 
House of Commons’ Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, Northern 
Development and Natural Resources on November 22, 2001, when it heard from 
Premier Duncan, who appeared as the only witness.86
The Kaska Nation and the Carcross/Tagish First Nation attempted to have the 
committee hear their concerns that the bill did not adequately protect their interests, 
but the committee quickly approved the bill and recommended its approval to the 
House of Commons that day. The House of Commons, in turn, gave the bill third
o n
reading and approval on December 3, 2001.
The Senate referred the bill to its Standing Committee on Energy, the 
Environment and Natural Resources, where it heard witnesses from the Kaska Nation 
and Carcross/Tagish First Nation on February 21, 2002. The First Nation witnesses 
argued that C-39 and the Devolution Transfer Agreement: failed to specify that the 
transfer of land and resources to Yukon government control was subject to aboriginal 
rights, title, and interests on their traditional territorial; had the potential to destroy 
attempts to obtain a fair settlement of the Kaska’s transboundary claim in the Yukon; 
and, was being used to achieve constitutional development for the Yukon 
government. More specifically, the Kaska’s position was that their land claims had to 
be settled before control of land and resources were transferred to Yukon control, and
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85 Government o f  Canada, Bill C-39, An Act Respecting the Yukon Territory, R.S.. c. Y-2. 2001.
86 House o f Commons, Proceedings o f  the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, Northern 
Development and Natural Resources, November 22, 2001.
87 Mary C. Hurley, 2002.
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that the clauses within the bill and the Devolution Transfer Agreement (DTA) were
DO
inadequate to protect their interests.
The First Nations received a sympathetic response from Senator Sibbeston of 
the Northwest Territories, and Senator Watt from northern Quebec, but the majority 
of senators felt that the bill adequately addressed First Nation concerns and 
recommended that it be adopted without amendment. Consequently, the bill was
89approved by the Senate and given Royal Assent on March 27, 2002.
The new Yukon Act was proclaimed into force and the Devolution Transfer 
Agreement was implemented on April 1, 2003, when Northern Affairs programs and 
their staff were transferred to the Yukon government. The Kaska Nation, which had 
launched a court challenge to the DTA, placed the action on hold after entering into 
an economic development agreement with the new Yukon Party government on May 
9, 2003.90
The devolution of land and resource management to the Yukon government 
was an event of national, as well as local significance. The Auditor General of 
Canada noted that, “this devolution exercise was an historic event that marked a 
significant step in nation building.”91
The new Yukon Act, when proclaimed on April 1, 2003, repealed federal 
legislation that controlled land, water and mineral rights allocation in the Yukon. This 
legislation was replaced by Yukon laws, which “mirrored” the federal statutes, and
88 Senate o f  Canada, Proceedings o f  the Standing Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural 
Resources, Issue 24, February 21,2002.
89 Mary C. Hurley, 2002.
90 Government o f  Yukon, Press Release, May 9, 2003.
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were approved by the Yukon Legislative Assembly. Consequently, Yukon politicians 
now control how most o f the Yukon’s lands and resources will be utilized and 
allocated. Yukon priorities, rather than federal government priorities, would prevail. 
However, it should be noted that federal jurisdiction has not been completely 
eradicated. The act still provides for the “take back” of Yukon lands to federal control 
for purposes such as settling land claims, or in the “national interest.”
Summary
The Yukon’s quest for provincial status has been hampered by the Yukon’s 
limited economic base, as outlined in Chapter 4, and the lack of social consensus 
within the Yukon. Yukon Indians have demanded that land claim and self­
government agreements be settled before provincial status is sought. Progress on 
devolution of federal programs to Yukon control has taken decades to achieve, and 
not all Yukon Indians have agreed with the devolution initiatives.
The Yukon is also faced with national constitutional issues when seeking 
provincial status. Even if  all Yukon residents were in solid support of provincial 
status, the initiative would require, under the constitutional amending formula, the 
consent of Canada’s Parliament and at least seven provinces that altogether possess 
fifty percent or more of the population of Canada. The national constitutional context 
is thus discussed in the next section of this dissertation.
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National Constitutional Change
The federal government was preoccupied with national constitutional issues 
during the period that the Yukon was seeking entry into the federation. Prime 
Minister Trudeau wanted to “patriate” the Canadian constitution so that Canadians 
could amend it instead of having to ask Great Britain for amendments. This initiative 
provided numerous forums for public input into the constitutional reform process, 
such as input to parliamentary committees, as well as constitutional conferences 
involving the provincial premiers (first ministers’ conferences).
Unlike the American system, where proposals for legislative change can be 
launched in the legislature, Canada’s parliamentary system generally requires 
legislative initiatives to be launched by a minister of the Crown (the executive). 
Legislative initiatives sponsored by “backbenchers” (non-cabinet ministers) are 
seldom debated and rarely approved. Consequently, constitutional changes enabling 
provincial status must be sponsored by a cabinet minister and approved by the prime 
minister and cabinet before they are laid before Parliament. In this context, obtaining 
the support of the national government is an essential prerequisite for seeking 
constitutional change.93
The federal government launched its public consultation process on 
constitutional issues in January, 1970, with the creation of the Special Joint 
Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada. The 
committee’s mandate was to, “examine and report upon proposals ... made public by
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the Government of Canada, on a number o f subjects related to the Constitution of 
Canada .. ..”94 The committee traveled across the country conducting public hearings, 
and reported to the House of Commons on March 16, 1972. The committee made 
several recommendations in support of northern aspirations, such as: providing the 
two territories with two Senate seats each (they had none in 1972); the federal 
government should foster provincial status by making it a stated objective; and, the 
formula for creating new provinces should remain unchanged (passage of a federal 
bill).95
The federal government acted on only one of the recommendations: it 
conceded to recommending that the British North America Act be amended in 1975 to 
allow for the appointment o f one senator for each territory.
While the special joint committee was preparing its report, Prime Minister 
Trudeau convened a constitutional conference of first ministers on June 14-17, 1971 
in Victoria, British Columbia. The conference did not include any representatives of 
the territorial governments, and the agreement reached at the conference made no 
provision for future attendance by territorial leaders, no ability for territorial 
governments to nominate candidates for Supreme Court appointments, no 
involvement in amending the constitution of Canada, and made no mention of 
territorial representation in the Senate. The agreement also gave provinces a veto over 
the creation of new provinces. The agreement was never implemented however.
93 See also An Act Respecting Constitutional Amendments, RSC, 1996, c. 1, which elaborates on this 
principle.
94 Government o f  Canada, The Special jo in t Committee o f  the Senate and the House o f  Commons on 
the Constitution o f  Canada: Final Report, 1972, p. 4.
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Premier Bourassa o f Quebec vetoed the deal after he came under intense pressure 
from Quebec nationalists to back out of it.96
According to political science professor David Milne, the federal government 
lost interest in constitutional issues following the defeat of the Victoria Accord. 
Discussions and public meetings continued, but the issue was on the back burner until 
1974, when Prime Minister Trudeau began renewed efforts to get the premiers 
interested in patriation, revamping the constitutional amending formula, and a charter 
of rights. He also hinted that the federal government might move unilaterally on these 
issues if  a consensus could not be reached amongst the premiers. The premiers 
responded by demanding increased provincial powers. Discussions in 1975 did not 
result in any consensus on these issues.97
Prime Minister Trudeau renewed his efforts in 1976 when he wrote to the 
premiers proposing three alternatives for constitutional patriation and amendment, 
and suggesting the federal government might proceed alone if  consensus was not 
achieved.98
Parliament established the Task Force on Canadian Unity in July, 1977 to 
inquire into, support and assist the development of Canadian unity in the wake of the 
election of a separatist government in Quebec the previous year. The task force held 
public hearings across Canada, but it had no members from northern Canada and its
95 Government o f  Canada, 1972, p. 61.
96 David Milne, The Canadian Constitution: The players and the issues in the process that has led from  
patriation to Meech Lake to an uncertain future, Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1991, pp. 58­
60. Milne makes it clear that the negotiations focused heavily on the role and power o f  provincial 
governments in the amending formula. The interests o f  the territories were never an issue.
97 David Milne, 1991, p. 60.
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recommendations did nothing to address northern constitutional development. While 
it recommended that aboriginal rights be recognized, it ignored the issue of aboriginal 
land claims, and its recommendations for parliamentary reform excluded any 
participation by the territories in their proposed Council of the Federation, which was 
designed to replace the Senate."
Prime Minister Trudeau launched his next constitutional initiatives in 1978 by 
tabling, “A Time for Action” in the House of Commons and introducing Bill C-60, 
the Constitutional Amendment Act, 1978. “A Time for Action: Toward the Renewal 
of the Canadian Federation,” provided the background and context for legislative 
action and the principles that would be found in Bill C-60. The bill, in turn, 
prescribed a two-phased approach of amending and patriating the British North 
America Act. The first phase, to have been completed by July 1, 1979, was to amend 
the constitution in areas where Parliament could act without provincial approval. The 
second phase, to have been completed by July 1, 1981 would have implemented 
changes in areas requiring provincial approval.100
The bill proposed major changes to Canada’s constitutional arrangements and 
institutions, including the entrenchment of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
replacement o f the Privy Council with a Council of State, replacement of the Senate 
with a House of the Federation, formalizing the requirement for federal-provincial
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99 Government o f  Canada, The Task Force on Canadian Unity, A Future Together: Observations and  
Recommendations, 1979, p. 98.
100 House o f Commons, Journals, 1978, pp. 966-67.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
first ministers’ conferences, and entrenching the Supreme Court of Canada.101 The 
bill would also have solidified the subordinate status of northern territories. A review 
o f the bill prepared by Carleton University professor David W. Elliott noted fifteen 
specific concerns for the Yukon government, including: no reference to fostering 
provincial status for the territories, no provision for consulting territories before 
making them provinces, no requirement to consult territories before changing their 
boundaries, no involvement of the territories in selecting House of the Federation 
nominees, no representation for territories in first ministers’ conferences, and no
provisions for territories to nominate people for Supreme Court o f Canada
• 102 appointments.
Bill C-60 was subsequently referred to a Special Joint Committee o f the 
Senate and the House of Commons, established on June 29, 1978, with a mandate to, 
“examine and report upon proposals that have been and in the future are from time to 
time made public by the Government of Canada, on subjects related to the 
Constitution of Canada.”103 The Committee issued an interim report on October 10, 
1978, noting that it had heard from territorial representatives, but the report did not 
address any northern issues.
Prime Minister Trudeau’s constitutional agenda was interrupted when his 
government was defeated in the national election held on May 22, 1979. However, 
Prime Minister Joe Clark, who campaigned on a promise that the Yukon’s residents
101 Government o f  Canada, Bill C-60, Constitution Amendment Act, 1978.
102 David W. Elliot, “Aspects o f Bill C-60, the Constitutional Amendment Bill, 1978, o f  Possible 
Concern to the Government o f the Yukon Territory,” July 26, 1978, unpublished.
103 House o f  Commons, Journals, 1978, p. 906.
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would be given the opportunity to vote on provincial status, was unable to live up to 
that commitment as his government was defeated just nine months later.104 Mr. Clark 
had an open mind on provincial status for the Yukon, in sharp contrast to Mr.
Trudeau, whose mind was closed on the issue.
Prime Minister Trudeau’s new Liberal government, elected in February, 1980, 
pressed on with constitutional reform proposals after the defeat of the Quebec 
government’s referendum on sovereignty association on May 29, 1980. However, the 
first ministers’ conferences held in June and September of that year did not result in 
progress, and Trudeau, in frustration, placed a resolution before Parliament on 
October 6, 1980 to proceed unilaterally with the patriation of the constitution.
The resolution sparked a quick response from the provinces. The provincial 
premiers met in Toronto on October 14, 1980, and soon announced that they would 
be challenging the decision in court. The resolution was then referred to a Special 
Joint Committee o f the House of Commons and the Senate on October 23-24, 1980 
for public review. The Yukon’s senator, Paul Lucier, was appointed to the committee 
on November 5, 1980, and the committee subsequently held hearings across Canada. 
The Yukon’s Government Leader, Christopher Pearson, presented the Yukon 
government’s position to the committee on November 27, 1980, including 
recommendations that: the Yukon government be included in all future first 
ministers’ conferences; a mechanism should be established for the creation of new
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provinces; and new provinces should be guaranteed the same rights as existing 
provinces, including guaranteed control over their resources.105
The special joint committee tabled its report in Parliament on February 13, 
1981, and debate on the constitutional resolution continued. The Yukon’s concerns 
were largely ignored, and the Yukon’s Member o f Parliament, Erik Nielsen, wrote to 
his constituents on March 20,1981 to complain that:
Yukon has a lot to lose if  Trudeau’s Constitution goes through.
We can forget about ever becoming a fully fledged Province in 
the Canadian Confederation. The provisions now in our 
Constitution ... which would enable Yukon to become a Province, 
as did all of the Western Provinces, are wiped out by the Trudeau 
changes. In addition, Quebec would have a veto over a request 
by Yukoners to become a Province in Confederation sometime 
in the future — as would Ontario also have such a veto.
So — under the Trudeau Constitution Yukon will remain a colony 
with no hope of ridding ourselves o f the status of colonials.106
The Yukon government also had strong concerns about the federal 
government’s constitutional resolution. The Yukon Legislative Assembly approved 
Motion #5, on March 30, 1981, calling on the British Government to not approve any 
such resolution, “until the British Parliament receives evidence that any such proposal 
has the popular support of the Canadian Federal, Provincial and Territorial
105 Government o f  Yukon, Canadian Constitution: Where Does Yukon F it?, 1980, p. 12.
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governments and therefore, the support of the people of Canada.”107 The resolution 
was in vain however, as Prime Minister Trudeau had already received British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher’s assurances that she would abide by any resolution put
1 Ofiforward by the Parliament of Canada.
Yukon Government Leader Pearson’s objections to the resolution were that: it 
made it too difficult to create new provinces; it was too vague about territorial 
representation at first ministers’ conferences; and it would adversely affect terms and 
conditions negotiated with the Northern Pipeline Agency for the construction of the 
Alaska Highway gas pipeline.109
Prime Minister Trudeau’s plans for unilateral action on the constitution were 
thrown a curve by the Supreme Court of Canada when it handed down its decision on 
September 28, 1981, and, “resolved two critical matters vital to everything that came 
afterward: the resolution was legal and the resolution was constitutionally 
improper.”110 The court ruled that, under Canada’s constitutional conventions, the 
federal government needed to have the support of a “substantial number” of provinces 
in order to proceed with a resolution to amend the constitution. While the prime 
minister might have continued to push his resolution unilaterally, given that the court 
ruled it was legal to do so, he determined that a better course of action was to call
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another constitutional conference to try to win over a “substantial number” of 
premiers.111
Prime Minister Trudeau called the first ministers conference for November 2­
5, 1981. On November 4, the majority of premiers reached an agreement with the 
prime minister which had far-reaching consequences. Quebec’s Premier, Rene 
Levesque, did not concur with the other premiers, and, feeling betrayed, refused to 
accept the agreement.
The agreement set the stage for the final debate on the resolution in 
parliament, and intensive lobbying campaigns were launched by northern and 
aboriginal Canadians to have their concerns addressed in the new constitution.
On November 16, 1981, the entire Legislative Assembly of the Northwest 
Territories flew to Ottawa to protest the absence of an aboriginal rights clause and to 
lobby ministers to drop paragraphs 41 (e) and (f) from the package. Paragraph 41(e) 
applied the general amending formula112 to the extension of existing provinces into 
the territories, and 41 (f) applied the same formula to the creation of new provinces. 
Thus, the possibility of amending territorial boundaries without the consent of 
territorial residents was reinforced, while the transition to provincial status became 
exceedingly more difficult. Previously provinces could be created by an act of 
parliament alone; under the new formula, parliament plus seven provinces would 
have to approve the creation of new provinces.
111 Pierre E. Trudeau, 1993, pp. 315-316.
112 The general amending formula provided that any seven provinces with fifty percent or more o f the 
population o f Canada, together with Parliament, could amend certain sections o f  the constitution. 
Paragraphs 41(e) and (f) were later renumbered as 42(1) (e) and (f).
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The Yukon Legislative Assembly approved Motion #24 to support:
The efforts of the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest 
Territories to have clauses 41(e) and 41(f) of the Constitution 
Act, 1981, now before the House of Commons, removed. And 
that this legislature further seeks the inclusion in the Constitution 
Act, 1981, o f a clause that will provide for the capability of new 
provinces to be created under similar circumstances to the British 
North America Act of 1871.113
Bolstered by the actions o f the governments of Yukon and Northwest 
Territories, the Yukon’s member of parliament, Erik Nielsen, placed a motion before 
the House of Commons on November 26, 1981, seeking to have paragraphs (e) and 
(f) removed from the proposed Constitution Act. Nielsen spoke to the fact that the 
territories had not been adequately consulted:
Never at any time did the governments of Yukon or of 
the Northwest Territories participate in putting together 
either the April Accord or the latest arrangement from which 
the North was totally ... excluded. We were given the 
opportunity ... to appear as witnesses before the standing 
committee on a resolution which did not contain these two 
provisions. After the committee had finished its work and 
after it reported back to Parliament, there was a meeting of
113 Government o f  Yukon, Hansard, November 23, 1981, p. 349.
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provincial Premiers at which the elected legislatures o f the 
two northern territories were not heard. They were not heard 
in April, and they were not heard in November. Yet we are 
now confronted with two provisions in a resolution affecting 
the future forever and a day of Canadians in which we in the 
north have not had any input; we have not been heard.114
Mr. Nielsen was supported in his efforts by Mr. Ittinuar, the Member for 
Nunatsiaq, but the amendment was defeated on November 27 by a vote o f 117 to 
85.115 Given the Liberal majority in the House of Commons, the defeat was 
predictable.
Events moved quickly following the House of Commons approval o f the 
resolution on December 8, 1981, and it was delivered to the British Parliament the 
following day. Queen Elizabeth gave Royal Assent to the new Constitution Act on 
March 29, 1982, and signed the Royal Proclamation bringing the act into effect on 
April 17, 1982.
Gordon Robertson, a former commissioner of the NWT and a former cabinet 
secretary, has argued that the constitutional amending formula enshrined a “rule” 
designed to protect provincial rights and regional interests in Canada:
The general amending procedure for the Constitution, 
reflects one of the most important of Canadian realities -  
our deep regional differences and regional interests. Under
114 Government o f  Canada, Commons Debates, November 26, 1981, p. 13355.
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the amending procedure no amendment can carry if  any four 
provinces are opposed, which means that both the West 
and the Atlantic region, each of which has four provinces, 
can veto any change that either region perceives to be 
against its own interest.116 
While northern Canadians were frustrated with their constitutional setback, 
they soon had an opportunity to restate their case in a different forum: the Royal 
Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (also 
known as the Macdonald Commission, so named for its chairman, former Finance 
Minister Donald Macdonald). According to David Milne, this commission’s role was 
to study the, “Canadian economic union, federalism, and the broader functioning of 
Canada’s political institutions and policies.”117
The royal commission held public hearings in the northern territories in 
September, 1983, and released its three volume report two years later, in September, 
1985. Its recommendations reflected much of what the Yukon government was asking 
for: the amendment of the Yukon Act to reflect current practices o f responsible 
government; the negotiation of formula financing arrangements to increase 
predictability and promote better financial accountability; a federal commitment to 
the goal of provincehood; establish a timetable for the transfer of provincial-type 
responsibilities to the territorial governments, including Crown lands; institute
115 Government o f  Canada, Commons Debates, p. 13436.
116 Gordon Robertson, Northern Provinces: A Mistaken Goal, Montreal; the Institute for Research on 
Public Policy, 1985, pp. 37-38.
117 David Milne, 1991, p. 188.
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resource-revenue/sharing arrangements similar to those negotiated with Nova Scotia
and Newfoundland; and confirm territorial participation in federal-provincial forums
118where matters of concern to northern Canadians were being discussed.
The report also recommended a speedy resolution of land claims, and an 
increase in smaller provinces’ and territorial representation in the senate.
Trudeau’s approach to constitutional issues was replaced with Brian 
Mulroney’s following the September 4, 1984 national election. The Progressive 
Conservative government began to implement some of the report’s recommendations 
by negotiating formula financing arrangements with the territorial governments in 
1985 and signing an agreement on the devolution of federal programs with the Yukon 
government in 1988. The commission’s recommendations were also reflected in the 
federal government’s 1987 policy statement on northern development, entitled^ 
Northern Political and Economic Framework.119 
The Meech Lake Accord
Prime Minister Mulroney was also keenly interested in redressing Quebec’s 
constitutional grievances, and in April, 1987 he met with the provincial premiers at 
Meech Lake, Quebec to address those issues.
In contrast to the protracted series of conferences on aboriginal rights that 
concluded without substantial progress on a constitutional amendment, the first 
ministers’ conference resulted in an agreement in principle on a set of constitutional
118 Government o f  Canada, Report o f  the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development 
Prospects fo r  Canada, Vol. Ill, 1985, p. 406.
119 Government o f  Canada, A Northern Political and Economic Framework, Ottawa: Minister o f  
Supply and Services Canada, 1988.
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amendments almost over night. This conference did not include any representatives 
o f the territorial governments, and their interests were not addressed in the draft 
accord. A subsequent meeting of first ministers to finalize the text of the accord was 
held on June 2-3, 1987 in Ottawa, and the territories’ political leaders, Yukon’s 
Premier Penikett and Northwest Territories’ Government Leader Sibbeston, flew 
there to seek involvement. However, their requests for admission were rebuffed.120
The Meech Lake Accord proposed, amongst other things, to: allow every 
province (but not territories) an opportunity to nominate persons to be appointed to 
vacancies in the Senate and on the Supreme Court of Canada; require the unanimous 
consent of provinces to create new provinces, and to extend the boundaries o f a 
province into the territories; and, establish annual first ministers’ conferences which 
only provincial premiers and the prime minister could attend.121
On June 16-17, 1987 the Senate and House of Commons established a Special 
Joint Committee to review the Meech Lake Accord. The committee subsequently held 
a series of public hearings from August 4 to September 1, inclusive.
The territorial governments attacked the accord on two fronts: by launching a 
legal challenge in the Yukon Supreme Court, and in their representations to the 
special joint committee and subsequent committees established to review the accord.
The Yukon government’s legal challenge met with some initial success. In his 
August 11, 1987 decision, Mr. Justice McDonald ruled that two parts of the claim 
could proceed to trial:
120 Senate o f Canada, Report o f  the Senate Committee on the Meech Lake Accord and on the Yukon and
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(1) The lack of consultation with the government of
of the Yukon territories [sic] by the federal government 
could possibly be held to violate the legal rights of the 
Members of the Territorial Council....
(2) the judgement also held that the signing of the Accord 
by the federal government could possibly be a breach of an 
alleged duty to act in the best interests of the citizens o f the 
Yukon.122
Lawyers for the federal government immediately launched an appeal o f Mr.
Justice McDonald’s decision, arguing that the Yukon government was an arm of the
federal government and thus could not launch an action against itself.
The federal lawyers eventually dropped the argument that the Yukon did not
exist as a separate political entity, but they did succeed in having the court challenge
rejected in the Yukon Court of Appeal on December 23, 1987.124 This decision was in
turn appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which ultimately declined to hear the
1matter in a decision released on June 2, 1988.
Northwest Territories, Ottawa: Government o f  Canada, 1988, p. 16.
121 Lome Ingle, (ed.), Meech Lake Reconsidered, Hull: Voyageur Publishing, 1989, pp. 83-93.
122 Government o f Canada, The 1987 Constitutional Accord: The Report o f  the Special Joint 
Committee o f  the Senate and House o f  Commons, 1987, p. 116.
123 Whitehorse Star, July 22, 1987, p. 4.
124 Yukon Court o f  Appeal, Reasons fo r  Judgement o f  the Court, Vancouver: Yukon Court o f  Appeal, 
December 23, 1987.
125 Steven Smyth, 1991, p. 225.
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The governments of the Northwest Territories and Yukon made their cases to 
the special joint committee on August 18 and 31, respectively. According to the 
committee’s report:
1. The territorial governments of the Yukon and the North­
west Territories, together with Members of Parliament from 
the territories and many other witnesses, have criticized the 
1987 Accord on the following grounds:
(a) it is unfair to give each of the existing provinces a right of 
veto over the creation of a new province ...
(b) it is not entirely clear whether the Governor General retains 
the authority to appoint territorial Senators under Section 24 of
the Constitution Act, 1867 without the participation of the provinces;
(c) qualified territorial residents should have the opportunity of 
being considered for appointment to the Supreme Court o f Canada 
without having to be nominated by a province;
(d) northern Canadians should have a say in constitutional and other 
matters by allowing territorial government leaders to participate
in First Ministers’ Conferences on issues that directly affect them.126 
The special joint committee sympathized with the territorial objections to the 
accord, but recommended that their issues be addressed in processes that did not
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require amendments to the accord. However, the Liberal and New Democratic 
Party members of the special joint committee made recommendations that the accord 
be amended to address the demands of the northern territories. The Liberal members 
were especially critical, and abstained from supporting the report’s
1 98recommendations.
Outside of the special joint committee hearings and the court challenge, a 
variety of comments were made and initiatives taken that supported the validity of the 
territories’ demands. These included: a New Democratic Party motion in the House of 
Commons proposing that the territories be allowed to become provinces without the 
concurrence of all the provinces (defeated on June 8, 1987); a public statement by the 
Supreme Court of Canada agreeing with the Canadian Bar Association report that 
stated territorial lawyers should be eligible for appointment to the Supreme Court of 
Canada (issued on August 23,1987); a statement by Prime Minister Mulroney that a 
separate first ministers’ conference should be held to discuss the future of the 
northern territories (August 28, 1987); and the establishment o f a special senate 
committee to review in detail the grievances of the territories respecting the Meech 
Lake Accord.129
However, none of these initiatives persuaded the federal government to depart 
from its stated position that the Meech Lake Accord had to proceed without
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amendment, and, on October 25, 1987 the resolution to adopt the Meech Lake Accord
1 "3 0was passed by the House of Commons.
The senate committee established to review the Meech Lake Accord 
conducted its hearings in Whitehorse, Yellowknife and Iqaluit between October 24 
and November 2, 1987, and presented its report to the Senate in February, 1988. The 
report recommended that significant changes be made to the Meech Lake Accord to 
accommodate the interests o f northern Canadians: that the governments of the 
Northwest Territories and Yukon be given the right to nominate persons to sit as 
supreme court judges and territorial senators; that the territories be invited to attend 
all future first ministers’ conferences on the constitution and the economy; that 
changes to territorial boundaries only be made with the consent of the affected 
territory; and that territories become provinces through the approval of the territorial
131government and the federal government alone.
The Senate debated the Meech Lake Accord resolution in April and 
proposed a variety of amendments, including amendments favorable to the North. 
However, none of the Senate’s recommendations were accepted by the government, 
and on June 22, 1988 the House of Commons passed a motion to approve the Meech
1 T9Lake Accord without amendment.
Nationally, the debate over the Meech Lake Accord continued, and support 
for it began to erode. A first ministers’ conference held February 27, 1989 failed to
130 David Milne, 1991, p. 11.
131 Senate o f Canada, Report o f  the Senate Committee on the Meech lake Accord and on the Yukon and 
Northwest Territories, 1988, pp. 27-28.
132 David Milne, 1991, p. 228.
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resolve the outstanding concerns of Premier Filmon of Manitoba and Premier 
McKenna o f New Brunswick. The federal New Democratic Party National Council 
decided to review its support for the accord in March, and the Liberal Party of 
Newfoundland, which opposed the accord, became the governing party of the 
province subsequent to the April 20, 1989 election. In October, 1989 the Manitoba 
and New Brunswick legislative committees reviewing the accord tabled reports 
supporting their premiers in calling for amendments to the accord.
With only three months remaining in the ratification process and support for 
the accord waning, Prime Minister Mulroney quickly supported Premier McKenna’s 
March 21, 1990 proposal to adopt a “companion resolution” to the accord as a 
mechanism for obtaining ratification of the accord. Under this approach, the Meech 
Lake Accord would have been adopted without amendment, while at the same time a 
“companion resolution” of amendments to the accord would be adopted. This 
compromise approach was designed as an attempt to satisfy both the federal 
government’s position that the Meech Lake Accord could not be amended, while also 
accommodating the major concerns of those who wanted to see the accord changed. 
Among the proposed amendments found in the “companion resolution” were 
amendments that would have permitted the Yukon and Northwest Territories to 
nominate people to the Supreme Court of Canada and the Senate and allow the
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establishment of new provinces by resolution of Parliament alone, with no provincial
114vetoes.
The companion resolution was referred to a Special House of Commons 
Committee, headed by the Honorable Jean Charest, on March 27, 1990. The 
committee held hearings in Yellowknife and Whitehorse on April 18 and 19, 1990, 
and reported back to Parliament on May 17, 1990, that: the companion resolution 
would address the omission of the Yukon and Northwest Territories in the selection 
o f Senators and Supreme Court Judges; recommended that the companion resolution 
adopt the territories’ position on creation of new provinces; the territories be invited 
to participate in first ministers’ conferences where an item on the agenda directly 
affects them; and, that the territories be invited to the proposed annual first ministers’
1 ISeconomic conferences where an item on the agenda directly affects them.
The tabling of the report of the special committee set the stage for the final 
first ministers’ conference on the constitution to address the constitutional impasse. In 
a marathon negotiation session that ran from June 3-9, 1990, Prime Minister 
Mulroney was able to obtain a commitment from the premiers of Newfoundland, 
Manitoba and New Brunswick, “to undertake to submit the Constitutional 
Amendment, 1987 for appropriate legislative or public consideration and to use every 
possible effort to achieve decision prior to June 23, 1990.”136
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Yukon’s Premier Penikett and Northwest Territories’ Government Leader 
Coumoyea flew to Ottawa to participate in the discussions as they were granted 
delegate status at open sessions. However, all the negotiations were carried out in 
camera, without their direct participation. In any event, the Final Communique and 
appended schedule of constitutional amendments contained provisions to: allow 
territories to nominate people for Senate and Supreme Court appointments; permitted 
the attendance of territorial government leaders at annual and economic first 
ministers’ conferences, at the invitation of the Prime Minister; and established a 
series of triennial constitutional first ministers’ conferences to which aboriginal and 
territorial governments had a right of attendance. Furthermore, the Final 
Communique provided for territorial participation on a federal/provincial/territorial 
commission to consider Senate reform. Finally, the Communique noted that:
The Prime Minister and all Premiers agreed future 
constitutional conferences should address available options 
for provincehood, including the possibility that, at the request 
o f the Yukon and Northwest Territories to become provinces, 
only a resolution of the House of Commons and Senate be 
required.137
David Milne commented that, while some of the proposals represented 
substantive concessions to public criticisms, the proposals did little to address the
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desires of aboriginal peoples for self-government or the aspirations of territorial 
governments to confirm the rules for provincehood.138
The federal government’s efforts to save the Meech Lake Accord failed when 
the resolutions affirming the accord were not approved in the Manitoba and 
Newfoundland legislatures within the required time frame. Its demise came about as a 
result of the federal and provincial governments’ inability to accommodate the 
demands of Canada’s aboriginal people in the process. Elijah Harper, an aboriginal 
member of the Manitoba legislature, stonewalled the resolution, and it could not be 
approved within the required timeframe.139
Quebec’s Premier Bourassa felt that the failure of the accord reflected a 
rejection by Canada of Quebec’s demands, and he vowed not to attend any more 
constitutional conferences, and the Quebec legislature approved a bill requiring the 
Quebec Government to hold a referendum on Quebec sovereignty in 1992.140 
The Charlottetown Accord Constitutional Proposal
The process leading to the Meech Lake Accord was criticized as a closed 
process that did not allow for meaningful public input, and amendments to reflect 
what Canadians wanted. The federal government stuck steadfastly to its position that 
it would not change the accord.
Faced with another sovereignty referendum in Quebec in 1992, the federal 
government tried a new strategy to obtain an acceptable constitutional reform 
package. The process was turned over to federal Constitutional Affairs Minister, Joe
138 David Milne, 1991, p. 245.
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Clark, who sought to build consensus through a broadly based, open and inclusive 
process. Territorial governments, aboriginal organizations, and the public were 
invited to participate in various forums.141
The constitutional amendment process was revived in late 1990 with two new 
initiatives: the appointment of the Citizens’ Forum on Canada’s Future, chaired by 
Keith Spicer, on November 1, and the establishment of a Special Joint Committee of 
the House of Commons and the Senate to review the constitutional amending 
formula, on December 17.
The Citizens’ Forum on Canada’s Future was a broad ranging, eight month 
consultative process designed to discover, “the values and characteristics fundamental 
to the well-being of Canada.”142 To accomplish their task the forum’s staff conducted 
content analyses on letters and briefs received by the commission, organized 
discussion groups in communities across the country utilizing local volunteers to 
obtain responses to a group of standardized questions, and compiled comments 
phoned in on toll-free, “idea lines.” However, the process did not explicitly address 
the North or northern issues, and, despite repeated requests and two opportunities to 
appoint a northern resident to the forum’s panel, the prime minister refused to make 
such an appointment. Of the 168 pages of the forum's final report, the North merited
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only one substantial paragraph noting the need to ensure northerners were heard at the 
constitutional table.143
In contrast to the Citizens’ Forum, the Special Joint Committee on the Process 
for Amending the Constitution of Canada devoted significantly more attention to 
northern issues. Two pages of its report addressed northern Canadians’ concerns, and 
its recommendations supported what northerners requested: changes to territorial 
boundaries should only be made with the consent of the territory involved; the 
creation of new provinces should be effected through the approval of the territorial 
legislature and the Parliament of Canada; and, territories should be invited to 
participate in all future constitutional conferences.144
While the Citizens’ Forum and the special joint committee were carrying out 
their mandates, progress on northern participation at first ministers’ conferences was 
being made. On May 13-14, 1991 Premier Penikett and Northwest Territories’ 
Government Leader Patterson attended the Western Premiers’ Conference at 
Nipawin, Saskatchewan as full participants. This was followed by full participation at 
the premiers’ conference held at Whistler, British Columbia, on August 25-27, 1991. 
These were the first times that the northern political leaders had been granted full 
participatory status at such meetings. Then, on September 6, 1991, Prince Edward
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Island’s Premier, Joe Ghiz, announced that he fully supported territorial participation 
at first ministers’ conferences.145
Given the territories’ recent participation at first ministers’ conferences, and 
the support for territorial positions expressed in the reports of the Senate task force 
(1987), the provisions of the Premier McKenna’s “Companion Resolution” to the 
Meech lake Accord (1990), the Report of the Special Committee to Study the 
Proposed Companion Resolution (1990), the June 9, 1990 Final Communique, the 
Citzens’ Forum Report (1991), and the report of the Special Joint Committee on the 
Process for Amending the Constitution of Canada (1991), the proposals outlined in 
the federal government’s document, Shaping Canada's Future Together, on 
September 24, 1991, came as a disappointment to northern Canadians. Among the 
proposals outlined in the federal document were recommendations for an elected 
Senate, and nominations of appointees for the Supreme Court for provinces and 
territories.146 However, there were no provisions to address territorial boundary 
alterations without the consent of territories, or territorial attendance at first ministers’ 
conferences, and the document proposed the maintenance of the “7 and 50” formula 
for the admission of new provinces.147 Furthermore, the proposed Council of the 
Federation would only have permitted non-voting membership for territorial 
representatives, thus preserving the difference between provinces and territories.148
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The Special Joint Committee o f the Senate and the House of Commons on a 
Renewed Canada, created on June 21, 1991, heard Yukoners’ responses to Shaping 
Canada’s Future Together at its hearings in Whitehorse on January 28, 1992. Its final 
report was released on June 28, 1992, but it did not address the full range of northern 
concerns. The report recommended that senators be elected and that the territories be 
permitted to nominate persons for Supreme Court of Canada appointments. However, 
territories would not be invited to attend first ministers’ conferences, the issue of 
amending territorial boundaries without territorial consent was ignored, and, on the 
issue of the amending formula for creating new provinces, the committee said, “We 
endorse the recommendations of the Beaudoin/Edwards Committee on the need to 
review the effect o f the creation of new provinces out of existing territories on the 
amending procedures.”149
The committee’s recommendations with respect to the amending formula and 
creation of new provinces were so confusing that its interpretation was publicly 
disputed by the Yukon’s member o f parliament and the Yukon’s premier: Member of 
Parliament Audrey McLaughlin argued that the committee recommended in favor of 
the pre-1982 formula for creating new provinces, while Premier Penikett argued that 
it meant Quebec would retain a veto over constitutional amendments.150A third 
interpretation was offered by the committee’s co-chair, Dorothy Dobbie, who said the 
report recommended that the existing “7 and 50” formula should apply.151
149 Government o f  Canada, Report o f  the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada, 1992, p. 95.
150 Whitehorse Star, March 2, 1992, pp. 1-2.
151 Whitehorse Star, March 5, 1992, p. 2.
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Following the release of the Report of the Special Joint Committee on a 
Renewed Canada, .. the Prime Minister invited representatives of the provinces and 
territories and Aboriginal leaders to meet with the federal Minister of Constitutional 
Affairs to discuss the report.”152 The meeting, held March 12, 1992, resulted in 
agreement to continue negotiations, and eleven more meetings were held, culminating 
on July 7, 1992, with an agreement on a package of constitutional amendments. These 
amendments included provisions to recognize aboriginal self-government and to 
allow territories to negotiate provincial status with the federal government alone.
Representatives of the government of Quebec did not officially participate in 
these constitutional meetings, so it was necessary for Prime Minister Mulroney to 
convene a first ministers’ meeting to involve Quebec in the process. A first ministers’ 
luncheon meeting was held at Harrington Lake on August 4, 1992 and Premier 
Bourassa attended on the condition that territorial and aboriginal leaders not be 
invited.154
Prime Minister Mulroney offered to brief territorial and aboriginal leaders on 
the results of the meeting afterwards, but Assembly of First Nations Chief, Ovide 
Mercredi, and Premier Penikett declined the offer. Northwest Territories Government 
Leader Nellie Coumyea and other aboriginal leaders did attend.155
Another first ministers’ conference was held on August 10, 1992, and again 
territorial leaders were excluded. However, a full first ministers’ conference involving
152 Government o f  Canada, Consensus Report on the Constitution, 1992, p. i.
153 Whitehorse Star, August 10, 1992, p. 8.
154 Whitehorse Star, July 31, 1992, p. 8.
155 Whitehorse Star, August 5, 1992, p. 9.
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territorial and aboriginal leaders was held on August 18-22 in Ottawa. During this 
session agreement on aboriginal self-government, senate reform, and admission of 
new provinces was achieved. Again, the territories’ right to negotiate provincial status 
with the federal government alone was confirmed.156
The final first ministers’ conference on renewing Canada was held in 
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, on August 27-28, 1992. This meeting, 
involving the Prime Minister, all provincial premiers, and territorial and aboriginal 
leaders, finalized the wording of the Consensus Report on the Constitution, (the 
Charlottetown Accord), which was released to the public.
The Charlottetown Accord laid out the principles to be addressed in future 
constitutional amendments, the issues to be addressed at future constitutional 
conferences, and the issues to be addressed in a proposed political accord. For 
example, the territories’ right to nominate people for Supreme Court appointments 
would have been assured in a constitutional amendment, while the right to attend first 
ministers’ conferences would have been included in the political accord.157 With 
respect to the creation of new provinces, the Charlottetown Accord proposed that the 
“7 and 50” formula be rescinded and replaced with the pre-1982 formula. However, 
all provinces would be consulted at a first ministers’ conference before a new 
province was created, and new provinces would not have a role in the amending 
formula without the consent of all provinces and the federal government, (except in 
some circumstances). Furthermore, any proposed increase in the representation of
156 Yukon News, August 26, 1992, p. 6.
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new provinces in the Senate would require the unanimous consent o f the provinces 
and the federal government.158
The Charlottetown Accord also supported northern demands that provinces 
not be entitled to extend their boundaries into the northern territories without the 
consent of the territories.159
Additional measures benefiting the territories included amendments to section 
36 of the Constitution Act, 1982, whereby:
Parliament, the provincial legislatures and the 
territorial legislative authorities, together with the 
government of Canada and the provincial and territorial 
governments, are committed to ... (d) ensuring the provision 
and maintenance of reasonably comparable economic infra­
structure of a national nature in each province and territory 
of Canada.160
Furthermore, under subsection 36(4), the governments and legislatures of the 
federal, provincial and territorial governments were, “committed to the promotion of 
regional economic development to reduce economic disparities.”161
Finally, the territories also obtained constitutional guarantees with respect to 
negotiating agreements with the government of Canada in the areas o f culture,
157 Government o f Canada, Consensus Report on the Constituion, 1992, pp. 7-8.
158 Government o f Canada, Consensus Report on the Constitution, 1992, p. 19. The areas where 
territories could have a role in the amendment process would be bilateral or unilateral matters 
described in sections 38(3), 40, 43 ,45  and 46 as it relates to 43, o f  the Constitution Act, 1982.
159 Government o f Canada, Consensus Report on the Constitution, 1992, p. 19.
160 Government o f Canada, Draft Legal Text, 1992, p. 44.
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recreation, telecommunications, urban and municipal affairs, tourism, housing, 
mining, forestry, labor market development and training, and regional
1 fOdevelopment.
The provisions o f the Charlottetown Accord were written into a Draft Legal 
Text, completed on October 9,1992, just seventeen days before the national 
referendum on the accord was held. The Charlottetown Accord was defeated in the 
referendum conducted on October 26, 1992, with 54.4 percent of voters opposing the 
accord. The accord was a very diverse set of proposals, and because it was an, “all or 
none” package, voters tended to reject the whole accord if  they objected to any part of 
it.
The defeat of the Charlottetown Accord meant that Canada’s constitutional 
status quo remained. The Constitution Act, 1982 remained substantially intact, 
leaving northern governments, native peoples and the government o f Quebec 
frustrated with the result. The government of Quebec renewed its efforts to promote 
separatism, and its proposal to negotiate separation from Canada was only narrowly 
defeated in a provincial referendum on October 30, 1995.
Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chretien, elected in 1993, seeking to appease 
Quebec’s demand for a constitutional veto, obtained Parliament’s approval of Bill C- 
110,An Act Respecting Constitutional Amendments, in 1996. The act gave a veto over 
any proposed amendment to the Constitution Act to Quebec, Ontario, the Atlantic
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provinces, the western provinces, and British Columbia.163 The Yukon government 
opposed the bill, then later made representations to have the bill amended to give the 
territories involvement in the process, but to no avail.164
The June 28,2004 federal election returned a Liberal national government in 
Canada, under the leadership of Prime Minister Paul Martin. Prime Minister Martin 
launched a new approach toward Canada’s North in the October 5, 2004 Speech from 
the Throne, in which he announced that the government of Canada will develop a 
comprehensive northern strategy in cooperation with the territorial governments and 
the North’s aboriginal peoples. The strategy “will foster sustainable economic and 
human development; protect the northern environment and Canada’s sovereignty and 
security; and promote cooperation with the international circumpolar community.”165 
Furthermore, in November 2004, the Prime Minister offered his opinion that the 
territories would “eventually” become provinces, and that he felt the provinces would 
support this evolution. Mr. Martin tied the constitutional change to advancing 
Canada’s claims in the Arctic: “The prime minister says the future o f the North is not 
just about creating provinces, but about asserting Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. 
He says that climate change will make it possible for shipping to sail through the 
North and because of the vast natural resources to be exploited in the region.”166 
However, the prime minister did not provide a time table for this evolutionary 
change, and indicated that he was not yet prepared to engage in constitutional
163 Steven Smyth, 1999, p. 250.
164 Steven Smyth, 1999, pp. 250, 252.
165 Government o f  Canada, Speech from the Throne, October 5, 2004.
166 CBC North, November 22, 2004.
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negotiations.167 Nevertheless, this announcement does indicate a shift that Canada 
once again is concerned about its sovereignty claims in the Northwest Passage, and 
that constitutional change for the territories is one means for advancing those claims. 
Summary
During the 1960s and 1970s the federal and provincial governments 
dominated the constitutional agenda by attempting to negotiate various agreements on 
patriating and amending the constitution of Canada, the British North America Act. 
The Yukon and Northwest Territories were excluded from these constitutional 
conferences, which focused on the division of federal and provincial powers, a 
formula for amending the constitution (including whether Quebec should have a veto 
over constitutional amendments), and whether Canada should adopt a charter of 
rights. The primary avenue for citizens and organizations, including territorial 
governments, to speak to constitutional reform proposals was to various committees 
established by parliament. These committees often traveled around the country to 
hear ideas and concerns about constitutional reform proposals, and reported to 
parliament about what they heard. The government in power was free to accept or 
reject the recommendations of these committee reports.
During this period, the territorial governments attempted to persuade the 
federal government to let them participate in constitutional conferences, and to retain 
the right to negotiate provincial status with the federal government alone (without
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provincial involvement in the process). Throughout Canadian history, new provinces 
were created by the federal government acting alone.
The 1981 federal-provincial agreement to patriate the Canadian constitution 
was achieved without the consent of the territories, and the governments of the 
territories opposed those proposals in the constitutional package that would impair 
their ability to become provinces and that codified a process for extending provincial 
boundaries into the territories without territorial consent. They also continued their 
efforts to try to be guaranteed representation in first ministers’ conferences. Their 
efforts were in vain: in 1982 the Canadian constitution was patriated and none of the 
territorial demands was successful. This was a major constitutional setback for the 
territories.
Territorial efforts since patriation have focused on changing the amending 
formula to revert to the pre-1982 formula for creating new provinces and eliminating 
or qualifying the provisions enabling the extension of provincial boundaries: if  the 
provision remained, territorial governments wanted a veto over any proposed 
extensions. The territories also continued lobbying for inclusion in first ministers’ 
conferences so that they could influence future constitutional amendments. The 
Meech Lake Accord proposed to set back territorial aspirations even further than the 
1982 amendments: all provinces would have been given a vote (and a veto) on 
creation of new provinces, and the accord also proposed to give provinces, but not 
territories, the right to nominate citizens for senate and Supreme Court of Canada 
appointments. It also ignored territorial aspirations for representation at first
264
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ministers’ conferences. The territories fought doubly hard to defeat the accord, 
launching court challenges as well as voicing their objections to parliamentary 
committees. But the accord was defeated, not by territorial objections, but by 
aboriginal objections and the recalcitrance of two provincial governments.
In contrast to the Meech Lake Accord process, the process leading to the 
Charlottetown Accord provided the territories with an opportunity to be directly 
involved in the federal-provincial negotiations, and the result was dramatically 
different from the Meech Lake Accord: the territories were able to convince the 
federal and provincial governments that their interests could be met without 
compromising those of the federal or provincial governments. The results of the two 
processes for the territories are summarized in Figure 5. The territories won 
credibility and acceptance through this process, but lost, once again, not because of 
provincial or federal concerns, but because the federal and provincial governments, 
collectively, were unable to convince the Canadian public that the entire package of 
reforms was in the best interest of Canadians.
Conclusion
Alaska and the Yukon were federally run colonies or territories for most of 
their histories, and their constitutional status, form of government, public finances, 
and restrictions on their powers all reflected a powerful role for, and involvement of, 
the federal government. Elected legislators distrusted and resented the powerful role 
played by federal agencies and federal appointees, especially the territorial governors
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2 6 6
Meech Lake Accord Charlottetown Accord
Every province given a veto over 
creation of new provinces
No province could veto
Provinces and federal 
government could alter territorial 
boundaries without territorial 
consent
No boundary alterations 
without territorial consent
Territories could not nominate 
persons for appointment to 
Senate or Supreme Court of 
Canada
Territories guaranteed 
opportunity to nominate 
people for appointment
Territories could participate in 
first ministers’ conferences only 
upon invitation
Territories guaranteed right 
to participate in first 
ministers’ conferences
Figure 5
A Comparison of Outcomes Demonstrating Efficacy of Involvement
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and territorial commissioners, and sought to find ways to strengthen their hand 
against the federal government.
Each jurisdiction’s society was fragmented into three social forces: aboriginal, 
settler, and non-resident interests. Non-resident interests included representatives of 
federal agencies as well as non-resident corporations. The federal government, as the 
dominant force in each region, was lobbied by the other three parties to invoke 
policies that favored their disparate interests. Many settlers wanted self government 
and economic opportunities, aboriginal people wanted their land and harvesting rights 
recognized, and the non-resident corporations wanted policies that ensured they could 
maximize profits, including limiting the ability of local governments to tax them.
But there was little social solidarity in the North. Settlers were divided 
amongst themselves over the issue of whether, when and how self-government should 
be achieved; Natives and settlers were divided over the issues o f aboriginal rights and 
entitlements; “boomers” and conservationists argued over conservation of lands 
versus development of those lands; and regional interests within the North also 
competed for influence and entitlements. Some of these disputes have been resolved, 
while others remain and are debated today.
National governments also had interests that they pursued in the North. In 
Alaska, the strategic location of the territory, made apparent by World War II, 
ensured federal investment in military bases and infrastructure. Military interests 
hindered the statehood movement to some extent as military officials argued that
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allocation of lands to a state government might hinder the establishment of bases. 
Moreover, Alaska’s pristine natural environment and its oil and gas resources are 
viewed by many Americans as national resources, and their significance to the United 
States has increased when world production declined at various times since the 1970s.
In Canada, federal interest in the North increased when Canada’s sovereignty 
over its northern territory and the Northwest Passage were apparently threatened -  
primarily by the actions of the United States. Federal interest was also engendered 
during resource “booms” such as the Klondike gold rush and the oil and gas 
exploration boom in the late 1970s and early 1980s that spawned major pipeline 
proposals. Otherwise, most national governments left the Canadian North to private 
business to develop.
As residents of territories, the inhabitants of the Yukon and Alaska possessed 
fewer rights and privileges than those who lived in states and provinces. As we saw in 
Chapter 1, Alaskans could not vote in presidential elections, could not manage their 
land and resources, their laws could be overturned by Congress, and their delegate 
had no vote in Congress. Alaska Natives were not even considered citizens until 
1924. Yukon residents had no representation in the Senate until 1975, very limited 
ability to manage land and resources (until 2003), territorial laws could be vetoed and 
were subordinate to federal laws, and Yukoners had no vote in national constitutional 
amendments. Discriminatory laws such as the Indian Act further limited aboriginal 
residents’ rights in the territories. This subordinate status upset many territorial 
residents, who sought constitutional change to address their concerns.
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The United States’ constitutional provisions relating to the admission of new 
states remained unchanged during the years that Alaska sought admission as a state, 
while in Canada, efforts to change the national constitution were ongoing. In the 
1980s, the Canadian federal government succeeded in “patriating” the constitution 
from Great Britain, and, in so doing, changed the rules for admitting new provinces. 
After 1981, Parliament alone could not approve the admission of a new province; 7 
provinces which collectively possessed 50 percent or more of the population of 
Canada also had to approve. A further proposal to require the unanimous approval of 
all the provinces was vigorously opposed by the territorial governments. Since 1982 
there has been an ongoing debate over the admission rule -  parliamentary committees 
and first ministers’ conferences that included northern leaders have generally 
supported the pre-1982 formula for admission of new provinces, while Quebec and 
national governments have sought to impose a veto for Quebec. Yukon residents who 
sought provincial status were diverted from their goal by constitutional proposals and 
changes that required them to battle efforts to make the acquisition of provincial 
status more difficult. When northern and aboriginal leaders were included in first 
ministers’ conferences, they were often able to have their needs and interests 
addressed. When they were excluded, their interests were ignored or overlooked.
Alaska Natives mobilized to ensure that their land rights would be protected if  
statehood were granted, but they had little organized involvement in the statehood 
campaign. Only one aboriginal person attended the 1955-56 constitutional
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convention, and the issue of Alaska becoming a state prior to a land claims settlement 
was not viewed as a significant concern by the dominant political powers. This can be 
contrasted with the Yukon situation, where the First Nations and the Council for 
Yukon Indians demanded a veto over provincial status, at least until their land claims 
were settled, at a different point of historical development.
The Yukon government’s demands for constitutional development and 
devolution of federal programs were, in effect, demands for land claims and self­
government that paralleled the Yukon First Nations’ demands for land claim and self­
government. They were also viewed as competitive processes, which created tension 
and animosity between the Yukon government and Yukon First Nations. The Yukon 
government was able to address many First Nation concerns by: making 
commitments to treat land claim negotiations as their highest priority; supporting the 
entrenchment of aboriginal self-government in the constitution; moving from a 
competitive negotiating model to a consensus building model; developing 
government to government relationships; improving consultation processes; and, by 
negotiating economic development agreements with some First Nations. Furthermore, 
Yukon Indians became major participants in the Yukon’s system of public 
government since 1978 by running for elected office and receiving appointments to 
key roles in the legislative and executive branches of government.
With the exception of the issues of contiguity and racial composition of the 
population, arguments launched by those who opposed provincial status for the 
Yukon were similar to those raised by the opponents of statehood: lack of an
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economic base, small population, and excessive reliance on federal programs. Both 
jurisdictions also had to contend with the purely political issues that were raised about 
the potential impacts admitting new jurisdictions would have on the status quo.
In the American political system of separation of powers, initiatives for 
admission of new states can be sustained because proposals can be launched in 
Congress without the support of the executive. Under Canada’s parliamentary system, 
where power is concentrated in the executive, serious legislative initiatives are only 
effected after the support o f the executive has been gained, because the executive 
controls the parliamentary agenda. Historically, Canadian prime ministers, except for 
Joseph Clark, have not given demands for provincial status for the Yukon any 
support. Clark was willing to give Yukoners’ request serious consideration, but his 
government fell before he could take action on the issue. Subsequent prime ministers 
(until 2004) have been more concerned with addressing the interests of Quebec than 
they have with northern constitutional development.
The American “loose” federal system has been spared the process known as 
“first ministers’ conferences” familiar to Canadians. While state governors meet with 
the president to discuss matters of national importance, they are not able to guarantee 
any particular outcome. Under the U.S. system, the initiatives o f governors and 
presidents can be thwarted by their legislatures. While the same is true in Canada, 
Canada has a relatively “tight” federation that permits greater coordination of federal 
and provincial efforts. Provincial premiers and prime ministers with majority
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governments are generally more able to reach consensus on issues and to gain the 
compliance of their legislatures.
The inability of northern Canadians to get the constitutional amending 
formula changed to allow admission of new provinces by federal initiative alone (the 
pre-1982 formula), forced the Yukon government to focus on areas where it could 
make substantive gains. The Yukon government succeeded in gaining significant new 
powers through the devolution of federal programs and amendments to the Yukon Act. 
However, the territory’s constitutional status remains problematic because it has no 
guarantees that its new powers will not one day be removed, that its budget will not 
be drastically cut, or that its borders will not be altered without its consent. 
Historically, all the constitutional and budgetary reversals that the Yukon suffered in 
the past can legally be recreated in the future under territorial status. Only provincial 
status provides constitutional protections and guarantees against such actions.
Unlike incorporated territories in the United States, Canadian territories have 
little constitutional certainty. There are no provisions or precedents in Canadian law 
that requires the federal government to confer provincial status on a territory by virtue 
of any financial or population formula. And under Canada’s constitutional amending 
formula, the federal government can veto any resolution that proposes to grant a 
territory provincial status. Consequently, Canada’s territories could conceivably 
remain territories for many years to come.
While some might doubt that constitutional reversals are still possible in the 
twenty-first century, the Yukon’s history provides numerous examples of Yukon
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residents being surprised by the unilateral actions of federal authorities that acted 
without consultation. This dissertation provides some of those examples, but it is not 
exhaustive. Without guarantees of involvement in federal-provincial negotiations, the 
Yukon may well be surprised once again.
On the other hand, as noted in Chapter 4, climate change appears to be 
convincing the government of Canada that it needs to pay more attention to its North 
and to its claims of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. As in the past, perceived 
threats to Canada’s northern sovereignty, rather than claims for equal treatment, are 
the major factors in turning Canada’s attention northward.
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Chapter 6 
Greenland: An Internal Colony?
Introduction
As noted in Chapter 1, Greenland provides an opportunity to study a region 
that differs significantly in many ways from that o f the Yukon and Alaska. 
Greenland’s proper Inuit name is Kalaallit Nunaat, or “Greenlanders’ Land.” It is an 
enormous island, 90 percent of which is ice-covered. Its small population of 
approximately 50,000 people is scattered along an immense coastline. The island 
itself is remote and separated from Denmark by a vast expanse of ocean. Greenland’s 
economy is primarily based on extracting renewable resources from the sea, with 
shrimp being the major economic resource. There is little mining activity and 
offshore oil exploration has yet to yield significant discoveries. Greenland thus 
continues to depend on massive cash transfers from the Danish government to support 
its economy and standard of living. Yet, despite its small population, limited 
economy, and ongoing dependence on Denmark, Greenland achieved a significant 
degree of autonomy from Denmark with the granting of Home Rule in 1979. Under 
Home Rule, Greenland remains a part of the Danish realm but has its own premier, 
parliament, and system of governance.
The majority of Greenland’s population is o f Inuit descent, with non-Inuit 
forming only about 18 percent of the population. The predominant language is 
Kalaallisut, a dialect related to other Inuit languages spoken in Canada, Alaska, and 
Chukotka. The settler community has always been small relative to the Inuit
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Greenlandic population, as settlement was never a priority of the Danish government. 
Most Danes or other Europeans stayed in Greenland for only short periods of time -  
until their postings as teachers, police officers, KGH (Den Kongelige Gronlandske 
Handel -  also known as the Royal Greenland Trade Department) officers, etc. were 
over.
Denmark’s policies toward its Inuit population differed significantly from 
those of Canada and the United States towards their aboriginal populations. Having 
stated this, Greenlanders today experience many of the same socio-economic 
problems that indigenous peoples in northern North America experience. 
Anthropologist Jens Dahl argued that, “In contrast to ANCSA and land claims 
agreements in Canada, Greenlandic Home Rule is a political reform recognizing a 
politically, geographically, and demographically undivided Greenland.” 1
This chapter attempts to answer the questions: how have Denmark’s policies 
toward Greenland affected Greenland’s constitutional and economic development, 
and what can we learn from the Greenlandic experience of constitutional change?
A Brief History of the Colonization of Greenland
The Inuit lived in Greenland for nearly 4000 years prior to European contact. 
Prior to colonization, “Greenlanders numbered less than 10,000 people, and they 
wintered in numerous dispersed settlements along the coast. They relied primarily on 
sealing, whaling, bird hunting, and localized fishing for their livelihoods. The
1 Jens Dahl, “Greenland: Political Structure o f  Self-G overnm entArctic Anthropology, Vol. 23, Nos. 1 
and 2, 1986, p. 323.
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extended family groups were to all practical purposes self-reliant.”2
Viking settlements were established in Greenland from about 982 until the 
mid- fifteenth century. European interest in Greenland was sporadic from the 1400s 
to the 1600s, with a variety of Basque whalers, British explorers, and Dutch and 
Danish-Norwegian expeditions traveling to the island at various times. Expeditions 
often captured individual Inuit and brought them home as curiosities, which provided 
Europeans with some rudimentary knowledge of the people occupying the island, and 
their language and technology.
Relations between European whalers and traders and the Inuit people were not 
always amicable, largely because of the kidnappings. However, the Europeans and 
Greenlanders did establish trade relations, bartering furs for manufactured products 
such as knives, clothing, tools, etc. According to historian Finn Gad, trade relations 
had a significant impact on the island’s indigenous residents:
The influence on the Eskimos’ culture took place through 
the consumer goods bartered to them. Needs were created 
that could be satisfied only by outside supplies. Side effects 
of this contact with foreigners were sexual promiscuity and 
some use of strong drink. It is probable that tuberculosis got 
its foothold in Greenland through this contact.4
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3 Finn Gad, “History o f  Colonial Greenland,” Handbook o f  North American Indians -  Arctic, 
Washington: Smithsonian Institute, 1984, pp. 556-557.
4 Finn Gad, 1984, p. 558.
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Trade with the Greenlandic Inuit people increased significantly in the 1700s, 
and Danish-Norwegian enterprises competed with Dutch companies for furs and 
whale blubber. Finn Gad noted that:
Danish-Norwegian trade with Greenland was carried on 
by various enterprises: from 1728 tol733/34 for the Crown, 
and from 1733/34 to 1749 by a Copenhagen merchant, who 
transferred it to the Royal Chartered General Trading Com­
pany, which went into liquidation in 1774. From 1774-1776 
to 1950 the Royal Greenland Trade Department... had a 
monopoly on trade in Greenland.5
Greenland was administered by Denmark-Norway until 1814, when the Treaty 
o f Kiel resulted in Denmark relinquishing Norway to Sweden. Greenland remained 
under Danish colonial rule and Denmark resisted efforts by other nations to surrender 
control. For example, Denmark refused to sell Greenland to the United States in 
1916.6 Finally, in 1933, the International Court of Justice at the Hague confirmed 
Danish sovereignty over all of Greenland.7
Viking settlements had been established on Greenland in the distant past, but 
no permanent settlement of Europeans was established there until Hans Egede, a 
Norwegian Lutheran priest, was granted permission from the Denmark-Norway 
government to establish a mission in 1721. The mission was moved in 1728, and, 
after Egede -  filled with missionary zeal - convinced the king that he had obligations
5 Finn Gad, 1984, p. 558.
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to baptize Greenlanders, additional missions, trading and whaling stations were 
established along the western coast.
In 1774 -  1776, the Royal Greenland Trade Department was given 
responsibility for managing trade in West Greenland by the Danish Government, and 
on March 18, 1776 it created a trading monopoly by officially closing the coast of
n
Greenland to foreign ships except for emergency landings.
European colonization of Greenland had major impacts on Greenlandic 
society. As in North America, the most immediate impact was the introduction of 
new diseases, and in 1733-34 the first of several smallpox epidemics hit the 
population, and nearly half of the Greenlandic population perished.9 The population 
dropped to an estimated 5,000 people.
Greenlandic Inuit dependency on Europeans and manufactured goods 
increased as the European presence increased. For example, Finn Gad notes that, 
“After 1750 bad hunting years occurred more and more often, resulting in famines. 
This called for active social welfare. Not dictated by any elevated philosophy, this 
policy was due to an obligation to protect the Eskimos, pure necessity, and the 
positive humanism of the mission.”10 The introduction of firearms by Dutch traders 
resulted in a demand for gunpowder and lead for bullets as well. Consequently,
“arms, gunpowder, and lead had become necessities for Greenlandic hunters. These
6 Finn Gad, 1984, p. 570.
7 Finn Gad, 1984, p. 571.
8 Richard Caulfield, Greenlanders, Whales, and Whaling, Hanover: University Press o f  New England, 
1997, p. 30. Finn Gad, 1984, p. 558.
9 Richard Caulfield, 1997, p. 30.
10 Finn Gad, 1984, p. 560.
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consumer goods thus had an enormous influence on the Eskimo culture and increased 
dependence on outside supplies.”11
The advent of Christianity in Greenland also had a profound impact on the 
Inuit. In addition to Hans Egede’s mission, a German Moravian mission was 
established in 1733, a church was funded and built by Greenlanders in Holsteinsborg
i 'y
in 1775, and most people in West Greenland were baptized by 1782.
With Christianity came rudimentary education for Greenlanders, and as in 
North America, residential schools were established. Finn Gad wrote that, “Schools 
for children, organized as boarding schools, seem to have been established as early as 
the 1730s. In addition, each missionary trained the Greenlandic catechists he thought 
he needed....”13
Still other changes to Greenlandic society included the slow growth of 
communities around missions and trading stations, intermarriage between Europeans 
and Greenlanders, and the evolution of a “half-breed” population, which, “in the 
following centuries ... formed the nucleus of the population of West Greenland. Not 
until after 1782 was the future of such children attended to.”14
A cultural division of labor was established early-on in Greenland history.
Finn Gad noted that:
Greenlandic manpower was attractive because it was cheap.
... In principle, Greenlanders were to be kept to hunting and
11 Finn Gad, 1984, p. 561.
12 Finn Gad, 1984, p. 562.
13 Finn Gad, 1984, p. 563.
14 Finn Gad, 1984, p. 563.
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must not therefore be ‘spoiled’ by ‘un-national food.’ The 
Greenlandic standard of living was considerably lower than 
that o f Europeans stationed in Greenland, so that the wages 
in money of a Greenlander could also be kept lower. Payment 
in money was considered in any case only a supplement.... 
Greenlanders’ needs were considered to be small, and they had 
to get their own payment in kind by hunting and fishing. Thus 
the concept o f ‘Greenland wages,’ considerably less than the 
wages o f Europeans stationed in Greenland, was introduced.
Once in practice, it became traditional and difficult to eradicate, 
especially since it aided economizing efforts.15 
Government policy respecting European-Greenlander relations became 
important in 1782, after “the KGH divided West Greenland into two inspectorates, 
each headed by its own colonial administrators (Inspektor). These inspectorates 
consisted of 13 trading stations ... stretching from 60 N latitude northward to about 
72 N.”16
The Danish Crown, through the KGH, issued the Instruction of April 19,
1782. Finn Gad commented that, “The main objective of the Instruction ... was to
1 7formulate a set o f regulations to protect the Greenlanders.” Regulations were 
established respecting mixed marriages, the training of mixed race children, 
prohibition of the sale o f alcohol except to those employed in whaling, outlawing
15 Finn Gad, 1984, p. 563.
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semifraudulent practices, providing for social welfare during famines, conservation of 
eider ducks, regulating commodities sold to Greenlanders, and so on. KGH Inspector 
Johan Schwabe also “set up the world’s first relief fund, based on the earnings o f the 
local occupations. A certain percentage of the Greenlanders’ share in the whaling 
proceeds, as well as fines for violating the Instruction of 1782, were put into savings. 
The fund provided relief in kind to all in times of need, help to widows, and others 
without providers, as well as occupational help.... The relief fund of the northern 
inspectorate was partially used to pay the first resident doctor in Greenland.”18 While 
a single doctor was inadequate to meet the needs of the population of Greenland, 
assistants and catechists also provided rudimentary medical services to the people, 
including smallpox vaccinations. Indeed, a “.. .systematic program of vaccination was 
initiated in 1804, with successful results.”19
Denmark’s colonial policies towards Greenlanders reflected the perspective 
that Greenlanders could and should be “civilized” -  that their indigenous economy, 
beliefs, and practices could be supplanted by those of Europeans. History professor 
Ole Marquardt compared American and Danish policies towards indigenous peoples, 
and discovered that, “For decades Danish politicians had believed that Denmark 
successfully and simultaneously could elevate the cultural level o f the Greenlandic 
Inuit and instigate a continued improvement in their economic situation and general
16 Marquardt and Caulfield, 1996, p. 109.
17 Finn Gad, 1984, p. 564.
18 Finn Gad, 1984, p. 564.
19 Finn Gad, 1984, p. 565.
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welfare.”20 However, this view began to change in 1856, after H.J. Rink, a Danish 
administrator, began lobbying for changes to Denmark’s policies. From Rink’s 
perspective, contact with European society resulted in decadence which would lead to 
the destruction of Inuit society. According to historian and geographer Michael 
Bravo, Rink, “blamed the missionaries’ harsh Lutheran dogmatism for doing more to 
accelerate than remedy the problems of rapid cultural change in Greenlandic
91society.” Rink’s view prevailed, and Marquardt states that thereafter, “Greenland 
was to be protected against any impact o f Western civilization which might 
jeopardize the proficiency of its inhabitants in that art of the seal hunt.”22 Under 
Rink’s administration, Greenlanders regained some element of political control within 
the colonial regime.
Despite this official policy, the socio-economic conditions in Greenland began 
to change in ways that resulted in increasing westernization of the Inuit. Greenland’s 
population grew from 1880 to 1920 by nearly 50 percent. A dramatic rise in ocean 
temperature around 1916 resulted in a massive influx of cod from the North Atlantic
‘j ' l
and a shift in the seal population to the North. Greenlanders began to pursue fishing 
as a commercial activity, rather than for personal use. Danish authorities began to 
explore prospects for economic diversification, such as sheep farming and whaling.24
20 Ole Marquardt, “Reservation, Westernization or Annihilation: A Comparison o f U.S. Indian Policy 
and Danish Policy in the Nineteenth Century,” in I.Sigurdsson and J. Skaptason, (eds.), Aspects o f  
Arctic and Sub-Arctic History, Reykjavik: University o f  Iceland Press, 2000, p. 74.
21 Michael Bravo, “Measuring Danes and Eskimos,” in M. Bravo and S. Sorlin (eds.), Narrating the 
Arctic: A Cultural History o f  Nordic Scientific Practices, Canton: Watson Publishing International, 
2002, pp. 238-39. ’
22 Ole Marquardt, 2000, p. 77.
23 Richard Caulfield, 1997, p. 32.
24 Richard Caulfield, 1997, p. 33.
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Mining for cryolite began in 1859, and increased in importance in the twentieth 
century with the advent of aircraft and increased demand for aluminum.
In 1924 the Danish government signed the Treaty of East Greenland with 
Norway, allowing Norwegians hunting rights in East Greenland. The action was 
taken without consulting Greenlanders, and Greenlanders demanded changes when 
the new administrative law was passed in 1925. The new law established district 
councils that, “were to review and comment on all proposed changes in Danish law 
affecting Greenland.”
World War II transformed Greenland in a variety of ways. Germany occupied 
Denmark early in the war, and Greenland was effectively disconnected from its 
center. The Danish ambassador to the United States signed a treaty with the United 
States’ government authorizing the building of American military bases on the island, 
and the Americans were quick to occupy and exploit Greenland’s cryolite mine and to 
establish air bases.26
The United States’ military quickly appreciated Greenland’s strategic location 
and after the war signed additional treaties with Denmark that allowed it to maintain 
bases on the island. This continues to this day, with a major radar installation at Thule 
Air Base in northern Greenland. The bases were kept off limits to most Greenlanders 
until fairly recently, when the Greenlandic government was able to participate in the
97treaty negotiations and arrange for economic benefits to accrue to Greenlanders.
25 Richard Caulfield, 1997, p. 34.
26 Richard Caulfield, 1997, p. 34.
27 Clive Archer, “The United States Defence Areas in Greenland,” Cooperation and Conflict, XXIII, 
1988, pp. 123-144.
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The Modernization of Greenland
According to economist Graham Poole, Denmark’s pre-war approach to 
Greenland was, “characterised by a paternalistic social policy which had kept 
Greenland more-or-less isolated from the rest of the world for two centuries.”28 This 
approach changed in the post-war era as a result o f several important factors: the 
ongoing presence of American military installations, and,
The growing perception in Denmark of the abysmally low 
material standard of living prevailing in the colony, and the 
extremely low average lifetime expectancy of the Greenlandic 
population (Hoyem 1988). The second was a requirement 
made by the United Nations concerning the registration of 
conditions in non-self governing territories (Gad 1984). These 
factors created the right atmosphere for change to be considered 
in accordance with the wishes of the Greenlandic population as
90put forward by their representatives.
Unlike the approach taken in North America, where entrenched bureaucracies 
made policies affecting indigenous peoples without consulting them, Denmark 
launched a consultative process in 1948 that resulted in the development of a ten-year 
modernization plan (referred to as G-50), and the passage of nine laws with profound 
effects on Greenland: establishing the Greenland provincial council elected by
28 Graham Poole, The Development o f  Greenland’s Shrimp Fishing and Processing Industry Since 
1979: A Study in Applied Economics, unpublished PH.D. thesis, Cambridge: Scott Polar Research 
Institute, 1995, p. 7.
29 Graham Poole, 1997, p. 7.
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Greenlanders; separating the school system from the church; abolishing the state 
monopoly over business in Greenland; overhauling the justice system, and numerous 
other reforms.30 In 1953, a new Danish constitution was enacted to fully integrate 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands into the Danish realm, and all Danish laws were 
made applicable to the island unless expressly excluded.31
According to Greenland scholar Richard Caulfield, “Frustration with the 
results of G-50 led to creation of another state-controlled commission, the Greenland 
Committee of 1960 (referred to as G-60). The G-60 commission’s goal was to 
normalize relations between Greenlandic and Danish institutions; in large measure, to 
assimilate Greenland fully into the Danish realm.”32
The modernization process was accompanied by unprecedented investment by 
the Danish state in Greenland, with expenditures to improve housing, schools, 
hospitals and other infrastructure in Greenland, as well as program improvements in 
education, governance, health and welfare, justice, and so on. However, Finn Gad 
pointed out that while, “Modernization was able to begin in all fields ... all plans 
were undone almost at once by a rapid rise in population.” The population o f 
Greenland grew quickly with the influx of Danish laborers and administrators and as 
a result o f improved health care. Consequently, “The population bom in Greenland 
rose from 22,148 in 1948 to 30,378 in 1960 and to 38,914 in 1969: a total increase o f
30 Finn Gad, 1984, p. 574; Richard Caulfield, 1997, p. 35.
31 Roxann Henry and Kenneth Miller, “Denmark, Including Greenland and Faroe Islands,” in Albert P. 
Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, (eds.), Constitutions o f  the Countries o f  the World, Dobbs Ferry: 
Oceana Publications, Inc., 1985, pp. 15-24.
32 Richard Caulfield, 1997, p. 36.
33 Finn Gad, 1984, p. 574.
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over 75 percent. Modernization likewise brought about a drastic increase in the 
population bom outside of Greenland, from over 900 in 1948 to 2,762 in 1960 and 
7,417 in 1969: an increase of over 700 percent.”34
Other aspects of the modernization process were the efforts to transform the 
Greenland economy -  to replace the subsistence economy with one focused on 
harvesting the abundant cod and shrimp stocks. This required relocating much of the 
rural population into larger communities where services could be provided more 
efficiently and where fish processing plants were located. These efforts proved 
unpopular with many Greenlanders who were reluctant to give up their traditional 
livelihoods and cultural homelands.35
The cultural division of labor was reinforced as modernization progressed in 
the 1960s. Danish workers that came to Greenland took many of the well paying jobs, 
and Richard Caulfield pointed out that, “In 1967, Danes in Greenland comprised only 
15 percent of the population yet earned 50 percent of all private income.” Thus, at 
least one author has argued that, “Legally, Greenland’s colonial status was suspended 
in 1953, but in practice the colonial policy was intensified by virtue of an economic 
neo-colonialism and the immigration of a considerable number of Danes.” 
Anthropologist Jens Dahl went on to note that, “Observers o f Greenlandic politics 
pointed out that the economic, social, and political oppression of Greenlanders
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34 Finn Gad, 1984, p. 574. Note, “bom outside o f  Greenland” refers to the large influx o f Danes.
35 Richard Caulfield, 1997, p. 36; Graham Poole, 1995, p. 8. See also: Jens Dahl, p. 317.
36 Richard Caulfield, 1997, p. 36.
37 Jens Dahl, 1986, pp. 316-317.
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resulted in a growing ethnic consciousness. Among Greenlanders, the well-educated
•50
and Danish-speaking elite were most aware of this oppression.”
It was this small group of disaffected and educated Greenlanders that led the 
movement for greater autonomy from Denmark in the 1960s. Their efforts were given 
impetus by a variety o f events that galvanized Greenland society to oppose Danish 
policies, such as the closure of the mining town of Qutdligssat and the forced removal 
of its inhabitants, and the integration of Denmark and Greenland into the European 
Economic Community against the wishes of the people of Greenland in 1973. These 
events contributed to the politicization of Greenland society, including the creation of 
the Siumut (or “Forward”) movement and political parties, and increasing demands 
for home rule.
The non-indigenous minority population (primarily Danes) of Greenland 
either did not, or could not, oppose home rule. Jens Dahl referred to this group of 
people as the “Danish bourgeoisie,” which was, “heterogeneous in its composition 
and included persons employed in leading positions in the KGH and the Greenlandic 
Technical Organization (G TO )... doctors and other holders of service and 
cultural/ideological positions ... [and] bureaucrats in higher administrative positions,
39independent master artisans, and similar persons ....”
The non-indigenous population of Greenland lost its over-whelming influence 
in Greenland as the sentiment for home rule gained momentum. Dahl stated that:
38 Jens Dahl, 1986, pp. 317-318.
39 Jens Dahl, 1986, p. 318. Note: The GTO was the Danish government’s administrative arm in 
Greenland prior to the establishment o f  Home Rule. It was responsible for most o f the construction and
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In the early 1970s, when it was obvious that the Danish 
implemented development policy (“modernization”) had to 
be changed, the small Danish bourgeoisie lost the initiative 
to a still more critical elite of young Greenlanders. The 
heterogeneous composition of the Danish bourgeoisie and 
the ideological and political basis o f their dominant economic 
position caused this group to fall apart when radical changes 
in the colonial policy came about. After 1970, the small 
Danish bourgeoisie began to loose [sic] its influence as a 
group, as changes occurred in economic and political colonial 
policy 40
Unlike Alaska and the Yukon, where the settler population played a major 
role in promoting constitutional change, Greenland’s settler community lost its role as 
a major political force in Greenland. Inuit Greenlanders supplanted the Greenland 
settler community as the driving force for change in Greenland society.
The Danish government responded to the demands for change by appointing a 
committee o f Greenlanders to make recommendations on enhancing self­
determination. This committee recommended the formation of a Commission on 
Home Rule in Greenland. The proposed commission, composed of an equal number 
of Danish and Greenlandic members, was established in 1975, and it reported its 
recommendations in 1978. According to Caulfield, the commission recommended:
infrastructure development set out in the G-50 and G-60 ten year plans. Richard Caulfield, p er  s.
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a system of Home Rule that retained the unity of the 
Danish realm. Greenlanders’ aboriginal rights were hotly 
debated by the commission, with Siumut representatives 
arguing that Greenlanders had full and complete ownership 
of nonrenewable resources under international law. Negotiations 
nearly broke down until Denmark’s prime minister stated 
bluntly that Greenland could insist on full ownership, but 
doing so would mean leaving the Danish realm. Greenlanders, 
recognizing their continuing dependency on Denmark, were 
forced to back down.41 
The Political and Constitutional Development of Greenland Under Home Rule 
The Danish Parliament (Folketing) approved Act No. 577, The Greenland 
Home Rule Act, on November 29, 1978, which came into effect on May 1, 1979 after 
voters in Greenland approved it in a referendum. The Act gave Greenland an elected 
parliament (Landsting), and an executive body (Landsstyre), elected by the 
Landsting. Greenlanders also continued to be represented in the Danish parliament by 
two elected representatives 42 Home Rule in Greenland mirrored in many respects 
similar governmental arrangements in the Faroe Islands, also part of the Danish 
realm.
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comm., 2005.
40 Jens Dahl, 1986, p. 318.
41 Richard Caulfield, 1997, p. 38.
42 Richard Caulfield, 1997, p. 39; Roxann Henry and Kenneth Miller, 1985, pp. 59-66.
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The Greenland Home Rule Act made provision for the Greenland government 
to take over a broad range of responsibilities from Denmark. Powers that could be 
drawn down included responsibility for education, hunting, fishing, agriculture, 
reindeer herding, taxation, county planning, environmental protection, health, and 
social welfare, amongst others. Furthermore, Section 7 of the act stated that, “The 
central authorities o f the Realm may after negotiation with and having secured the 
consent o f the home rule authorities by statute determine that jurisdiction in fields not 
listed in the schedule to this Act shall be transferred to the home rule authorities.. ..”43 
Consequently, there was opportunity for additional powers to be transferred to the 
Greenland government as a consequence of negotiations. However, the natural 
resources o f Greenland are jointly administered by Denmark and the Greenland 
government.44 Denmark would continue to have sole jurisdiction over defense, the 
constitution, national finances, and foreign affairs, although special provisions were 
included in the Home Rule Act to inform, consult, and involve the Greenland 
government on international issues and agreements that might have an impact on 
Greenland and its economy.45 These provisions were put to the test when Greenland 
successfully withdrew from membership in the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1982, while retaining favorable trading status with Europe 46
43 Roxann Henry and Kenneth Miller, 1985, p. 61.
44 Finn Larsen, “The Quiet Life o f  a Revolution: Greenlandic Home Rule 1979-1992,” Inuit Studies, 16 
(1-2), 1992, p. 201.
45 Roxann Henry and Kenneth Miller, 1985, pp. 63-64.
46 Hans Mortensen, “Greenland’s bilateral fisheries agreement with the European Union,” Cultural and  
Social Research in Greenland,95/96, Nuuk: Ilisimatusarfik/Atuakkiorfik A/S, 1996, pp. 199-208.
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The Danish approach to law-making and treaty-making on issues related to 
Greenland is highly consultative. The Home Rule Act requires the Danish government 
to refer bills, administrative orders and proposed treaties which are of importance to 
Greenland to the Greenland government before they are approved by the Danish 
parliament. According to historian Finn Larsen:
When the Danish authorities draft new laws in fields 
already within the competence of the Home Rule 
authorities, the governing rule is that such laws are 
invalid in Greenland. Other laws, drafted by the Danish 
authorities, must be made available for comment by 
the Home Rule authorities before they can be legally 
enforced in Greenland. In practice, no new Danish law 
will be rendered valid in Greenland without the Home Rule 
authorities’ affirmative consent thereto. (Harhoff, 1987).47
Constitutionally, Greenland’s status resembles that of a Canadian province or 
an American state. Thus, while Denmark is formally a unitary state, Larsen notes that: 
It has ... developed into something more like a federal state 
consisting of Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland.
Each constituent state has its own legislative and executive 
branch, while the Danish Government continues to operate 
as a federal government ...The Danish Parliament’s delegation
47 Finn Larsen, 1992, p. 201.
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of power to the Faroe and the Greenland Home Rule authorities 
does not, according to constitutional law experts, allow the 
Danish Parliament to unilaterally rescind the Home Rule Act 
without violating the constitutional principles and international 
law.48
Importantly, Greenland’s government is a public government in which both 
indigenous and non-indigenous residents have full rights of citizenship. Both can run 
for election, and the country has an advanced system of political parties. However, 
Greenland’s political parties are a relatively recent phenomena, evolving only in the 
1970s. The Siumut movement that evolved in the 1960s and 1970s was a nationalist 
movement acting in response to the modernization process and the “Danification” of 
Greenland. The movement picked up momentum after the 1972 referendum that 
brought Denmark into the European Economic Community in spite of Greenland’s 
opposition. The Siumut (or “Forward”) party, a moderate socialist and nationalist 
party, was created in 1977 out o f the social and political movement of the same name 
that promoted Greenlandic culture.49
The Atassut (or “Mutual Connection”) party, was also created in 1977, but as 
a reaction to the Siumut party’s aggressive stance toward Denmark. It supported 
Home Rule for Greenland, but wanted to ensure that the movement did not advance 
to being a separatist movement. Atassut emphasized resource development in
48 Finn Larsen, 1992, p. 205.
49 Finn Larsen, 1992, pp. 206-207.
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Greenland, advocated the exploitation of Greenland’s oil and mineral potential, and 
supported Greenland’s continued membership in the EEC.50
Differences within Siumut over the issue of ownership of Greenland’s 
resources resulted in a new party being created in 1978. Left-wing members of the 
Siumut Party who thought Greenlanders should own their resources formed the Inuit 
Ataqatigiit party. The party proclaimed itself a Marxist-Leninist party, but later 
moderated its position and advocated less radical positions. It succeeded in getting 
members elected in every election since 1983 and worked as a coalition partner with 
Siumut in three successive governments in the 1980s.51
The Atassut Party also lost support with the formation of two center- 
conservative parties: Issittup Partii-a, (or “Arctic Party”) established in 1986, and 
Akulliit Partiaat, (or “Inuit Brotherhood”) party, established in 1991. Both parties 
achieved some electoral success by promoting expansion of the private sector and 
limitations on the public sector. The Issittup Partii-a is the most nationalistic of the 
three right wing parties.52
The devolution of powers to the Greenland government, combined with the 
rapid maturation of party politics and a broadly supported constitutional arrangement 
with Denmark provided Greenland with the political and constitutional stability of a 
modem nation. Presumably, these arrangements would also have provided Greenland 
with a stable basis for attracting foreign investment and the capital required to foster
50 Finn Larsen, 1992, p. 207.
51 Finn Larsen, 1992, p. 208.
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economic development. But Greenland’s economic success has not materialized, 
and, according to economist Lise Lyck:
The Greenlandic welfare state has income disparities 
and such extreme differences in real living standards and 
opportunities for the approximately 58,000 people who 
live in Greenland that we would not accept them in the 
context of the Danish welfare state. There is a world of 
difference between life and opportunities for the Danish/
Greenlandic bom upper civil servants in Nuuk and for 
Greenlanders in East Greenland, in many west coast 
municipalities and in North Greenland. Greenland has towns 
and settlements which largely survive on income transfers 
alone....53
The social and health problems on the island, particularly amongst indigenous 
Greenlanders, have proven to be devastating. Historian Finn Larsen wrote in 1992 
that:
The social malaise in Greenland could be characterized 
by the following: alcohol abuse, violence, sexual crimes, 
suicide, accidents, absenteeism. The various mischiefs
52 Finn Larsen, 1992, p. 208. Statistics Greenland provides slightly different dates for the formation o f  
the various parties. See the Greenland 1997 Statistical Yearbook, Nuuk: Kalaallit Nunaanni 
Naatsorsueqqisaatarfik, 1997, p. 20.
53 Lise Lyck, Arctic International Trade: A Study Focused on the Greenlandic International Trade 
Regime, Copenhagen: N ew  Social Sciences Monographs Institute o f  Organizational and Industrial 
Sociology, 1999, p. 17.
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are often connected to, and enhanced by, alcohol con­
sumption.
The number of alcohol related crimes, 
accidents and suicides is still frighteningly high.
Greenland has one of the highest suicide rates in 
the world, and the murder rate is 20 times higher 
than that of Denmark. The explanation for these de­
pressing numbers is the way of drinking, associated 
with a number of cultural and social factors (Larsen 
1992b). The pattern is well known from other countries 
in the fourth world which have undergone the same 
rapid change from being a traditional country to be­
coming a modem society.54
Mark Nuttall’s 1994 assessment of Greenland’s social problems echo those of 
Finn Larsen. Nuttall commented that, “The modem health problems experienced by 
Greenlanders seem to correspond with those experienced elsewhere in industrialized 
and developing countries.”55 Nuttall also noted that the infant mortality rate in 
Greenland was five times higher than in Denmark.56
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54 Finn Larsen, 1992, p. 221.
55 Mark Nuttall, “Greenland: Emergence of an Inuit Homeland,” Polar Peoples: Self-Determination 
and Development, London: Minority Rights Group, 1994, p. 18.
56 Mark Nuttall, 1994, p. 18.
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Greenland’s Economy
The Greenlandic economy shares several attributes with other circumpolar 
subnational jurisdictions like Alaska and the Yukon Territory: heavy reliance upon 
national government expenditures and on resource extraction; long distances to 
markets; high costs for developing infrastructure; and a shortage of manufacturing 
industries. Greenland’s reliance on the fishing and shrimping industries has been well 
documented, and a variety of studies have attempted to analyze and rationalize this
cn
sector to maximize economic benefits for the island and its people. In addition to 
commercial fishing, many Greenlanders -  particularly those in smaller, more remote 
settlements - continue to hunt seals and go whaling as part of a mixed subsistence- 
cash economy. Greenland also has commercialized hunting so that hunters can sell 
their produce in local markets or to a Royal Greenland subsidiary company for resale. 
Thus, “In 1991, GFI sold about US$5.5 million worth of country foods in local 
markets.”58 These activities are important, not only for local economies, but for 
sustaining Greenlanders’ cultural identity in the face of the trends of industrialization
. . 50and westernization.
Political economist Ivar Jonsson has concluded that:
The general problems of the Greenlandic economy stem 
from the fact that it is a microeconomy ... that suffers from 
‘organizational dependency.’
Being a microeconomy, Greenland is particularly
57 Graham Poole, 1995; Lise Lyck, 1999.
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vulnerable in terms of capital accumulation because 
the local markets are unusually small and there are 
unusually long distances between local markets....
As for ‘organizational dependency’, one has 
to keep in mind that Greenland is dependent on Denmark, 
in terms of both specific institutions and techno-economic 
paradigms. This is to be expected, because of Greenland’s 
historical relations and because Greenlanders are still in 
the first phase of their independence struggle.60
Lise Lyck concurs with Jonsson’s assessment of Greenland’s dependency 
relationship with Denmark:
If one takes into consideration how mercantilism and 
colonisation have affected Greenland’s limited variety 
of export products, its diversification of imports, and yet 
its dependency on Denmark for both imports and exports, 
one might surmise that the old trade colonial relations 
form the single most important factor affecting Green­
landic society related to external trade. This leftover from 
the old trade regime has meant that import volume is ensured 
en route from Denmark to Greenland and that prices for these
58 Ole Marquardt and Richard Caulfield, 1996, p. 114.
59 Richard Caulfield, 1997; Mark Nuttall, 1992.
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imports are higher, due to the transportation system having 
excess capacity on the return voyage -  factors which 
deeply affect the relative prices of exports from Green­
land.61
Unlike the relatively open, competitive economies of the Yukon and Alaska, 
the Home Rule Government of Greenland inherited an economy dominated and 
monopolized by Danish Crown corporations, which might be referred to as 
mercantilist. Since Home Rule, Greenlanders have nominally transformed most of 
these state-controlled corporations into private firms. However, the state continues to 
have a controlling interest in most of them. Royal Greenland Ltd. is a corporate 
structure wholly owned by the Home Rule government and is by far the largest 
company in Greenland. While Royal Greenland Ltd. is a multi-faceted, multi-national 
corporation, its primary and most profitable business is the harvesting, processing, 
exporting and marketing of the island’s stocks of cold water shrimp.63 However, the 
corporation is also expected to create jobs and provide social benefits for 
Greenlanders. This conflict of goals has created difficulties for the company that at 
times affected its profitability. For example, in 1991 the Landsting required the
60 Ivar Jonsson, “Reflexive Modernization, Organizational Dependency and Global Systems o f  
Embedded Development: A Post-Colonial View,” Cultural and Social Research in Greenland, 95/96 , 
Nuuk: Ilisimatusarfik/Atuakkiorfik, 1996, p. 140.
61 Lise Lyck, 1999, pp. 2-3.
62 According to Hechter, “Mercantilism basically held that economies should operate in the service o f  
states, to increase their wealth and power relative to other states in the international system. 
Accordingly, it was the proper function o f government to intervene in the economy to achieve these 
ends, primarily by manipulating exports and imports in such a way as to nourish native manufactures 
and bring about a favorable balance o f  trade.” Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic 
Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966, Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1975, p. 
91.
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company to fill the cold storage capacity of the Disko Bay region with unprocessed 
shrimp in order to secure factory employment, which cost the company extra money 
to fulfill.64
KNI (Kalaallit Niuerfiat) Pisiffik Ltd., is another corporation wholly owned 
by the Home Rule government. According to Lyck, its primary purpose is, “running a 
business based on wholesale and retail trade in Greenland outside of the settlements 
and outlying districts.”65 Created in 1992, “The company forms a part o f the KNI 
concern, which includes KNI Pisifik Ltd., and its divisions, as well as an affiliated 
company, KNI Pilersuisok Ltd., and a holding company, KNI-mik Piginnittut Ltd.”66 
Lyck notes that, together:
The two home rule owned corporations, ... 
provide complementary parts of Greenland’s inter 
national trade. Royal Greenland Ltd. collects fish 
products, processes them and markets them in 
Greenland and abroad. In this way it supervises the 
export and import for export for most of Greenland’s 
economy. KNI Pisifik Ltd. purchases Greenlandic 
and international products for distribution in the 
competitive centres along Greenland’s west coast. For 
both corporations it is true that they affect the perspective
63 Lise Lyck, 1999, p. 52.
64 Graham Poole, 1995, pp. 81-82.
65 Lise Lyck, 1999, p. 60.
66 Lise Lyck, 1999, p. 60.
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that Greenlander’s have on their geo-strategic position.
Sales to Denmark indicate a continuing reliance on relations
/< 7
within the Danish Realm for economic prosperity.
Lyck goes on to state that Royal Greenland Ltd. contributes to Greenland’s 
efforts to reduce dependency on Denmark by finding markets for Greenlandic 
products in Japan, NAFTA, and other European countries. However, she also notes 
that:
Import appears to be fixed in terms of post-colonial relations.
Traditions and monopolies have hindered all forms of 
flexibility. It seems unlikely that KNI Pisifik Ltd. can expand 
its purchasing from Japan, NAFTA and other EU countries.
Many barriers block any diversification in this direction....
KNI Pisifik Ltd. has a commitment to Greenlandic 
suppliers/producers and to the tastes of Greenlandic 
customers. To some extent it can affect the purchasing 
patterns so that they resemble those of Danish customers 
... but it cannot single-handedly unravel the post-colonial 
system of trade routes and the unitary system. KNI Pisifik 
Ltd. must make import purchases which have a hope of 
arriving. The present set up allows almost exclusively for 
an acceptable level of frequency and volume from Denmark
67 Lise Lyck, 1999, p. 66.
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• Aftalone. Because of these factors, its hands are tied.
While Greenland has numerous economic problems to overcome, its 
constitutional arrangements and relationship with Denmark did provide it with one 
significant advantage: a significant voice in international relations and a large degree 
of independence in how it relates to the international community. As noted earlier in 
this chapter, Greenland was able to remove itself from the European Union even 
though Denmark remained a member. According to Richard Caulfield:
Greenlanders’ resistance to membership was clear from 
the 1972 referendum; they clearly feared that Brussels 
would dictate fisheries policy. The issue of the country’s 
continuing membership came to a head in a 1982 election, 
which proved to be a major test of Home Rule. Voters 
decided overwhelmingly to withdraw from the EC. Despite 
this decision, Greenland was able to retain favorable trading 
status, which brings lucrative multiyear fisheries agreements 
and free access to European markets.69
Greenlanders were also concerned about their right to continue whaling in 
1982. Denmark was a member of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and, 
as a consequence, Greenland was bound by IWC rules. As Caulfield relates:
Though Greenlanders’ primary concern in the [1982] 
referendum was control over fisheries, they also feared
58 Lise Lyck, 1999, pp. 66-67.
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outside control over marine mammal hunting. In 
previous years proposals had surfaced suggesting that 
EC members speak with one voice in the IWC. Re­
membering well the support given in the 1970s to anti­
sealing campaigns, by some EC nations, Greenlanders 
feared being overwhelmed politically on an issue vital 
to their economy. As a result, they began to work more 
closely with Alaskan and Canadian Inuit on whaling issues.70
The Home Rule government was compelled to adopt an increasingly 
restrictive and stringent management regime for whaling, and to subsidize the 
modernization of the Greenlandic whaling fleet in order to comply with the IWC 
requirements. This increasingly difficult management regime generated a variety of 
conflicts within Greenlandic society, so that, “The Home Rule faces disgruntled 
hunters who resent reduced quotas and increased regulation. It also continues to 
confront ideological challenges to whaling both within the Danish realm and within 
the IWC.”71 
Summary
Hechter’s model of internal colonialism predicts that the integration of two 
cultures results in a cultural division of labor, with a superordinate group or culture 
dominating the subordinate culture, and the evolution of an economic system that 
exploits the subordinate group.
69 Richard Caulfield, 1997, p. 41.
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This examination of Greenland’s political and economic history reveals that 
national policies of internal colonialism are an integral part of the Greenlandic 
experience. Denmark sought to dominate Greenland in order to “civilize” the 
indigenous population and to exploit the resources of the island. However, Danish 
policies reflected a much greater degree o f concern for the social and economic well­
being of the indigenous population than was reflected in the North American policies 
towards indigenous peoples, even though the underlying assumption was that 
Greenlanders were an inferior people in need of civilizing. Denmark’s benign policies 
likely reflect the fact that Greenlanders embraced Lutheran teachings and the material 
culture offered by the Europeans, did not resist colonization, and were a valued 
component in providing the furs and blubber sought by the European traders. As in 
North America, the indigenous population became dependent on manufactured 
products that could not be developed locally -  sugar, firearms, steel knives, tea, and 
so on.
The Danish approach is best contrasted with the American approach.
Denmark had no wars with the Inuit o f Greenland. Indeed, they were introducing 
smallpox vaccinations into Greenland around the same time that American soldiers 
were using the disease in isolated cases in a form of germ warfare against North 
American Indians. And since 1838, when the Greenland Health Service was created,72 
the Danes were more involved in delivering active health care programs to the Inuit, 
whereas many North American Natives were left to fend for themselves.
70 Richard Caulfield, 1997, p. 126.
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The Danish government had no policy or practice of entering into treaties with 
aboriginal peoples as the British did since the 1700s. Furthermore, the Inuit in 
Greenland were open to the teachings of Christianity, rather than resistant. And they 
did not pose a large military threat to the colonizers or to colonization. Consequently, 
there was no need for a treaty with the Greenlanders, and this reflects more the 
approach taken toward northern indigenous peoples in Canada and Alaska by their 
respective federal governments.
Non- indigenous Alaskans and Yukoners have taken issue with indigenous 
subsistence harvest and access rights, and this issue has been a thorny one in the 
twentieth century. It has been largely resolved through land claim settlements in the 
Yukon, but remains a contentious issue in Alaska. However, it has not been much of 
an issue in Greenland, where the island’s remoteness and small non-indigenous 
population have kept conflicts to a minimum. Greenland’s major challenge, on the 
other hand, comes from animal rights and anti-whaling movements that have had 
significant impacts on the subsistence economy of northern aboriginal peoples 
throughout the circumpolar North.
A cultural division of labor was established early in Greenland’s history and 
persists today. Greenlanders were paid less than Danish workers and they received 
only rudimentary education until the 1950s, when some Greenlanders began attending
304
71 Richard Caulfield, 1997, p. 146.
72 Michael Banks, Greenland, Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975, p. 116.
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university in Denmark. Greenlanders did not have the option of attending university 
in Greenland until 1984, when the Inuit Institute became the Greenland University.73
This dissertation suggests that policies of internal colonialism have been 
implemented by Denmark in Greenland, and that they have had some of the same 
consequences as the policies o f internal colonialism implemented in Alaska and the 
Yukon. Policies of internal colonialism are one way of explaining why these 
indigenous populations suffer socio-economic problems akin to those experienced by 
populations in developing countries. (Other explanations are not excluded). These 
conditions include: poor and crowded housing conditions; high rates of alcoholism, 
unemployment, and suicide; health problems, such as higher rates o f infant mortality, 
diabetes, and other forms of illness than are found in non-Native populations; lower 
wages and incomes per capita, than non-Natives; high drop-out rates in high school; 
and so on.
These conditions are exacerbated by an under developed economy that relies 
on the extraction of raw materials and which requires extensive transfers from 
Denmark to support the standard of living that exists on the island. Greenland 
continues to rely upon Denmark for about half of its annual budget, and thus is less 
dependent than the Yukon is on transfer payments, but certainly more so than 
Alaska.74
73 Statistics Greenland, Greenland Kalaallit Nunaat, Nuuk: Kalaallit Nunaanni 
Naatsorsueqqisaartarfik, 1997, p. 97.
74 Arctic Human Development Report, Akureyri: Stefansson Arctic Institute, 2004, p. 231.
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In contrast to Alaska and the Yukon, Greenland’s social order did not evolve 
through a large settler community that grew to dominate the population of the island. 
Rather, indigenous Greenlanders remained the majority population, even after World 
War II. Furthermore, the predominance of state run corporate structures on the island 
meant that there were few trans-national corporate interests to oppose Home Rule. 
Consequently, when indigenous Greenlanders began demanding greater political 
autonomy, there were few interests to oppose this movement. Greenland society was 
not divided over the issue of Home Rule.
While a long history of internal colonialism, and its consequences, are evident 
in Greenland today, it is important to note that Danish governments should also be 
credited with a good record, in recent decades, of consultation with Greenlanders.
Both the G50 and G60 processes were developed in close consultation with 
Greenlanders, as was the process leading to Home Rule. Furthermore, the 
consultation requirements written into the Home Rule Act reflect the importance 
Danish governments attach to the need to consult Greenlanders on important issues 
that affect them. As noted in Chapter 1, unilateral decision making is fundamental to 
internal colonialism, so measures to guarantee consultation are fundamental to 
reversing policies of internal colonialism.
Secondly, the Danish government acted swiftly to implement Home Rule 
without preconditions for fiscal viability. While the Danish government retained a 
role in managing the resources of Greenland, it did not insist that Greenland had to be
306
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self-supporting economically in order to advance constitutionally. Denmark has 
extensively subsidized, and continues to subsidize, the social welfare programs and 
government of Greenland. Today, a small but growing number of Greenlanders favor 
the idea of complete independence from Denmark. However, most Greenlanders 
recognize that independence without a more substantial and diversified economy 
would likely cause a significant and politically unacceptable decline in the quality of 
life.75
A third significant feature of Danish-Greenlandic relations is the considerable 
influence that the Greenlandic government has in foreign relations. Given 
Greenland’s subordinate constitutional status, its relative independence in foreign 
affairs appears unprecedented in the circumpolar North. Greenland was able to 
withdraw from the European Community and to negotiate a special fishing agreement 
with the EC nations. These arrangements have benefited the Greenland economy 
enormously. The Greenlandic experience appears to offer a useful argument that 
northern subnational jurisdictions can be given greater flexibility to pursue 
international agreements that benefit them economically without threatening the 
integrity of national governments.
Greenland’s constitutional advancement was, in some respects, similar to 
Alaska’s. In the post-World War II anti-colonial era, the Danish government acceded 
to demands for constitutional change. However, the change was effected much more
307
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quickly than anywhere else in the circumpolar North, reflecting a positive disposition 
towards its northern periphery and the needs of its people.
Many Greenlanders still want unilateral control of Greenland’s resources and 
to reduce Greenland’s dependence on Danish grants. These will likely be difficult, 
although not impossible, goals to achieve. Greenland still has opportunities to 
diversify its economy and its markets. And Greenland’s strategic location may 
provide opportunities for providing support to increased shipping in the Arctic Ocean 
if  global warming continues to reduce sea ice conditions.
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
Summary: Correlates of Internal Colonialism
Michael Hechter’s elaboration of the theory of internal colonialism provides an 
insightful tool for understanding conflict in circumpolar northern jurisdictions today. This 
dissertation utilizes the theory for analyzing the evolution of relations amongst aboriginal 
peoples, settlers and “Outside” interests in Alaska, the Yukon, and Greenland.
The theory predicts that, as two societies merge, a cultural division of labor will 
be established in which the dominant society will subject the subordinate one to 
discriminatory policies, and relegate members of the subordinate society to less valued 
roles in the overall social system. Members of the subordinate society will likely 
experience lower self-esteem, greater stress, higher levels of unemployment, higher rates 
of suicide and alcoholism, and other social-psychological problems as they experience 
policies of sustained systemic discrimination.1 Where the subordinate society is also 
readily identifiable due to racial features, the effects of the policies will be even more 
difficult to overcome. Such a system can result in inter-racial conflict, and, as Amy Chua 
points out, in societies where majority populations are repressed by a racially different 
minority, the conflict can escalate to violent behaviors of genocidal proportions.
Policies of internal colonialism can also be economic in nature and directed at
1 There will be exceptions to this proposition. For example, it does not apply very well to the Jewish or 
Chinese diaspora, where resilient communities and individuals thrived while under extraordinary pressures 
from, first, colonial, and then nationalistic, politically dominant forces. Gerald McBeath,pers. comm.,
2005.
2 A m y  Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic H atred and Global 
Instability, New York: Doubleday, 2003.
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discrete regions within a country. Where this occurs, we may refer to the problem as one 
of regional economic disparities. In this scenario, a developed region uses its periphery as 
a source of raw materials and a market for centrally-produced manufactured products. 
Investment in the peripheral region will occur when a resource is discovered there that is 
valued by the market, and investment will be withdrawn when the desired resource is 
exhausted or demand for it ceases. Consequently, the peripheral region is subjected to 
exploitation and development booms and busts.
This dissertation utilized case studies to examine the relationships of citizens of 
three circumpolar subnational jurisdictions: Alaska, Yukon Territory, and Greenland. It 
presents evidence that the national governments of the United States, Canada and 
Denmark have used policies of internal colonialism toward the indigenous populations of 
these jurisdictions, and that the consequences of these policies appear to have manifested 
themselves in various forms of conflict.
The dissertation argues that, as northern North America and Greenland were 
settled, the indigenous peoples were viewed as inferior peoples in need of “civilizing.” At 
the urging of white evangelists, educators and government officials, efforts were made to 
inculcate the indigenous peoples with Christian values and beliefs. The “civilizing” of 
indigenous peoples was sanctioned by national governments and became the official 
policy of those governments. Policies toward the aboriginal peoples varied greatly from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and over time, but the impact of the policies appear to have 
had the same ultimate impact on the lives of the Natives: poverty, high levels of suicide, 
illness, and premature death.
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In each jurisdiction exploitation was spurred by the search for furs, minerals and 
other resources of value to Europeans. The aboriginal peoples were initially valued for 
their skills as hunters, trappers, guides and packers. Their trapping skills were utilized to 
supply fur traders and trading companies with valued trade goods that sold for high prices 
in Europe. Aboriginal people were also used as cheap labor in more industrial activities 
like mining, but, over time, many were displaced from the work force by an influx of 
white settlers and laborers (a cultural division of labor).3
Most explorers, missionaries, fur traders, and other representatives of the 
corporate enterprises from the “center” arrived in the northern regions with no intention 
of staying. However, over time, some began to settle in these regions with the intention of 
making it their home. This represented a significant shift in relationships: a settler 
population with interests in developing the North, rather than exploiting it, meant that 
conflicts with national and international interests would inevitably result. It also meant 
that the settler population had some interests that coincided with those of the indigenous 
peoples. Inter-marriage became more common, and aboriginal peoples became dependent 
on manufactured products in much the same way that non-aboriginals were.
The conflict between settler, aboriginal and non-resident interests became 
apparent during the gold rush period in the Yukon and Alaska, and during other “boom”
Robert McPherson provides examples o f  how Inuit in the eastern Canadian Arctic were underpaid 
compared to the non-Inuit workers in the 1950s, prompting social scientists to recommend, “scrutiny ... to 
ensure fairer wage levels and equitable benefit deductions.” However, he also points out the exceptional 
situation o f the Nanisivik mine in the 1970s, where living conditions, on the job training, and good wages 
provided long term employment for some Inuit and few social problems. Furthermore, “fur harvesting ... 
increased, in part because wages could be used to purchase better hunting equipment and supplies.” Robert 
McPherson, New Owners in Their Own Land: Minerals and Inuit Land Claims, Calgary: University o f  
Calgary Press, 2003, pp. 9, 11, 13, 107- 113.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
312
times in the North. As wealthy corporate interests began buying up valuable gold 
properties, local miners protested. Indigenous peoples recognized that powerful non­
resident interests could over ride their rights to land and resources such as salmon and 
caribou, and began asking that their interests be protected by federal agencies. The 
federal government became a crucial actor in allocating rights in the North, and thus 
became the focal point of lobbying by settler, aboriginal and “Outside” interests. The 
settlers soon recognized that the laws or constitutions creating the jurisdictions they 
inhabited could provide them with self-governing powers that could be used to control 
the “Outside” interests, and lobbying soon commenced to have those laws amended to 
grant them self-government.
The movements to promote self-government in Alaska, Yukon and Greenland 
took time to consolidate, and during that time divisions arose amongst those who 
advocated self-government and those who wanted the status quo to continue. As Gurston 
Dacks, Kenneth Coates, and Oran Young have noted, a colonial culture is a divided 
culture, filled with conflicts amongst competing interests, and competing with “Outside” 
forces for control of the land and resources.4
National authorities were often slow to respond to proposals for change, and 
changes came incrementally. Alaskans lobbied on and off for some 43 years before 
statehood was achieved. In the Yukon, the struggle has lasted for over 100 years, and 
provincial status remains elusive. However, in Greenland’s case, Danish authorities
4 Gurston Dacks, A Choice o f  Futures: Politics in the Canadian North, Toronto: Methuen, 1981, pp. 88-92, 
94-98; Kenneth Coates, “The Discovery o f the North: Towards a Conceptual Framework for the Study o f  
Northern/Remote Regions,” The Northern Review, No. 12/13, 1994; Oran Young, Arctic Politics: Conflict 
and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North, London: University Press o f  New England, 1992.
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reacted quickly to appease the demands for self-government once they were articulated, 
and Home Rule was achieved in a few short years.
National policies of internal colonialism began to be reversed in the 1950s and 
1960s as the western world reacted against colonialism in the developing world and the 
civil rights movement spread in North America. Resistance to national policies and 
advocacy for change resulted in renewed demands for statehood, provincial status and 
devolution, the abandonment of termination policies, legal challenges and lawsuits that 
forced governments to reconsider their approaches to aboriginal land rights. As a 
consequence, Alaskan statehood was achieved in 1959, Alaska land claims were settled 
in 1971, Greenland Home Rule was granted in 1979, and devolution of federal programs 
and land claim settlements progressed in the Yukon from the 1980s to today. These 
accomplishments have substantially reduced federal influence in local decision-making in 
the North, although large federal transfer payments continue to ensure that the federal 
voice is still a loud one. In some cases, such as northern Alaska, “The victory o f the 
North Slope Borough in its legal battle to win the authority to levy property taxes on the 
oil development infrastructure at Prudhoe Bay institutes an exceptional situation in the 
Arctic.”5 North Slope Borough residents have reaped huge profits from their taxing 
authority, making them the wealthiest aboriginal community in the circumpolar North.
Marxist theorists have generally asserted that national governments will pander to 
corporate interests at the expense of all others. If this were the case, one would presume 
that corporations would have unrestrained access to northern resources and substantial
5 Arctic Human Development Report, Akureyri: Stefanson Arctic Institute, 2004, p. 232. .
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subsidies to assist them in their endeavors. This was largely the case in the nineteenth 
century. However, today corporations contend with significant and complex 
environmental regulations and increasingly must negotiate with aboriginal organizations 
and governments because national governments have recognized aboriginal rights to land 
and resources, and, in many areas, have transferred large blocks of land over to regional 
governments and to aboriginal ownership. Furthermore, national governments have paid, 
or are paying, large sums of money to northern First Nations and governments to 
establish corporate structures that may compete with, or partner with, national and multi­
national corporations on northern development projects, such as pipelines. These factors 
suggest that national governments are somewhat independent from national and multi­
national corporate interests and may act in ways that can hinder those interests in the 
northern periphery.
If we accept this view of the role of national governments, it places those 
governments at the epicenter of conflicting demands from northern regional 
governments, northern First Nations, and corporations with interests in the North. In the 
past, the national governments of Canada and the United Sates did not have to pay much 
attention to northern aboriginal interests. Poverty stricken, disorganized and 
disenfranchised, they posed no threat to the established order. Demands for land claim 
settlements were ignored, social and educational programs were minimal, and 
discrimination was acceptable.
The interests of settler populations in the North fared little better. Their demands 
for self-government were largely ignored until after World War II, when the strategic
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
significance of the North became apparent, and the Arctic became an extensively 
militarized region. National governments then began investing in infrastructure for 
northern defense and resource development that attracted more people to the region, 
which in turn generated a louder voice in national politics.
Indigenous peoples were slower to mobilize and to learn the tactics of political 
lobbying, but World War II ended the isolation of many indigenous peoples in the 
circumpolar North, and by the 1940s and 1950s these peoples were becoming 
increasingly concerned about their land and harvesting rights as a result of the huge 
influx of non-Natives. The civil rights movement provided impetus to their demands, and 
by the 1960s their land claims were being effectively advocated. The settlement of 
Alaska’s land claim spurred Yukon Indians to lobby more effectively for their claims and 
by the 1970s Yukon and Canadian First Nations were actively seeking to have their 
aboriginal rights recognized in the constitution of Canada.
Greenlanders’ experience was similar, although Danish national policies were 
different from those administered in North America. Danish officials did not contest 
Inuit ownership of land and did not treat land in Greenland as a commodity to be bought 
and sold to settlers. Government owned corporate structures displaced capitalist 
enterprises as the catalyst for development in the evolution of Greenland. Greenland was 
first exploited for its fur resources, but colonization was justified on the basis of bringing 
civilization and Christianity to the Inuit. Non-Inuit ran the colony with increasing input 
from Inuit Greenlanders, but indigenous Greenlanders were restricted occupationally to 
being hunters, trappers, and assistants to the clergy. A cultural division of labor was
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established early in Greenland’s history, so that Danish labor was more highly valued and 
more highly paid than Inuit labor.
As in northern North America, Greenlanders’ isolation ended with World War II, 
and Danish policy toward Inuit Greenlanders also changed dramatically. After the war, 
the conditions and living standards of colonized peoples, including Greenlanders, came 
under international scrutiny. The Danish government made concerted efforts to improve 
living standards, to modernize the economy, and to improve educational opportunities in 
Greenland. The influx of Danish workers and new policies to integrate Greenland into the 
Danish political and economic framework brought the two cultures into closer proximity. 
Danish policies began to affect Inuit Greenlanders negatively. Greenlanders disliked the 
closure of their small communities and forced centralization; they opposed joining the 
European Union; and so on. And, as in other parts of the circumpolar North, their 
response was to seek empowerment through the devolution of state power by legislative 
change.
Self-government (Home Rule) was more quickly achieved in Greenland, largely 
because there were few counter-forces against the movement.. The settler community in 
Greenland was small and disorganized, and there were few “Outside” economic 
enterprises (corporate interests) to oppose the movement. Greenland’s economy was 
monopolized by government spending and government-controlled corporate structures, 
rather than by private sector interests.
This recapitulation of the history of social forces in Alaska, Yukon and Greenland 
emphasizes the importance of understanding the relationships amongst the three major
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
segments in northern societies: the indigenous population, the settler community, and the 
“Outside,” interests. It also emphasizes the important role the national government plays 
in the North. Federal policies can play an important role in mediating the conflict in 
interests amongst the three groups, or exacerbating conflict if  its policies favor one group 
over another.
In Alaska, federal economic policies appeared to favor “Outside” interests for 
many years: fishing and canning industry interests clearly controlled federal fisheries 
policy to the detriment of aboriginal people and settlers alike; large mining interests 
dominated the gold fields and coal-mining in the territory; and so on. Settlers and 
aboriginal people struggled to acquire control o f state land and resources, and the right to 
control “Outside” interests for decades.
In Alaska, the Yukon, and Greenland, aboriginal policy was federal policy. The 
settler communities in each jurisdiction often sought to influence federal policy toward 
First Nations in ways that the aboriginal people themselves often found offensive.
Settlers in Alaska and the Yukon did not generally want to recognize aboriginal claims 
to the land and often resented subsistence harvest rights.
Aboriginal labor was welcomed when it was cheap, but was quickly displaced 
when non-aboriginal labor was available. Aboriginal efforts to negotiate fair wages for 
their work as guides and packers were resented. And aboriginal people were generally 
treated as lower class citizens and excluded from many social activities. Representatives 
of the various churches in the North often spoke out for better treatment o f the aboriginal 
peoples, but they were also the most active agents of cultural change, and their mission
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schools later became the most notorious symbols of cultural oppression.
Federal policies differed amongst the three jurisdictions: being moderately 
interventionist in Alaska; “laissez-faire,” in the Yukon; and dominating in Greenland. In 
all three jurisdictions, national aboriginal policy had the same ultimate goal until recent 
times: assimilation. “Outside” organizations in the form of churches were the primary 
agents of the federal policy of civilization. However, Indian agents, police officers, and 
other national government officials also had important roles to play.
National policies of “civilization” had mixed results. Many aboriginal people did 
not assimilate and vanish into a melting pot. However, many also acquired skills that 
enabled them to function well in modem industrial economies. Today, Inuit control the 
government of Greenland, and many aboriginal people hold positions of power and 
influence in northern societies, including important positions in territorial, state and 
municipal governments. But many also resented and resisted efforts to reduce or 
eliminate their rights to land and resources, to eliminate their language and culture, and to 
remove or restrict their rights to harvest animals on the land and in the sea.
Many aboriginal people were also confounded by the experience o f rising 
expectations and low achievement as a consequence of attitudes of racism and inferior 
educational opportunities. Educators in northern Canada and Alaska continue to straggle 
with the issues of culturally appropriate curriculum, high drop out rates, and appropriate 
educational standards. In Alaska, the well-intentioned federal “No Child Left Behind” 
policy has created issues for rural schools that may well result in those schools closing 
and providing rural students, the large majority of whom are Native, with fewer
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educational opportunities.6 Furthermore, “Alaska has a statewide educational assessment 
system, including annual testing on Benchmark examinations and a High School
n
Graduation Qualifying Examination, which lowers Native graduation rates.”
Lacking adequate education, many aboriginal people in Alaska, Yukon and 
Greenland continue to face high rates of unemployment. The “boom and bust” economies 
of the circumpolar North exacerbate the problem of Native unemployment. Many remain 
in their northern communities even when there is no employment there, while non-
o
Natives are more likely to travel to regions where employment is more available. While 
the subsistence economy assists aboriginal people to remain on the land, it usually does 
not provide the economic resources for retraining or upgrading required to take advantage 
of new opportunities in a changing economic environment.
Federal policies tended to alienate both aboriginal and settler populations in 
Alaska, the Yukon and Greenland, in large measure because they often sided with 
powerful “Outside” interests, such as the fishing and canning industries based in Seattle 
and California. Efforts to achieve constitutional change or recognition of rights were 
frequently resisted by national politicians or bureaucrats. And once the legitimacy of 
settler or aboriginal arguments was accepted, they often created conflicts between 
aboriginal peoples and settlers. In Alaska, efforts by the settler community to gain land 
for the state government and to build the pipeline were stymied for years by the legal 
claims of Alaska Natives to the land. And in the area of subsistence harvest rights, many
6 Fairbanks D aily News-Miner, August 22, 2003.
7 Gerald McBeath,pers. comm., 2005.
8 Michael Whittington, The North, Ottawa: Ministry o f  Supply and Services Canada, 1985, pp. 26-32.
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people view aboriginal subsistence rights as anathema to individual hunting rights.
It should also be noted that land claims were not a significant issue at the time 
Alaska sought statehood, and Natives did not argue that their land claims needed to be 
settled before statehood was achieved (although “Outside” interests attempted to make 
this issue at hearings into statehood). Consequently, the conflict between aboriginal 
interests in land and settler interests in land did not arise until after the constitutional 
status of Alaska was resolved.
In the Yukon, the advocates of provincial status and advocates for Indian land 
claims advanced their arguments to federal officials at almost the same time, and Yukon 
Indians argued strenuously that their claims had to be addressed first. Federal officials 
took neither claim seriously because federal policy was still focused on the elimination of 
aboriginal rights, and addressing the separatist challenge in Quebec. In the 1970s, the 
federal government was forced to change its policy on aboriginal claims because o f the 
Calder decision in the Supreme Court of Canada. Thereafter, disputes amongst the three 
parties over process and priorities undermined constructive negotiations until the Yukon 
government recognized the necessity of settling land claims as the highest priority. This 
recognition eventually led to an informal quid pro quo in negotiations that allowed 
devolution (of federal programs) negotiations to proceed, culminating in limited 
constitutional development for the Yukon government in 2002-03.
In Greenland, land rights were not an issue because Inuit Greenlanders always 
formed the large majority of the population and the settler community was miniscule -  
most non-Inuit were transients who never intended to settle in Greenland. And few
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exploitable resources, such as oil and gas, have been found to attract multi-national 
corporate interests.
Conclusions
As noted at the beginning of this dissertation, political scientists and historians 
have commented that northern populations are embroiled in numerous forms of conflict, 
and Gurston Dacks observed that, “Nowhere do the conflicts within northern society and 
between North and South make themselves more acutely felt than in the issue of native 
claims.”9 Charles Wilkinson then pointed out that Native land claims, or treaty 
negotiations, “are parallel in concept to negotiations with representatives of prospective 
states over statehood.”1 °And Oran R. Young commented that, “the recent experience of 
the Arctic offers a variety of fascinating cases worthy of close examination by those 
interested in the links between the exercise of political authority and the availability of 
secure sources of public funding.”11 This dissertation provides a comparative case study 
of the struggle for constitutional change in the circumpolar North, focusing on the efforts 
of aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples to achieve self-determination in Alaska, the 
Yukon, and Greenland. A key element in these struggles has been the policies o f national 
governments towards their northern populations, and their willingness to engage in 
negotiations to permit constitutional change.
A variety of books and theses have now been written about aboriginal land claims 
in the North, and the struggle for Alaska statehood has been well documented by Alaska
9 Gurston Dacks, 1981, p. 50.
10 Charles Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, p. 
102 .
11 Oran Young, 1992, p. 20.
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historians. A few books and papers have compared aboriginal policy in Canada and the 
United States, and Ole Marquardt has compared Danish policy toward Greenlanders with 
the United States’ Indian policy.12 Unfortunately, few authors have addressed 
comparisons o f policies by national government towards their northern peripheries. Yet it 
seems obvious that national policies are critical components of northern development, 
and their application has had significant impacts, not only on the pace of northern 
development, but also on how the North has developed, and the social relationships 
within the North.
This dissertation fills a gap in the literature on the North by providing a 
comprehensive comparative analysis of the evolution o f three northern jurisdictions -  
from colonial status, through territorial status, to statehood and home rule. The 
dissertation also provides social scientists with new insight into the role that policies of 
internal colonialism have played in the North’s evolution, and how such policies have 
created or exacerbated social tensions within the North.
The dissertation applies the globally-oriented dependency theory to a regional 
context, in which I have tested both the advantages and disadvantages o f the theory. It 
suggests that dependency may not be a permanent condition, and that social revolution is 
not the only cure. The dependency relationship may be reversible, or at least ameliorated, 
by independent states displaying characteristics o f “embedded autonomy” and acting to 
advance the interests of their peripheries. The dissertation also provides evidence that 
northern economic and constitutional development can be fostered through vigorous
12 Ole Marquardt, 2000, pp. 68-79.
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national support -  either direct economic investment, as happened in Alaska, or through 
supportive “greenhouse” type policies, as described by Peter Evans, that foster 
partnerships with multi-national corporations on terms favorable to the developing 
region.13
Understanding national government policy processes, the history of national 
policies, and the impact of national policies of internal colonialism are crucial elements to 
understanding and resolving many northern conflicts. Alaskans, northern Canadians, and 
Greenlanders had little involvement or input into national policy development, even when 
the policy directly affected northern populations, until they achieved statehood, Home 
Rule, and devolution, respectively. Many northerners were disempowered by 
discriminatory policies, such as Canada’s disenfranchisement of Indian voters, Alaska 
and Yukon’s subordinate constitutional status, lack of representation in national forums, 
and so on.
Given this lack of power and influence, federal or national agencies, national and 
international corporations, national and international churches, and special interest non­
governmental organizations frequently held more sway over national northern policies 
than local indigenous organizations or territorial legislatures.14
National policies often resulted in divisions and conflicts within northern 
communities. Lack of consultation ensured that there was little opportunity for aboriginal 
and non-aboriginal peoples to discuss the potential impacts of policy initiatives on their
13 Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995.
14 Gurston Dacks, 1981.
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communities. Often they could only react to, and protest, decisions that had already been 
made and were difficult to reverse. Many communities were divided on racial lines, often 
because national policy, as interpreted by local Indian agents or the clergy, determined 
that it was best to keep aboriginal people segregated. The poorer living conditions and 
social problems found in many aboriginal communities reinforced negative stereotypes of 
aboriginal people and hampered communication between the aboriginal and settler 
communities.
In Alaska, federal policies on subsistence access have generated protests from 
Natives and non-Natives, and brought national policies into conflict with the state 
constitution. Today, Natives prefer the provisions in ANILCA to state proffered 
solutions, but this has not satisfied many non-Natives. The stalemate continues.
National policies, processes and decisions have also created conflicts within and 
among aboriginal communities. In the Yukon, decisions to amalgamate some bands in 
and near Whitehorse without consulting them, and without their consent, created tensions 
and problems that are only now being tackled. In Alaska, tensions between North Slope 
Natives and other Native communities were generated during negotiations over 
ANCSA,15 and other Native communities are divided on the issue of tribal sovereignty.
More recently, aboriginal people in Alaska became divided over the issue of 
opening the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge to oil exploration and drilling, with 
Gwich’in peoples and North Slope Natives taking opposing views on federal policy. 
Furthermore, as a result of ANCSA, Alaska Natives became embroiled in a variety of
15 Donald C. Mitchell, Take My Land, Take M y Life: The Story o f  Congress’s Historic Settlement o f  Alaska 
Native Land Claims, 1960-1971, Fairbanks: University o f  Alaska Press, 2001, pp. 346-348, 359,483-486.
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issues and disputes that were non-existent in the past: the gulf between wealthy and 
poorer Natives widened, corporations competed with one another for business, and law 
suits proliferated.
While the legacy of internal colonialism has been social conflict and dysfunction 
in the North, it has also generated creative news ways of addressing conflict as well as 
innovative solutions. The land claim agreements achieved in Alaska and the Yukon, and 
the creation of the Home Rule regime in Greenland, were innovative approaches that 
pioneered new ways of dealing with land claims and demands for aboriginal self­
government.
The power of cooperation between and among social forces, particularly between 
settler and aboriginal communities, is apparent. It is important, therefore, for political and 
social scientists to carefully assess how social forces align themselves on issues that 
generate conflict in the North. Where conflicts appear intractable, the interests of each 
party to the conflict need to be assessed to determine where common interests lie. When 
coalitions can be built on the basis of achieving common goals, difficult problems can be 
overcome. For example, once it became apparent to state officials and oil companies that 
a rapid settlement o f land claims was in everyone’s interest, the provisions of ANCSA 
were quickly agreed upon. And federal officials were only too happy to eliminate the 
vexing problem of Alaska land claims quickly when they were able to find ready 
compromises.
In the Yukon, a decade of fruitless land claims negotiations quickly began to gel 
into agreements in principle when a cooperative conflict resolution approach was injected
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into the process, and the mantle of secrecy gave way to public briefings on the claims 
process.
In Greenland, there was little opposition to the demands of indigenous 
Greenlanders for Home Rule, so it was relatively easy for national leaders to acquiesce to 
Greenlanders’ demands. Social cohesion on the issue of Home Rule was an important 
factor in achieving their goal. Such social solidarity is rare in most other circumpolar 
subnational jurisdictions.
Seeking Empowerment Through Constitutional Change
As noted above, northern peoples have responded to their colonial or territorial 
status by demanding changes that would grant them greater powers of self-government 
and greater control over their land and resources. National government responses to these 
demands have been mixed: Alaska and Greenland were able to achieve constitutional 
reforms that granted statehood and home rule. Alaska Natives, a minority within Alaska, 
demanded that their claims to land in Alaska be recognized, and Congress eventually 
agreed to pass legislation to recognize those rights when pressures to develop Alaska’s 
oil resources mounted. Negotiations subsequently focused on what the legislation would 
grant Alaska’s aboriginal peoples in terms of land rights, monetary compensation, 
corporate structures, and so on.
In the Yukon Territory, demands for constitutional change and land claim 
settlements were influenced by events in Alaska, but national governments were slower 
to respond. There were no resource “booms” to spur the pace of negotiations. National 
governments inflicted constitutional setbacks on the territory, and only gradually
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devolved federal powers to territorial control over decades o f negotiations. Yukon’s 
Indians were also engaged in decades-long negotiations before their claims reached 
resolution, and some settlements are still pending in 2005.
What factors have expedited constitutional change and land claims settlements in 
Alaska and Greenland? It appears that two inter-related forces have served to expedite 
constitutional change: sustained national government interest in their North, and united 
social demands for change within the northern region.
In the case o f Alaska, national government interest in Alaska was sustained by the 
Cold War. The federal government invested heavily in military infrastructure in Alaska in 
the 1950s. Federal investments in Alaska spurred a large population increase and a 
building boom in the state, enhancing interest by Alaskans in constitutional change 
(statehood). With economic development came renewed faith that Alaska could sustain 
itself economically. Alaskans’ dissatisfaction with their constitutional arrangements 
increased.
The achievement of statehood resulted in the Alaska government commencing the 
process of making state land selections. These selections, combined with attempts to 
establish a pipeline route, compelled Alaska Natives to launch legal action to defend their 
land rights, forcing the issue of land claims in the state, and compelling the federal 
government to take action.
In Greenland, Danish interest and investment in the island over three decades 
alienated Greenlanders by increasing the population of non-Inuit and imposing policies 
that Greenlanders did not approve of. A cultural revival movement and demands for
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greater autonomy for Greenland ensued.
Federal government interest in the Yukon since World War II was more sporadic. 
The federal government had no plan for northern development until Prime Minister 
Diefenbaker proposed the “roads to resources” program. The people and government of 
the Yukon began demanding constitutional change in the 1960s, but federal interest in the 
North was not consistent. The federal government only paid attention to its northern 
territories when Canada’s sovereignty was threatened by American actions or when 
northern resources were in high demand.
Lessons from Alaska
Alaska provides a model of constitutional and economic achievement that remains 
unparalleled in the circumpolar North. For example, the Arctic Human Development 
Report notes the, “ease with which it is possible to overlook Arctic issues in the national 
capitals of the Arctic states. [But] There are exceptions. The American constitution 
accords Alaska the same representation in the US Senate as it grants to California.”16 
Alaska is a wealthy and influential state with a large land and resource base, a small 
population, and few taxes. Yet, less than fifty years ago it was a relatively insignificant 
territory whose citizens could not even vote in presidential elections.
Alaska’s development was expedited by World War II, which brought 
unprecedented federal investment to the territory, which in turn supported population 
growth and private sector investment. The statehood movement was rekindled in the 
post-war years, and ended successfully in 1959 after a vigorous campaign. Statehood was
16 Arctic Human Development Report, 2004, p. 230.
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won at a time when Alaska’s economy was growing but uncertain, and statehood was
1 7achieved without any financial preconditions having to be met. Fortunately, the state 
then prospered with the discovery of oil on the North Slope and the settlement of Native 
land claims.
ANCSA was the first modem aboriginal land claim in northern North America, 
and it departed significantly from the treaties negotiated in the southern states. It provided 
Alaska’s Natives with financial resources, corporate structures, and a land and resource 
base to enable them to participate effectively in a modem economy. ANCSA improved 
the economic condition of many aboriginal Alaskans, although the benefits have not been 
equally shared throughout the state. Many rural Alaska villages still have substandard 
infrastructure and many social and economic problems. For many rural aboriginal people, 
the benefits of ANCSA have yet to be realized.
Unfortunately, while ANCSA clarified subsistence harvest rights on the surface 
estates of ANCSA corporations, ANILCA did not resolve the broader issue of 
subsistence harvest rights on public land in Alaska. Many Alaskans continue to be 
dissatisfied with the dual management system in the state.
ANCSA has both the benefit and the problem of being subject to changes by 
Congress. Unlike Canadian land claims and treaties, which are constitutionally protected, 
ANCSA can be amended by Congress, with or without the consent of the tribes of 
Alaska. This situation provides flexibility -  enabling ANCSA to change as the social and
17 However, Congress was aware o f  the Swanson oil field discovery on the Kenai Peninsula which provided 
some comfort that Alaska had resources to support statehood. Gerald McBeath, pers. comm., 2005.
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economic situation of Alaska and Alaska Natives change, but it also opens the door to the 
possibility that some future federal government might once again adopt a policy of 
termination of aboriginal rights that could negatively impact Alaska’s indigenous 
peoples.
Lessons from Greenland
The Danish government readily acceded to requests from Greenlanders for Home 
Rule. The struggle was relatively short once the interests of Greenlanders were clearly 
articulated. The absence of a large settler community meant there was little dissent over 
the legitimacy of the demands.
Denmark has not been stingy with economic support for the island, and it has 
allowed Greenland a level of independence that has enabled the Greenlandic government 
to opt out o f the European Community and negotiate its own fishing treaty with the 
European countries. This flexibility has been extremely important for the Greenland 
economy.
Thirdly, the Danish government has recognized the importance o f consultation, 
and has incorporated requirements for consultation into the Greenland constitution. 
Essentially, no law affecting Greenland can be implemented without some form of 
consultation with the government of Greenland.
Unfortunately, the Greenland economy continues to struggle. It continues to rely 
on the fishery resource as its economic mainstay, and thus its economy remains subject to 
the vagaries o f world market prices and the sustainability and location of the resource. 
Should global warming or some other factor, such as over-fishing, intervene to remove or
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deplete the fisheries, Greenland would lose its economic base, unless some other 
attractive resource is found, or the economy is diversified to reduce its dependence on 
resource extraction.
Lessons from the Yukon
The Canadian approach to settling aboriginal claims in the North has been 
protracted. It bore little fruit until the consensus approach to negotiating land claims was 
adopted in 1986. Soon after, innovative and practical land claim settlements were 
achieved with most o f the Yukon’s First Nations. These agreements could not have been 
achieved without the leadership and innovative approaches taken by the Yukon 
government’s chief negotiator, applying the principles of conflict resolution theory to 
achieve agreements. Neither were they possible without the support of federal negotiators 
who were able to coax the massive federal bureaucracy into accepting the innovative 
approaches contained in the agreements. These included strong self-government 
agreements that enabled Yukon First Nations to assert jurisdiction in areas such as 
education, taxation, justice, and social welfare, if  they so wished.
The Umbrella Final Agreement required the enactment, by the federal 
government, in consultation with the Yukon government and First Nations, o f a single 
development assessment process that would apply on federal, Yukon, and First Nation 
lands, so that there would not be a patchwork approach to environmental assessment 
processes in the Yukon.
A third innovative element was the dispute resolution process written into the 
Umbrella Final Agreement and the individual First Nation Final Agreements, which
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enables parties to a claim related dispute to seek mediated solutions rather than going to 
court. While these provisions have yet to be utilized, they remain an inexpensive 
alternative to costly court battles that have plagued other indigenous peoples in North 
America.
A fourth major innovation of the Yukon land claim settlements was the resolution 
of taxation issues relative to Yukon First Nations. Historically, non-aboriginal Yukoners 
would point to taxation benefits that Yukon First Nation people received as a 
discriminatory practice that was race-based and unfair. With the settlement of a land 
claim, First Nation citizens became subject to the payment o f income taxes, and, in 
addition, First Nation governments were empowered to levy taxes on their citizens. A 
major issue that generated inter-racial resentment was eliminated.
A major point of contention between Yukon Indians and non-Indians that 
historically proved problematic for race relations was the issue of subsistence harvest 
rights. Historically, Yukon Indians could harvest virtually any form of wildlife at any 
time of the year for subsistence purposes under federal law, while non-Indians were 
restricted to a variety of seasons, bag limits, and other restrictions. As land claims are 
settled, First Nation citizens are entitled to hunt on their own lands or the lands of another 
First Nation which grants them hunting rights. However, they will be subject to whatever 
laws the First Nation governments pass that govern hunting on First Nation lands. Indians 
can also hunt on Crown lands, but are then subject to the laws o f general application. 
These arrangements appear to satisfy most aboriginal and non-aboriginal people 
throughout the Yukon, although there have been legal actions launched recently
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contesting the application of some public laws to First Nation hunters.
Still another area of innovation found in the Yukon land claims settlements has 
been the codification of the requirement to consult First Nations on issues that affect 
them. Historically, national and territorial governments enacted laws that had significant 
impacts on Yukon First Nations without consulting them. A significant measure to 
address this patently colonial problem was the inclusion of specific requirements to 
consult Yukon First Nations on major issues that affected them. Since land claim 
agreements are incorporated into the constitution of Canada, Yukon First Nations now 
have a powerful and enforceable right to be consulted. And, while there continue to be 
complaints about how effectively government conducts consultations, the signing of 
consultation protocols by the Yukon and First Nation governments should help to address 
this issue.
While the benefits o f the land claims settlements are significant, the Yukon has 
pioneered other innovations that have fostered better inter-racial relations, such as circle 
sentencing, and protocols and agreements to foster economic development, consultation, 
and priority setting and planning, as outlined in Chapter 5.
Lessons for Canada
Canada’s history has demonstrated that national policies can play a significant 
role in regional development. The National Policy was an essential element in opening up 
and developing western Canada in the face of concerns over national sovereignty in the 
west. Canada created the Royal Northwest Mounted Police, supported the creation of a 
national railway, promoted immigration and settlement of the prairies, and developed
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policies to address the causes of rebellion by the Metis and to “civilize” the Indians.
In contrast, the Canadian North was left to corporate interests to develop, except 
when northern sovereignty was threatened by real or imagined actions of Canada’s North 
American neighbor. The consequence has been an underdeveloped Canadian North that 
relies on substantial transfer payments from the national government to support northern 
and aboriginal populations and governments.
The federal government of Canada will need to develop a visionary policy of 
northern development, similar to the old National Policy, if Canada’s North is ever to 
develop a self-sustaining economy that can contribute to, rather than be a drain upon, the 
national economy. This alone is a compelling argument for northern development. 
However, as the impacts of global warming become increasingly apparent, it would seem 
that Canada will once again be faced with a threat to its sovereignty, as the arctic ice pack 
becomes thinner and easier to penetrate by commercial shipping. If Canada is to retain 
any compelling argument for ongoing jurisdiction over the Northwest Passage, it will 
have to demonstrate that it can monitor and control traffic through the Passage. This will 
require new northern infrastructure, such as port facilities, airports, monitoring stations, 
as well as oil recovery and spill response capability, vessel inspection capability, and so 
on.
The argument for developing northern economies has never been more 
compelling, and Peter Evans has demonstrated that a combination of effective policy and 
bureaucratic capacity can provide the necessary “greenhouses” for local entrepreneurs to
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thrive in.18
Furthermore, the evolution of northern Native corporate structures and self-government 
capacity, combined with supportive territorial government policies, could provide 
additional assets to ensure the success of greenhouse enterprises. By providing northern 
entrepreneurs with sufficient leverage, they can negotiate effectively and partner with 
multi-national corporate enterprises willing to do business in northern regions. The future 
Canadian North may well provide a multitude of opportunities for partnerships with 
enterprises interested in minerals, oil and gas, shipping, and services related to the 
transportation and communication needs of large shipping operations.
The prospect of creating northern provinces was raised by Prime Minister Paul 
Martin in November 2004, and the issue has generated renewed interest in Canada. Globe 
and Mail commentator, John Ibbitson, commented that while the northern territories are 
sparsely populated and heavily dependent on the federal government, “The arguments in 
favour of maximizing territorial sovereignty ... are compelling. All three premiers 
effectively enjoy the rights and responsibilities of first ministers; it is unthinkable that 
they would not be at a first ministers’ meeting.”19 Furthermore, “Canada’s ability to 
project and protect its claims to sovereignty over the arctic would be enhanced if  the
00islands of the archipelago were provincial lands, rather than mere federal protectorates.” 
And finally:
There is the question of dependency. The peoples of the territories
18 Peter Evans, 1995.
19 John Ibbitson, Globe and Mail, Nov. 23, 2004.
20 John Ibbitson, Globe and Mail, Nov. 23, 2004.
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will lessen their dependence on southern largesse when they have 
the tools and the responsibility to manage their lives and their lands 
by themselves. Canada is arguably the world’s least imperialist power. 
Yet our territories are effectively colonies. Other colonial powers have 
granted sovereignty to seemingly improbable states -  Iceland, Belize, 
St. Kitts-Nevis -  that have survived and even prospered. Are our 
Territories to remain dependencies forever?21
21 John Ibbitson, Globe and Mail, Nov. 23, 2004.
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